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ATHENS and ATOMISM: A SOCIAL HISTORY

by

Kasper Mazurek



19

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled ATHENS and ATOMISM: A SOCIAL HISTORY submitted by Kasper Mazurek in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education in the field of The History of Education.

For John and Stella Mazurek

ABSTRACT

Ionian materialism in general, and Democritean atomic philosophy in particular, received--at best--only tentative acceptance from the Athenian city-state. It is our thesis that the Athenian rejection of the radically physicalist philosophical orientation of Democritus is in fact rooted in the Athenian social milieu.

Acceptance of atomic philosophy--and the social perspective which logically follows from it--would have necessitated an enormous change in the existent social structure of fifth century B.C. Athens. Thus the "social costs" of accepting such an orientation were simply too great.

It is therefore proposed that the historian's task in understanding the events of an era (in this case, fifth century B.C. Athens) must take him beyond mere documentation of historical events. Such events give us only the resolution of often opposing tensions that past societies were exposed to, and embodied. A truer historical perspective may be gained through an immersion into the "social consciousness" of the society which is actually in the historical drama.

The results of such an inquiry are particularly relevant for education. Educational institutions have the unique formal objective of transmitting what are perceived to be the--for want of a more suitable term--"lessons of the past". Perhaps we can broaden the scope of this objective to include not only what did happen, but also what alternatives were present and what social-historical contingencies either facilitated or hampered their adoption. We must remember that in most

societies educational institutions form a large part of the social structure, therefore they are a part of the "social-historical contingencies". Thus, if we can succeed, we shall be closer to understanding the interrelationship between "education" (both as an ideology and a formal institutional structure) and other components of social systems.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The members of my committee are those persons to whom the completion of this work owes a large debt. Dr. H. Garfinkle, Dr. D.G. Wangler, Dr. A.K. Davis and Dr. A. Mardiros have the common trait--rare in all societies, including our own--of "open-mindedness". The interdisciplinary scope of this thesis is a pale reflection of their individual pursuits of knowledge, regardless of disciplinary jurisdictions. My personal satisfaction in the completion of this task is a confirmation of the praxiology all four men adhere to: Man can, through intelligence and the initiation of action, gain control of knowledge, his individual self, and his society.

Of particular import for my personal intellectual growth and social awareness is the relationship I continue to enjoy with Dr. Garfinkle. Both what I have learned, and what he has inspired me to learn in the future, I cannot adequately pen.

And finally, I must note the influence of my good friend--and "office-mate" for this past year--Brian Titley. Although having more than enough work to keep himself fully occupied, he was always willing to hear me out when I would try to overcome an impasse by "thinking out loud". These conversations greatly helped in both keeping up my morale and enabling my work to stay on schedule.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF INTENT

Atomic philosophy reached an advanced stage of development in fifth century B.C. Greece, yet it did not become the dominant philosophy of Athens. The intellectual legacy of Athens is not Democritean physicalism.

It is the intention of this study to critically examine the historical contingencies which prevented atomic materialism from triumphing over competing schools of thought. We are thus insisting that the history of ideas demands that Athenian philosophy must be considered within dimensions of historical time, place, and circumstance.

METHOD

Our method of analysis will be "materialistic"--in the broad sense of the term. That is, we shall not concern ourselves with the intrinsic merits of the atomic philosophical system--in relation to other philosophical systems. Rather, our focus will be on the social ecology within which atomic philosophy had to compete for survival (i.e. acceptance by Athenian society).

We therefore cannot overstress that our concern is not with either a defense or a criticism of atomic philosophy as a philosophical system. Its value as a philosophy is not of concern herein. That is properly the realm of a philosophical--not a historical--discourse. Thus our pre-

liminary exposition of the metaphysics of atomic philosophy is only included for the sake of lending continuity to our exposition.

What we are concerned with is, rather, an historical exposition of the dominant ideological orientations of fifth century B.C. Athens. This shall be done through an analysis of both the chronological history of religious, political, economic, etc. trends, and a subsequent analysis of how these historical trends became embodied in a general social orientation. This is merely to say that fifth century B.C. Athens, like all societies, is a product of the evolution of historical forces.

The introduction of a new orientation (be it a philosophy, an educational ideal, an art form, etc.) necessitates that it address itself to the peculiarities of the existent social orientations. This is so simply because the existent social orientations of a society--being a product of the historical development of the society--are, to a certain degree, "rigid". "Rigidity" is herein defined merely as the existence of a substantial degree of continuity between all facets of the social system. It does not mean that the society is incapable of change, inflexible in its policies, or has ceased its historical evolution. It simply indicates the obvious: In order to maintain stability, the dominant sectors of the social system must share a common set of values to enable them to cooperate in their task of ensuring the orderly functioning of the society. Thus the educational institutions, the political institutions, the religious institutions, etc., as well as the general mores of society, cannot be in fundamental opposition to each other if the society is expected to maintain any significant degree of functional stability.

It is therefore our intent to examine the nature of the Athenian "social consciousness" both as a product of its history and the partic-

ular historical manifestation that it assumed in the fifth century B.C. Into the social orientation of that epoch we shall introduce atomic philosophy--and its accompanying social ideology.

In essence, our thesis is: Athens could not incorporate an atomic world-viewpoint because such a viewpoint was incompatible with the Athenian social milieu.

"Compatibility" shall be defined as logical consistency between the metaphysics, ethics, politics, educational implications, etc., of atomic philosophy with the existent social milieu of fifth century B.C. Athens. "Social milieu" refers to both the social base (as reflected in institutional structures) and the ideological superstructure (as found in traditions, social beliefs and practices, etc.).

Of course, any element within society is a part of the "social milieu", and one cannot investigate the society in its entirety. Therefore we shall concern ourselves with an exposition of the peculiar nature of the dominant sectors of fifth century B.C. Athens' social milieu. This will reveal the historical peculiarity of our subject, and will recognize that different sectors of the social milieu may rise to dominance in successive historical epochs.

RELEVANCE FOR TODAY

It is hoped that this inquiry will offset some of the authority of tradition in the educators' selection of what is handed down as "knowledge" from generation to generation. If we can begin to consider why, in specific instances, one worldview is accepted over another, perhaps we will be on our way toward developing rational standards by which we may choose our own direction of thought.

This reflects our belief that a society aware of the social-historical contingencies which influence it, is a society which is then better able to consciously select its desired course of historical evolution. If a society refuses to examine itself within such an historical perspective, it is much more likely to merely react to those contingencies.

Our study is an attempt to undertake one such critical examination--in one specific historical era and place--as a "case study". Hopefully lessons will evolve from this preliminary effort which will facilitate similar attempts at coming to grips with our society's present place in history.

However, this does not mean that our selection of fifth century B.C. Athens as the historical focus of our inquiry is in any way an arbitrary choice. Quite the opposite.

Since, in our experience, educators seem to see the history of the western world as "beginning" in Athens, we feel that it is the most logical place to begin our critical rethinking of the history of ideas. That such a rethinking of what happened in Athens two thousand years ago will have profound repercussions for our own way of thinking is evident merely by bringing to mind such powerful social concepts as "democracy". Concepts which every schoolchild is able to immediately associate with the place and era we shall be investigating.

Educators in particular--because they are among the major agents lending continuity to the historical evolution of ideas--must address themselves to understanding the social soil which nurtures ideas. Thus, in broadest terms, our objective is to begin to understand the relationship between ideas and society.

DELIMITATIONS OF THE INQUIRY

It is important to note that no adherence to any "model" of social change--or equilibrium--is attempted herein. Rather, the emphasis shall be on examining Athens over a specific, and narrow, space of time and attempting to reconstruct the essence of its social milieu. "Essence" shall be taken to mean that our concern is with the dominant aspects of that social milieu.

Thus the problem of the "origins" of the atomic philosophical system is not exhaustively treated within the scope of our study. Rather --beyond a cursory historical explication--both the atomic doctrine and the Athenian social milieu will be described in the form that they existed; that is, they are treated as "givens".

However, as has been stated, Athenian society cannot be properly understood unless one takes cognizance of the course of its historical evolution. Therefore more emphasis shall be placed on the historical development of Athens up to the fifth century B.C. Only then can one fully appreciate the reasons for the historical peculiarity of fifth century B.C. Athens--and her accompanying world viewpoint. (This does not mean to imply that all societies in all epochs do not have equally unique--i.e. "peculiar"--historical manifestations.) Since the Democritean atomic doctrine was introduced in Athenian society from without, we are much less concerned with the course of its historical development.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GREEKS OF ASIA MINOR

Asia Minor was settled around the end of the eleventh century B.C. by three main groups of peoples. Settlements were Aeolic, Ionic, and Doric.¹ Not only was there this plurality of settlers, there was also an eventual flourishing of several schools of philosophy.²

Our attention shall be directed toward that school of philosophy which came to be known as "atomism". We concentrate upon atomism as it is the most "materialistic" philosophy to emerge from Asia Minor, and also--at the hands of Democritus of Abdera--was subjected to the most refined and sophisticated elaboration of all the philosophies to emerge from the eastern Greeks. It was atomism which was resurrected in Athens (specifically by Epicurus) and was to become the main challenge to the thought of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Reference to the other schools of philosophy which emerged in Asia Minor will be made periodically for purposes of example and illustration, however this study will limit itself to a detailed exposition of only the atomic school.³

Historical Background

Although we have stated that no attempt to elucidate a model of social change over time will be attempted, we feel that it is vital to give at least a brief account of the historical development of both mainland Greece and her eastern colonies.⁴ This procedure shall benefit us by providing an understanding of at least the major influences affecting

culture in these two areas, thereby providing at least the germ of an insight into the social forces nurturing philosophical thought throughout greater Greece.

The "Dark Ages" of Greek history ended at, approximately, the beginning of the eighth century B.C.⁵ Of the four centuries that this obscure historical era encompasses, the main sources of our knowledge of its social structure are the Homeric poems⁶--the Illiad and the Odyssey. Composed in Ionia, the former we may date near the middle of the eighth century, the latter perhaps a decade later.⁷

It appears that the political focus was the unit of the noble household. This was a society ruled by kings and their subordinate nobles; and all law stemmed from the king. War among kings, and nobles, was a permanent feature of life.⁸ Yet there must have been stimuli--unknown to us--which encouraged a diffusion of power. By the eighth century we have the king formally at the head of government, but much practical power already lies within a council of elders and a popular assembly.⁹ Thus Ionia¹⁰ underwent a fairly early experience in power sharing. In fact, the institution of the monarchy quickly disappeared after this, and a land owning aristocracy became the dominant form of government. As a group, they controlled all political institutions and ruled over small, independent, communities.¹¹

However, the area was extremely underpopulated, and the group which was to make up the bulk of the population over the next three centuries was drawn, in the main, from the poorest sectors of the citizenry of established city-states. It must be stressed that the impetus for emigration--as well as the composition of the emigrating population--varied with the peculiar conditions that each city-state existed under.

However, we are concerned with a general historical trend, and it is fair to state that the great bulk of emigrants from the Greek mainland were those citizens who were responding to unfavorable demographic, economic, and/or political circumstances.

As a rule, the emigrants were citizens who had a difficult or inferior position at home, and were driven abroad by the hope of bettering themselves. The inferiority which they sought to escape might be the result of economic or of political circumstances, or of both.¹²

The result was that between the years 700 and 500, colonists from the mainland settled in Thrace, the Asia Minor coast, and reached as far as the shoreline of the Black Sea.¹³ The composition of this emigrating group is significant, and of course indicative of the social forces which prompted emigration.

Firstly, we must take care not to impose our present conception of the term "colonist" on the Greeks. These were not people seeking to establish trading outposts. Indeed, trade considerations were not a significant impetus to the movement.¹⁴ These were people seeking land. In the main¹⁵ overutilization and overpopulation of the mainland resulted in the poor soil becoming unable to support the increasing population.¹⁶ The result was emigration of the excess population--sometimes by force. And the term "force" is not an exaggeration, as at certain times the problem became so crucial that--although various methods of selection were utilized--the population which was selected to emigrate was not given the option of refusal.¹⁷

Emigration could also be a measure of political expediency. If we consider the economic discontent of a population unable to feed itself, we can readily envision how that sector of the population which is able to afford the spiraling costs of food perceives the poorest classes as

a threat to political stability. While it is true that the Attic soil was becoming depleted at an accelerating rate--thereby causing the land-owning aristocracy to suffer a loss of revenue--it is also obvious that the real victims of this state of affairs were the small farmers whose daily existence depended on their meager crop. This latter sector of the population was without sufficient political power to bring about a reform of the situation. Thus a colonist could rationally view his emigration as a bloodless way of gaining more political power--but in a new land.

A member of the less privileged classes in his own city became, if he participated in the settlement of a colony, one of the landed proprietors and aristocrats in the new city. The parent city thus got rid of discontented elements, and the aristocracy which was the object of attack might prolong its existence for decades and even for centuries if it made a skilful use of colonization.¹⁸

To this effect, we may note that although we find successive tyrannical governments being violently established on the mainland, in the mid-seventh century, Asia Minor was remarkable free of these excessively bloody political turmoils for another century.¹⁹

The replacement of government by landed aristocracy with rule by a popular leader with no traditional claims to authority (a tyrant) is generally conceded to be a major impetus behind what was later to become "democratic" government in Athens. However, it can indeed be argued that the emigration of discontented portions of the population kept postponing the inevitable political changeover (by getting rid of significant numbers of dissidents) thereby allowing the aristocracy of the mainland to enjoy an even longer ruling period than they might have had.

In fact, political discontent was an immediate cause of Greek colonization; and conversely it may be said

that colonization was a palladium of aristocracy. If this outlet had not existed, or if it had not suited the Hellenic temper, the aristocracies might not have lasted so long, and they wisely discerned that it was their own interest to encourage colonization.²⁰

However, we must not make the mistake of thinking that the emigrants from the mainland, upon reaching their destination, were prepared to wholly reject the political and economic structures of their homeland and become political agitators in the new land. Whereas many emigrants--being among the hardest hit victims of the aforementioned circumstances--had suffered greatly in their home city-state, they found socio-economic-political conditions in the Asia Minor colonies much more agreeable.

Firstly--and here we are speaking of emigrants who have arrived at an already established colony, not founders of a completely new settlement--the Ionian aristocracy became, by the late seventh century, a "commercial aristocracy".²¹ This means that the self-interest of the aristocracy was more compatible with the self-interest of the general populace. The result was that the prosperity of the elite does not necessarily have to be gained at the expense of the prosperity of the masses. In a situation where a landed aristocracy rules, the reverse is much more likely to be the case. A case in point is the increase in displaced farmers as the Athenian aristocracy began to expand its land holdings.²²

Secondly, the underprivileged sectors of society which this emigrating group represents were not by any means either the instigators for, or beneficiaries of, tyrannical rule back on the Greek mainland. In fact, tyranny reflected the emerging power of a new middle class on the mainland.²³

Lastly, the socio-economic conditions which brought about political

crises (over population, land scarcity, land-grabbing by the aristocracy, etc.)²⁴ were not present. The main reason for this--abundance of land--resulted in a "benevolent" aristocratic rule. With the breeding ground for political dissent removed, Ionia was spared the extremely violent political upheavals of the mainland. One of the results of this internal domestic tranquility of the Ionian city-states was the channeling of creative energies into philosophical, technological, and commercial speculation by the upper classes; rather than into political activity.

But even more importantly, we must consider the different social norms and the more egalitarian cultural climate in which both Ionian aristocracy and commoners lived. In the main, the Ionian culture differed from that of the mainland in three respects:²⁵

Firstly, the Ionians were severed from their historical roots and traditions. This, we believe, is a factor vastly underrated by the majority of Greek historians. Let us consider the evidence: We know already that there was much forced emigration from the mainland. Part of the emigrating population, for reasons which shall be further elucidated later, consisted of poor farmers who were bonded to what was once their own land. (In Athens, this situation reached crises dimensions at the close of the sixth century.) They were a poor, exploited, and we can assume, embittered group. And among them there was a smaller percentage of free and independent farmers.²⁶

Primarily, these were people seeking land of their own to work.²⁷ And they found it. What had once been a population of farmers bonded to land was now a population of free land-owners.²⁸ If we add the fact that the majority of emigrants were males who intermarried with natives upon arrival, we can surely concede that they were of a different men-

tality than their equals on the mainland.²⁹

Ionian development of an alphabet is also significant. In the ninth century, phonetic script was borrowed from Ionia's Phoenician neighbors, and writing rapidly spread through the Asia Minor coast. The implications of a spread of literacy (communication, retention of records, etc.) are obvious. But more subtle, yet certainly not less important, are the other possible effects of contact with older and more advanced (in some respects) civilizations. The Phoenicians, the Egyptians, and the Babylonians are three examples. And one particularly intriguing consideration is that of the Phrygian city of Gordion, located a mere two hundred miles from the Aegean coast. The city itself was destroyed in the early seventh century by the Crimeans, but one cannot help but speculate what interaction may have taken place among the Ionians and their advanced neighbors before that.³⁰ We do, however, know that Ionia had extensive contact with the peoples of the interior of Asia Minor for a combination of geographic, economic, military, and demographic reasons.³¹ And we know that this contact continued, and resulted in cross-cultural influence. For example, Democritus of Abdera's travels reputedly took him to Egypt and India, where he pursued his studies.³²

Thirdly, and of particular importance for our considerations, is the high status of practical techniques to be found in Ionia. Invention and technology was flourishing in Ionia, and subsequently careers such as engineering and architecture had a high social status. We need only consider the example of Thales--who is now remembered only as a philosopher. Yet in his lifetime, and for centuries afterward, he was rather remembered as an engineer, designer, and formulator of improved navigation techniques.³³

Respect for practical skills had a long tradition of support in Ionia. Remembering the Ionic origin of the Homeric poems, let us consider the personal qualities attributed to Odysseus himself:

But in everyday life in the poems we find men and women accustomed to manual labor even in the best families, and one of the qualities most admired in Odysseus is his ability to do things himself. Not only is he found charming to women, a father to his people and an admirable family man; not only is he a famous athlete, strong swimmer and crack shot; he can build a boat and a bedroom, dig trenches, lug the heaviest loads, tie up his own luggage, fumigate the house, and challenge younger men to a ploughing match.³⁴

Thus we may note that this Homeric aristocrat is well versed in the tasks of physical labour. This does not, of course, in any way alter the fact that he is an aristocrat -- noble by birth and heir to all royal privileges. As such, we must take care not to mistake him for a "man of the people". Certainly he would balk at such a suggestion. He is first and foremost a royal personage. But the point is; the activities of the noble and the commoner were not portrayed as necessarily exclusive tasks. The significance of this is clear when contrasted with an opposite development. We can readily envision a situation where all manual tasks, save those related to armed combat, are shunned by the aristocracy. (This, we shall see, is precisely the situation in sixth and fifth century Athens.)

Obviously the tradition continued in fine style as, among the accomplishments of the already mentioned Thales, we may note that he worked out a method to calculate the distances of ships at sea, defined celestial poles more precisely, predicted an eclipse of the sun, diverted a river to allow an army to cross, and predicted agricultural weather and growth trends (thereby making a fortune in the olive trade). He was

also a surveyor, an expert on geometry, and perhaps incidently a philosopher also. Anaximander followed not only in Thales' philosophical footsteps, but also found time to be a cartographer, an inventor (the sun dial) and a colonist.³⁵

And all of these practical skills were in demand. In return for the grains imported from the Black Sea area, goods were needed. The response of the Ionian cities was to develop specialized trades and industries.³⁶

Lastly, we may briefly note an attitude of religious tolerance in Ionian cities. This not to imply that there was an anti-religious sentiment; rather there was an atmosphere of religious tolerance.³⁷ The reasons for this social phenomenon are wholly speculative, and therefore shall not be pursued. However the issue assumes relevance when we later contrast this attitude with the sixth and fifth century Athenian perspective.

We may now conclude our brief over-view of the history of the Greeks in Asia Minor. The time is circa 600, and Asia Minor is probably the wealthiest and most civilized part of the Hellenic world. This is an historical circumstance which is simply not afforded enough importance.³⁸ The result has been the fallacy of limiting "Greek civilization" to fifth and fourth century Athens. It is to this historical misconception that Novack addresses himself:

When we think today of ancient Greece, we usually assume that Athens and Sparta were its capitals from the start. This is not so. These places on the mainland did not acquire their hegemony until the 5th or 4th Centuries B.C. While they were still immature in their social development during the 7th and 6th Centuries, the Greek settlements along the coast of Asia Minor were highly advanced.

It was not the cities of Greece proper which brought enlightenment to the outlying colonies; it was the Asian outposts which were the leaders and educators of metropolitan Greece. They not only elevated the mainland Greeks but helped civilize the barbarians around them.

In their technology and economy, their social constitution, their political activities, their culture and ideas, the Ionians were far ahead of the other Greeks in the 6th Century. They were the commercial pacemakers of Aegean civilization. Miletus was the most progressive center in the whole Greek world at that time. It was the mother city of ninety colonies around the Black Sea; its trade extended far and wide over the Mediterranean; its inhabitants were in contact with all the older hearths of civilization.

The Ionians not only took the lead in colonization and navigation, in the arts and crafts, in architecture and engineering. Greek art and literature as well as science and philosophy were born and bred in these Ionian cities. There the Homeric poems were polished into their perfected versions; there Sappho, Anacreon and others wrote their imperishable lyrics. The Ionians likewise fashioned the first instruments of prose writing for the Greeks.

Our scanning of the Ionian social-historical environment completed, let us now look at the philosophy it gave rise to--atomism.

Footnotes - Chapter II

¹For a brief, yet encompassing summary, see M.I. Finley, Early Greece: The Bronze and Archaic Ages, a Vol. in Ancient Culture and Society, ed. by M.I. Finley (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), pp.75-78, and Adolf Holm, The History of Greece: From Its Commencement to the Close of the Independence of the Greek Nation, (4 vols. translated from the German; London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1894), I, pp. 135-148.

²Most notably, the atomic philosophy of Leucippus and Democritus.

³This delimitation does not present any difficulty for our argument in the whole. In fact, atomism merely represents the ultimate refinement of the pervading philosophical world view of Asia Minor, and consequently --as it is the most thoroughly developed philosophical orientation--may serve as the best "representative" of the Eastern Greek colonies' orientation.

⁴Perhaps "colonies" is misleading--to a point. In the main, Greek city-states in both Italy, the islands, and Asia Minor were fiercely independent. Whatever interdependence with the mainland existed was primarily military and/or sentimental in nature; not economic. This distinction is brought to mind in order to avoid conceptualizing these outlying city-states within the definitional framework of "colony" commonly held today.

⁵All dates herein, unless otherwise specified, are Before Christ.

⁶Archeology is increasingly providing a larger contribution toward a knowledge of this historical era. Indeed many misconceptions about pre-eighth century Greek culture are only now being corrected due to the findings of archeologists. See: J.B. Bury, A History of Greece, (3rd. ed.; London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1951), pp. 5-85. However, the essential truth of the Homeric accounts remains. Indeed in some instances, such as the qualities of leadership which were considered to be "virtuous", it does not matter whether Homer's account is historically correct or not. The point is, the accounts were believed and therefore helped shape social consciousness of those exposed to them.

⁷Precise origins and dating of the Homeric poems has never been agreed upon. However, this represents the consensus of opinion. See: Finley, Early Greece, p. 82, and Bury, A History of Greece, p. 68.

⁸See, for example, M.I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), p. 9.

⁹See, for example. J.M. Cook, The Greeks in Ionia and the East, Vol. XXI of Ancient Peoples and Places, ed. by Dr. Glyn Daniel, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1962), p. 38, wherein he states:

"On the balance of all available evidence, it seems unlikely that there was much left of monarchy in the Ionic cities of Homer's own day; and it is also evident that at this time there was little scope there for the clans (gens) that are thought to have formed the basis of old-world society in mainland Greece."

¹⁰The term "Ionia" is commonly reserved for the Greek city-states of Asia Minor. This is a misnomer as, in fact, three main peoples settled Asia Minor, the groups we call the Aeolic, the Doric, and the Ionian. The Ionians, however, dominated the region--culturally, militarily, and economically--to the point where Asia Minor itself came to be called "Ionia". We shall therefore use the terms "Ionia" and "Asia Minor" synonymously, and revert to more proper terminology when we wish to draw a specific distinction.

¹¹See Finley, Early Greece, p. 91, and Finley, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 26-27.

¹²A. Jarde, The Formation of the Greek People, translated by M.R. Dobie, a volume in The History of Civilization, ed. by C.K. Ogden, (New York: Cooper Sware Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 178.

¹³Finley, Early Greece, pp. 93-94.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 97, also Bury, A History of Greece, p. 87. Laistner also takes effort to underscore, quite correctly, the importance of this motivation for colonization as not having a primarily economic impetus:

"It cannot be too strongly emphasized at the outset that only in a strictly limited sense was the colonial expansion of the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries B.C. due to an economic cause.....
That the presence of many new city-states in the more outlying parts of the Mediterranean or on the Black Sea ultimately led to an increase of trade, and to a more intensive interchange of commodities, no one would attempt to deny. But this was purely a secondary development; and, moreover, the extent of the commercial intercourse existing in the Hellenic world of the sixth century B.C. has, without doubt, been much exaggerated."

M.L.W. Laistner, Greek Economics, introduction and translation by M.L.W. Laistner, a vol. in The Library of Greek Thought, ed. by Ernest Barker (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1923), pp. 135-136.

¹⁵Political banishments are also another contributor of emigrants. Then there is the odd case of Sparta deporting a large illegitimate population. See Finley, Early Greece, p. 112.

¹⁶Finley, The Ancient Greeks, p. 27.

¹⁷See Finley, Early Greece, pp. 98-99.

¹⁸Holm, The History of Greece, p. 236.

¹⁹Finley, Early Greece, pp. 105-106.

²⁰Bury, A History of Greece, p. 87.

²¹George Novack, The Origins of Materialism (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1965), pp. 63-64.

²²See Laistner, Greek Economics, pp. XII-XIII.

²³Ibid., p. XIV.

²⁴See W.J. Woodhouse, The Tutorial History of Greece to 323 B.C., revised by B.G. Marchant, (4th ed.; London: University Tutorial Press, Ltd., 1965), pp. 32-33, and Cook, The Greeks in Ionia, p. 96.

²⁵Benjamin Farrington, Head and Hand in Ancient Greece: Four Studies in the Social Relations of Thought, vol. CXXI of The Thinker's Library (London: Watts & Co., 1947), pp. 17-21.

²⁶Finley, Early Greece, p. 105.

²⁷Ibid., p. 98.

²⁸Laistner, Greek Economics, p. XIII.

²⁹This gives us another clue to why the colonies of Asia Minor not only came to be culturally differentiated from their mainland cousins but also came to be culturally dominated by the Ionians. The Ionians differed from the Aeolians and Dorians in that the latter two were a relatively homogenous ethnic group, while the Ionians were a mixture of peoples from central Greece, Euboea, Attica, the Peloponnese, and both pre-Hellenic peoples as well as the Dorians who came into the region as conquerors at the outset of colonization. A further cultural advantage was gained by the rapidity of assimilation into Asia Minor which the Ionians enjoyed. Whereas the Aeolians had to physically conquer the existent populations of the land they sought, the Ionians did not meet military resistance and indeed were readily able to intermarry with the peoples they encountered. Thus:

"This diversity of origin, this mixture of men from every country and of every race, was bound to create a human environment with an infinite variety of characteristics, tendencies, and ideas, little bound by tradition and prejudice, the better able to understand anything, and the readier to do anything." Jarde, The Formation of the Greek People, pp. 188-190.

³⁰Finley, Early Greece, pp. 78-82

³¹See Jarde, The Formation, pp. 190-191.

³²Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (2nd ed.; New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1964), p. 110.

³³Benjamin Farrington, Greek Science: Its Meaning for Us, Penguin Books (2nd ed.; Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: C. Nicholls & Company, Ltd., 1961), pp. 35-36.

³⁴Cook, The Greeks in the East, pp. 39-40.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 92-93

³⁶Ibid., p. 94.

³⁷A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, (4th ed.; London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1965), p. 2.

³⁸Although recently the situation has been changing. Scholars such as Alban Dewes Winspear, Benjamin Farrington, George Novack, George Thomson, and Gregory Vlastos--but to name the few we are most familiar with--are instrumental in beginning to bring the contributions of Ionia to Greek civilization into perspective.

³⁹Novack, The Origins of Materialism, pp. 63-64.

CHAPTER III

ATOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY

THE CONTRIBUTION OF ATOMISM

The choice of atomism as the "representative" philosophy of the Ionian tradition does not ignore the accomplishments of the other major philosophical orientations of Asia Minor; most notably the "Milesian School"¹ and the work of Heraclitus.² Indeed, atomism represents the logical culmination³ of the efforts of the entire Ionic tradition.⁴

The essence of that tradition is an attempt to elaborate a naturalistic explanation of the universe.⁵ The essential characteristic of such an explanation is two-fold: All aspects of reality are firmly rooted in only physical matter; and the origins, continuance, maintenance and evolution of this reality requires no supra-physical forces.⁶

It must be stressed that this is only one isolation of the significance of atomistic philosophy, and it reflects our concerns. It can be argued that Democritus' resolution of the "monism"--"pluralism" debate among pre-Socratics is his main accomplishment.⁷ Be that as it may, the latter is essentially a contribution to the discipline of philosophy; it is a methodological contribution. We may understand the significance of this if we consider that there is another solution to the metaphysical debate amongst monists and pluralists. Indeed, the most devastating (for atomism) alternative resolution is culminated in the work of Aristotle--which is in many ways the antithesis of the Democritean solution.

In Aristotle, metaphysics forsakes materialism for an ontology which is firmly rooted in transcendentalism.⁸ And therein lies both the difference and significance of atomism in comparison to both its competing and complementary schools of philosophy. In the atomism of Democritus, the last vestiges of transcendentalism are purged to result in a wholly materialistic philosophy which offers a consistent and comprehensive philosophy and world view.⁹

LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS

To establish with any certainty the events surrounding the life of Leucippus is at present not possible. We shall therefore not consider his theory separately from Democritus' work; rather the work of both men will be considered the "atomic theory", and we shall herein refer to the entirety of the work as the product of Democritus. It is not doubted that this ignores a very real concern in the history of philosophy.¹⁰ However, for our purposes, the specific contributions of the two founding fathers of atomism are not a vital concern. What is of import is the final articulation of that philosophy.¹¹

Democritus is commonly held to have been born circa 460 in the Milesian colony of Abdera in Thrace. He was younger than Leucippus--at least by ten years--and was perhaps a pupil of his. If not a pupil, he at least knew the work of Leucippus intimately. Anaxagoras was another notable influence on him. Independent wealth came through an inheritance from his father and the money was utilized for travel. His journeys took him to Egypt and Persia, and as far as India. He also made a visit to Athens and possibly heard Socrates speak. A school was per-

sonally founded in Abdera circa 420, and the prolific writer on varied topics is believed to have lived to the age of ninety or more.¹²

ATOMIC METAPHYSICS

ONTOLOGY

Democritus, like Leucippus, believed that all phenomena could be explained by combinations of atoms and space.¹³

This statement by Kathleen Freeman is a simple, yet succinctly accurate, capsulization of atomic metaphysics. If we isolate and expand upon the three terms ("atoms", "space", and subsequent "combinations") which describe the constituents of phenomena, we shall have the essence of the Democritean ontological argument.

Atoms are the "ultimate constituents of the world" which are "unchangeable".¹⁴ These atoms have three, and only three, inherent properties. Concentrating on only two of these properties for the moment, we note that it is these properties which are themselves what is "unchangeable" about the atoms. Thus size and shape are intrinsic properties of all atoms and provide the physical base of all phenomena.¹⁵ Conversely, atoms do not have any other properties such as color, weight, taste, temperature, etc.¹⁶ We must note, however, the obvious. In addition to size and shape, all atoms must of course have existence. This is simply to say that some thing must have size and shape as size and shape cannot exist as transcendental entities. Thus atoms must be "solid corpuscles"¹⁷ which have existence because they have "Substance, Fullness, Being".¹⁸ In a philosophy of materialism, it cannot be other than so.

"Space" is an atomic concept which truly revolutionized material-

istic philosophy. It addressed itself to the crucial problem in materialism: If everything (i.e. reality) is composed solely of material substance (in this case, "atoms"), then how can there be nothing separating the atoms? That is to say, if "nothing" (i.e. space) exists, then it too is "real" (part of reality). Yet we are told that all of reality consists of only atoms. Thus how can nothing (i.e. space) be "real" (i.e. exist) and not be composed of the material of reality (atoms)? To overcome this problem, atomism postulates an empty space which is not "real" because it is totally devoid of all tactile properties (i.e. it has neither of the aforementioned "Substance", "Fullness", nor "Being"¹⁹). But this must not be taken to mean that space does not exist. Rather we must conceive of space as a reality which is "non-corporeal".²⁰

We thus have our complete description of reality. It is a composite duality of the corporeal (atoms) and non-corporeal (space).²¹ And we must remember that both atoms and space are equal ontological partners.²²

The third ontological entity intrinsic to all atoms is "the power of motion".²³ It is this trait which enables atoms to move through space and enter "into the composition of bodies".²⁴ Motion is a concept central to atomic cosmology.

COSMOLOGY

As motion is inherent in all atoms,²⁵ it is only logical to assume that all these self-propelled atoms must begin to encounter each other through collision. In order to avoid serious problems of quantification and logistics, an infinity of atoms as well as an infinite space is postulated:

This is a simple consequence of the fundamental idea of free, rectilinear motion for every atom with a velocity of its own. If one assumes rectilinear motion, space must be infinite. For otherwise one would have to assume also something like a tin box around the world against which the atoms would dash to come back again.

Furthermore, having assumed an infinity of space, Democritus had also to counterbalance this infinity with the assumption of an infinite number of atoms. For if there were only a finite number of atoms, they would spread so thinly in the infinite space that of the ²⁶whole world finally nothing would be seen any more.

Once atoms begin to collide, they may, of course, simply bounce off each other. Alternately, they may begin to aggregate. The chief cause of aggregation lies in the compatibility²⁷ of some atoms.

As a result of collision between atoms those which are of congruous shape do not rebound but remain temporarily attached to one another: for example a hook-shaped atom may become involved with an atom into whose shape the hook fits. Other congruous atoms colliding with this two-atom complex then become attached, until a visible body of a certain character is formed. It is emphasized that no real coalescence of atoms takes place: they simply come into contact with each other, and always retain their own shape and individuality. When a complex of atoms collides with another complex it may be broken up into smaller complexes or into its constituent atoms, which then resume their motion through the void until they collide with a congruous atom, or complex, once again.²⁸

Central to all this is the concept of mechanical causation. We must note the absolute absence of any teleological element in explaining a course of events. Events occur because atoms continue to aggregate, continue to interact, and continue to move in ever changing and novel combinations. The universe thus becomes composed of these aggregates of atoms, and each aggregate is unique because the infinity of sizes, shapes, and possible combinations of atoms in an infinite universe would be

mathematically astounding. Our world and all therein is but one such aggregate among countless others.²⁹

It readily follows that the above is but a natural consequence of infinitely numbered and varied atoms--in size and shape only--moving by inherent motion through an infinite void.³⁰ And it cannot be overstressed that teleological concepts have no room within atomic metaphysics. Once we have grasped the concepts of atom, void, and inherent motion, we cannot go farther with our inquiry. We have uncovered the fundamental units of existence which are neither susceptible to, nor in need of, any transcendental infusion.

...we have no more right to ask for the cause of movement than we have for the cause of the existence of the atoms and the void themselves.³¹

EPISTEMOLOGY

Democritean epistemology wholly centers on the concept of sensation. And sensation is a completely corporeal phenomenon; one that results from the interaction of atoms. This is necessarily so as all of reality is merely a composite of atoms and void, and the only "activity" of these ontological entities is physical contact.³²

Perhaps the simplest illustration may be found in an analysis of how the sensation of taste works. For Democritus, different tastes were simply a product of different atomic shapes. For instance, a sharp taste is the result of an intake of jagged atoms which essentially lacerate the mouth and tongue. Naturally, smooth round atoms result in a more pleasant sweet taste. Gradations in-between give rise to the spectrum of tastes we are all familiar with.³³

The simplicity of this explanation must not keep us from apprec-

iating a more subtle implication. We must note that not only do the incoming sensations (the "tastes") rely upon varying atomic shapes to give diversity, but the receptive organs (mouth and tongue) have an influence upon the resulting sensation.³⁴ That is to say the size, shape, and density of the atoms which constitute the taste organs will affect the particular "taste" each person will experience. What this means is a person with a surfeit of round atoms in his taste organs will experience sugar as more "sweet" than someone who has more roughly shaped atoms in his mouth and tongue. By the same token, a measure of sugar may taste less sweet after a person has been drinking beer because the more roughly shaped beer atoms may have penetrated and perhaps rearranged (by decreasing the density) the atoms of the taste organs. The result is that even the smooth sugar atoms seem to be more abrasive now.

This is obviously an indication of recognizing "subjectivity" in the perception of phenomena. This subjectivity is a result of atoms of varying size and shape combining in various ways and in varying densities. Subjectivity occurs because this happens in both the stimuli and the stimulated organ. The result is that we are hard pressed to make "objective" statements about, or measurement of, phenomena because

...sensations themselves can be graded, according to whether they depend on composition or arrangement of atoms and space, or on the shapes and sizes of the atoms. They are 'real' in that they have a corporeal cause; they are 'appearance' in that they are not what they seem to the experiencing subject, and give rise to different experiences in differently-constituted subjects.³⁵

This same line of reasoning carries through Democritus' conception of all the senses.³⁶

The most striking example of Democritus' consistent and pervasive

materialism can be found in his conception of mind and soul. Crucial to this conception is the twofold appreciation that thought is merely another form of sensation,³⁷ and mind and soul are the same entity.³⁸

By his identification of 'mind' and 'soul' Democritus meant simply that they were of the same atomic composition: the spherical particles which distributed in the body formed the soul, were gathered together unmixed, as Epicurus later explained, in the breast and so produced that complex form of sensation which is called thought.³⁹

This atomic concept is significant because, in one stroke, we have assigned a purely material interpretation to two of the most "abstract" conceptual entities in philosophy; mind and soul. This makes them wholly subject to the same mechanical laws of the universe that all matter is, and therefore the need for any transcendental explanation is avoided.

The difference between mind and soul is only a difference of density. Both are composed of the same atoms--extremely small and spherical atoms⁴⁰--but whereas the "soul" atoms are spread throughout the body, the "mind" atoms are more densely concentrated within the breast.⁴¹ But, again, "mind" and "soul" are not different entities per se, rather they are essentially the same as both are composed of the same atoms.

The body's ability to move is attributed to the soul. Because the soul atoms are so small and constantly moving, they move the body with them. Thus we may profitably conceive of the soul as a "body within the body".⁴²

The phenomena of thought--again, like all phenomena--is a result of physical contact with stimuli. The reason that the mind is capable of responding to certain stimuli in the form of "thinking" is because it is capable of reacting to more discrete stimuli than any other part of the body.

Certain 'idols' then which are too fine to stir the more distributed soul atoms on the surface of the body and in the organs of sense and so to produce sensation, pass on within the body until they reach the mind. There, as the soul atoms are so closely packed, the 'idols' cannot pass by without moving them and the result of this motion is the peculiar kind of sensation which we call thoughts; it is in its nature exactly parallel to the movements which produce sight or hearing.⁴³

If we keep in mind the smallness and the constant activity (motion) of the soul and/or mind atoms,⁴⁴ random thoughts may be the result of these atoms interacting even when no outside stimuli are incoming.⁴⁵

The final indication of the consistent materialism of atomic theory can be found in the Democritean concept of death. Firstly, soul atoms are not intrinsic only to the body. Indeed, breathing is a process whereby soul atoms are "squeezed" out by other atoms in the body (i.e. when we exhale) but are replenished with new soul atoms from the atmosphere (i.e. when we inhale). Thus we are constantly replenishing our supply of soul atoms. When we are no longer able to do so, we lose more soul atoms than we take in and we "die".⁴⁶

Mind and soul are thus made integral parts of a larger universe, subject to the same laws, and may be understood within the same conceptual framework as all matter.

The epistemological conclusion of atomism therefore is that men cannot know an objective truth because their knowledge comes from senses which are subject to all the aforementioned irregularities and inconsistencies of perception.⁴⁷ This is because sense perceptions are our "primary" knowledge of the world, but the senses register only "secondary" phenomena:

It follows that there can be no unchanging knowledge, the same for all, of the secondary appear-

ances (which are primary, however, for our experience) or 'qualities' of things.⁴⁸

Thus, for Democritus, the only form of understanding which we could genuinely claim to be knowledge would be recognizing that we are not privy to any truly objective knowledge. The closest that we can come to objective knowledge would appear to be an appreciation of the metaphysical argument we have traced to this point.⁴⁹ At best, we can only contemplate "reality" in terms of

...atoms and the void--it penetrates beyond the 'conventional' secondary characteristics to the ultimate reality. Leucippus and Democritus themselves had been employing this kind of judgement. Yet the mind, like the soul as a whole, operates through the mechanical motions and collisions of atoms, and its impressions must be subject to the same sort of distortions as those of sensation...It is clear, then, that Democritus should not have claimed, and perhaps did not claim, more than approximate truth for his 'genuine' opinions...⁵⁰

This concludes our brief overview of Democritean ontology, epistemology, and cosmology. From this base we may now begin an examination of atomic axiology in an effort to understand what consequences the preceding metaphysics have for the sphere of human values.

Footnotes - Chapter III

¹The "Milesian School" is commonly held to consist of the combined work of three men; Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. The dates of their combined lives covers a span of time from the mid-seventh to the late sixth century. Of the three, the most prolific contributor appears to be Anaximander. The name of the school derives from the fact that all three resided in Miletus. Most notably, all three had a materialistic base to their metaphysics. For a brief overview of the Milesian School see Edward Hussey, The Pre-Socratics, a Vol. in Classical Life and Letters, ed. by Hugh Lloyd-Jones. (London: Gerald Duckworth & Company Limited, 1972), pp. 11-31. This account is excellent as it not only describes the philosophy of the Milesian School, but also ties this philosophy into the social-historical perspective of Asia Minor. A more comprehensive overview of the Milesian School may be found in W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I: The Earlier Pre-Socratics and the Pythagoreans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 139-145. For source texts on the Milesian School see Charles Mr. Bakewell, Source Book In Ancient Philosophy, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), pp. 1-7.; Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla To the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, (Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 18-19.; and G.S. Kirk, and J.E. Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Critical History With A Selection of Texts. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 74-162.

²The work of Heraclitus, who dates from the mid-sixth to the first quarter of the fifth century reflects the same materialistic tendencies as that of the Milesian School. For an overview of Heraclitus' life and work see Guthrie, A History, pp. 39-145. For a source text see Bakewell, Source Book, pp. 28-35.; Freeman, Ancilla, pp. 24-34.; and Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 182-215.

³Guthrie, A History, p. 143. What is meant here is that atomism is the first elaboration of a wholly materialistic philosophy, purged of all transcendentalism.

⁴Herein we are not considering sophism--which espouses many ideas which show a distinct Ionian influence--as a school of philosophy. For an overview of the sophist's perspectives, see Kathleen Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (3rd ed.; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), pp. 341-423.

⁵See Guthrie, A History, pp. 140-145. For a comment on the efforts of Anaxagoras toward this end, see Robert Scoon, Greek Philosophy Before Plato (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1928), p. 102 and

p. 114. For a commentary on the total materialism espoused by atomism see Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 120-122.

⁶Other than Leucippus and Democritus, perhaps Anaxagoras came closest to such a comprehensive materialistic explanation. His viewpoint, however, still had significant differences with the atomic; see Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 34-43. For an overview of Anaxagoras' theory, see Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 216-274, and Scoon, Greek Philosophy, pp. 95-106.

⁷See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 69-76.

⁸It is not our intention to elaborate the Aristotelian position herein, as Aristotle's work falls outside of our chronological concern. The point is merely to illustrate that an alternative, non-materialistic, equally comprehensive, resolution is possible. Of particular note is the Aristotelian essence and appearance, potentiality and actuality, and the all important concept of causality.

⁹The materialistic tendency in Ionian philosophy, as we have suggested earlier, has distinguished the Ionian philosophers from the other philosophers of Greece. However, none were successful in completely ridding their philosophies of vestiges of transcendentalism. The "life forces" of Thales, Anaximander's "apeiron", and Heraclitus' "logos" serve as three prominent examples of transcendental elements in otherwise materialistic philosophies. Even the materialism of Anaxagoras--perhaps the closest thing to Democritean atomism--reserves a unique ontological status for mind, thereby infusing an anomaly into his materialism. A brief, but excellent account of transcendental elements in the Milesian School and in Heraclitus may be found in Scoon, Greek Philosophy, pp. 25-62.

¹⁰See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 64-69. Herein Bailey discusses the difficulties of separating the work of Leucippus and Democritus. He is of the opinion that a separation is desirable:

"There is therefore nothing extant of Leucippus' own work on which it is possible to build, and the difficulty of forming any exact view as to his theories is greatly increased, when the accounts of his theory are examined, for in nearly all the references he is coupled with Democritus and no distinction is drawn between them. It has in consequence been the usual practice of writers on the Atomic theory to group them together and credit them both with the whole of the system. This is however a very unsatisfactory plan and clearly ought not to be adopted, if it is possible to avoid it. For it cannot be doubted that in fact the theory must have undergone considerable modification and development in its transition through the School from Leucippus to Democritus, and the strongly marked character of the later philosopher with his insatiate love of investigation and his encyclo-

paedic knowledge and interests make it certain that he would not have been content to accept a ready-made system without development and expansion." Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 68.

Important as Bailey's argument is, it does not affect the nature of our task. In the end, Bailey in fact states that although he believes a separation of the two men's contributions is possible, such an accomplishment would not in fact reveal any marked discrepancies between their respective orientation. Referring to Leucippus and his "disciple" Democritus, he concludes:

"It must not however be supposed that great contrasts will appear between him and his disciple: they stand to one another rather as the pioneer and the enthusiastic and energetic follower." Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 69.

In contrast to Bailey's attempt at differentiating between the respective contributions of Leucippus and Democritus, we have the opposite and more generally held viewpoint, expressed in Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 402. Therein is maintained that a separation of the two thinkers is in fact a task of extreme difficulty.

Cleve goes even further. He considers the issue not only without resolution, but essentially without relevance:

"Therefore, the elusive problem of in the atomistic doctrine is specifically Leucippean and what is specifically Democritean appears to be virtually insolvable, and the only thing to derive comfort from is the insight that the whole question is after all not so important philosophically." Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 405.

¹¹This, again, reflects our concern not with methodological developments within philosophy--rather with the total world view (particularly concepts of man and society) which an adherence to atomistic philosophy necessitates.

¹²See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 109-117. For an alternative viewpoint, see Felix M. Cleve, The Giants of Pre-Socratic Greek Philosophy: An Attempt to Reconstruct Their Thoughts, (2 Vols.; The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), II, p. 398. Cleve feels that Democritus lived 493-404 B.C. However, aside from chronology, Cleve generally agrees with Bailey's description of the course of Democritus' life. Cleve, The Giants, II, pp. 399-405.

¹³Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 299.

¹⁴Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 397.

¹⁵Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 397. See also Bailey, Greek Atomists,

pp. 126-127, and Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 300.

¹⁶ Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 300. We should perhaps, at this point, note a common source of confusion: Weight is not a property of atoms for Democritus. This was a property added by Epicurus. See Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 301. Bailey is not as convinced that Democritus did not assign the property of weight to atoms. However, in the end he agrees to the majority viewpoint and considers the introduction of weight as a property of atoms to be a post-Democritean innovation. See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 128-129. The issue is also examined by Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 414-416. Their conclusion is that weight is not an inherent property of Democritus' atoms.

¹⁷ Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 397.

¹⁸ Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 299.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 299.

²⁰ Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 75.

²¹ Ibid., p. 75.

²² Reality is a composite of only atoms and void: Sources:

"...But in reality there are atoms and the void. That is, the objects of sense are supposed to be real and it is customary to regard them as such, but in truth they are not. Only the atoms and the void are real."

Bakewell, Source Book, p. 60.

"...atoms and Void (alone) exist in reality...We know nothing accurately in reality, but (only) as it changes according to the bodily condition, and the constitution of those things that flow upon (the body) and impinge upon it."

Freeman, Ancilla, p. 93.

"'...in reality there are only atoms and void.'" Theo Gerard Sinnige, Matter and Infinity In The Pre-Socratic Schools and Plato, Vol. XVII of Philosophical Texts and Studies, ed. by C.J. De-Vogel and K. Kuypers (2nd ed.; Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp., N.V., 1971), p. 139.

Atoms and the void have equal ontological status; Sources:

"Naught exists just as much as Aught."

Freeman, Ancilla, p. 106.

"'Thing does not exist to a higher degree than

no-thing."

Sinnige, Matter and Infinity, p. 139.

²³Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 330.

²⁴Ibid., p. 300.

²⁵Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 408.

²⁶Ibid., II, p. 411.

²⁷The whole issue of atoms aggregating is a bit confused in Democritean atomism. In some instances compatibility seems to mean compatibility of size (primarily in the sorting procedure that a vortex carries out) and in other cases it seems to mean compatibility of shape (most notably in the case of aggregates of soul atoms.) This whole complex issue is comprehensively, yet concisely, outlined in Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 418-421. In view of the preceeding, and considering that the resolution of the dilemma is not crucial to our purposes, we have omitted the whole concept of the vortex from our discussion. For an elaboration of this concept, see Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 143-146.; Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 302., and Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 411.

²⁸Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 419.

²⁹See: Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 146-148.; Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 302-303.; and Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 409-414.

³⁰On the coming together of atoms; Sources:

"...these atoms move in the infinite void, separate one from the other and differing in shapes, sizes, position and arrangement; overtaking each other they collide, and some are shaken away in any chance direction, while others, becoming intertwined one with another according to the congruity of their shapes, sizes, positions and arrangements, stay together and so effect the coming into being of compound bodies."
Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 419.

On the formation of a vortex from which further and more specialized aggregations of atoms take place; Sources:

"An eddy, of all manner of forms, is separated off from the Whole." Freeman, Ancilla, p. 107.

On the multiplicity of worlds; Sources:

"Democritus holds the same view as Leucippus about the elements, full and void...he spoke as if the things that are were in constant motion in the void; and there are innumerable worlds, which differ in

size. In some worlds there is no sun and moon, in others they are larger than in our world, and in others more numerous...." Kirk and Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 411.

³¹ Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 134. The same observation is made in Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 303.

³² See Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 422.

³³ Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 313.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 313.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 314

³⁶ See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 162-175, and Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 311-314. For a fuller treatment of Democritus' somewhat confused theory of vision, see Cleve, The Giants, II, pp. 434-438.

³⁷ See Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 172.; Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 310.; and Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 422.

³⁸ See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 160-161.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 161.

⁴⁰ Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 314.

⁴¹ Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 172-173.

⁴² Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 314. See also Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 157-158.

⁴³ Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 173.

⁴⁴ Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 314.

⁴⁵ Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 422.

⁴⁶ See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 158-160.

⁴⁷ Sources:

"One must learn by this rule that Man is severed from reality."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 92.

"We know nothing about anything really, but Opinion is for all individuals an inflowing (? of the Atoms)."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 93.

"It will be obvious that it is impossible to understand how in reality each thing is."

Freeman, Ancilla, p. 93.

"It has often been demonstrated that we do not grasp how each thing is or is not."

Freeman, Ancilla, p. 93.

"Man should know from this rule that he is cut off from truth."

Bakewell, Source Book, p. 59.

"This argument too shows that in truth we know nothing about anything, but every man shares the generally prevailing opinion."

Bakewell, Source Book, p. 59.

"And yet it will be obvious that it is difficult to really know of what sort each thing is."

Bakewell, Source Book, p. 59.

"Now, that we do not really know of what sort each thing is, or is not, has often been shown."

Bakewell, Source Book, p. 59.

"Verily, we know nothing. Truth is buried deep."

Bakewell, Source Book, p. 59.

"In fact we do not know anything infallibly, but only that which changes according to the condition of our body and of the [influences] that reach and impinge upon it."

Bakewell, Source Book, p. 59.

⁴⁸Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 423.

⁴⁹Sources:

"Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, colour by convention; atoms and Void (alone) exist in reality...We know nothing accurately in reality, but (only) as it changes according to the bodily condition, and the constitution of those things that flow upon (the body) and impinge upon it."

Freeman, Ancilla, p. 93.

"There are two sorts of knowledge, one genuine, one bastard (or 'obscure'). To the latter belong all the following: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The real is separated from this. When the bastard can do no more--neither see more minutely, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor perceive by touch--and a finer investigation is needed, then the genuine come

in as having a tool for distinguishing more finely."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 93.

"There are two forms of knowledge, one genuine, one obscure. To the obscure belong all of the following; sight, hearing, smell, taste, feeling. The other form is the genuine, and is quite distinct from this. (And then distinguishing the genuine from the obscure, he continues;) Whenever the obscure [way of knowing] has reached the minimum sensible of hearing, smell, taste, and touch, and when the investigation must be carried farther into that which is still finer, then arises the genuine way of knowing, which has a finer organ of thought."

Bakewell, Source Book, pp. 59-60.

"...By convention...sweet is sweet, by convention bitter is bitter, by convention hot is hot, by convention cold is cold, by convention color is color. But in reality there are atoms and the void. That is, the objects of sense are supposed to be real and it is customary to regard them as such, but in truth they are not. Only the atoms and the void are real."
Bakewell, Source Book, p. 60.

"By convention are sweet and bitter, hot and cold, by convention is colour; in truth are atoms and the void ...In reality we apprehend nothing exactly, but only as it changes according to the condition of our body and of the things that impinge and press upon the body."
Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 422.

⁵⁰ Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 424.

CHAPTER IV

ATOMISTIC SOCIAL CONCEPTS

The preceding chapter, having given us the fundamental tenets of atomic metaphysics, may now serve as a base from which we may construct a general picture of Democritean social reality. This is simply to say that we should expect consistency among the various branches of philosophy when they are thought through by one school of philosophy. (Indeed, the charge of being inconsistent is among the most devastating of criticisms one may levy against a philosopher or a school of philosophy.) Fortunately, our task of reconstructing the social world-view of Democritus is facilitated by our access to a handful of statements which we may confidently attribute to him.¹ We have, also, the work of Epicurus and Lucretius which are firmly rooted in Democritean atomism.² However, as these latter works contain modifications of the original atomic theory, we must be careful to use them only in an illustrative and supportive role.

Our approach shall therefore be an exercise in deductive logic. That is, granting the validity of our premises (Democritean metaphysics) we shall ask ourselves what conclusions about social reality necessarily follow.

HUMAN NATURE

We may profitably begin with a brief consideration of the subject

of social consciousness--man. What is the "nature" of man?

Firstly, we already know that the entirety of the human being is corporeal. That is; body, mind and soul consist only of atoms and void. We are made of the same material (atoms) as all other entities--organic and inorganic. Consciousness is an emergent phenomena attributable to particular movements of "soul" or "mind" atoms. These are not unique to human beings as, indeed, we are constantly losing and replenishing these soul atoms within the framework of our environment through respiration.³

Thus the entire human being is only a particular combination of atoms and void, following universal laws of physics. In Democritus' own words:

Man is a universe in little.⁴

Nothing--including consciousness--is in any way an exemption.

The implications of this are profound. Immediately we can see that to make man the "center" of any cosmology or ethics is ludicrous. Man is an integral part of the physical universe, and there is no justification in believing that he is a very extra-ordinary component. Not only, as we have already noted, does man depend on his physical environment to replenish the very organ of his consciousness (the soul and mind by the intake of soul atoms) but it is entirely possible that he is not very high on any hierarchical scale of consciousness. Not only may "superior" creatures which we call gods possibly exist,⁵ but there may be entire worlds scattered throughout the universe which are populated by creatures possibly greatly superior to man.⁶ None-the-less, all these entities would be, like man, subject to the same laws of physics.

The result is the necessary conclusion that man is but another "convention". Just as "sweet exists by convention", leaving essence to "atoms and Void",⁷ so are men, animals and inorganic matter (to say no-

thing of possible super-human entities) merely specific "conventions"-- i.e. particular manifest phenomena resulting from a specific combination of atoms.

Going further, we cannot even console ourselves with any thought that the specific "convention" we call "humaneness" is at least a "fixed" or at any rate semi-permanent manifestation. This is because men know nature through experience,⁸ and through the process of so doing they are able to change themselves!

Nature and instruction are similar; for instruction transforms the man,⁹ and in transforming, creates his nature.

This highly malleable nature can therefore hardly claim to be a "nature" within the conventional understanding of the term (i.e. a fixed predisposition). A constantly stimulating environment provides constantly new experiences resulting in a constantly changing human "nature". If one wishes to avoid this quandary by positing the ability to learn and change through experience as "human nature", it need only be pointed out that animals too learn from experience (i.e. parents and pet owners can sympathize with the respective frustrations of "toilet-training" and "house-breaking".)

Democritus has therefore left man without recourse to an ego-centered world viewpoint. Indeed, his conception of a plurality of worlds left the Greeks even without an earth-centered cosmology. Theodor Gomperz accurately notes the affinity of atomic cosmology and the Democritean perception of mankind:

The genius of Democritus did not stop at anticipating modern cosmology, but inherent in those speculations was his yet more striking view of life. How petty must man appear; how worthless his aims, pursued by most of us with such breath-

less haste; how great his modesty and humility, how small his arrogance and pride, if the world he lives in is deprived of every prerogative, if it loses all claim to unique distinction, and becomes in his eyes a grain of sand on the shore of the infinite! Here, we venture to believe, is the key to the ethics of Democritus. Posterity has characterized the sage as 'the laughing philosopher,' because he saw the disproportion of the business of man with his actual place and meaning.¹⁰

DIVINITY

If Democritus was unkind to the pretensions of men, he inflicted even more damage upon the egos of the gods.

We must firstly note that the possibility--indeed probability--of entities which we would call "gods" existing is not disputed. What Democritus rejected are the extra-ordinary attributes we conceive they possess. If they do exist, they do so only as wholly corporeal and mortal entities. True, they may be superior to us in strength, intelligence, and any number of physical attributes, but they are by no means immortal deities.¹¹ The explanation for this follows from the dictum that reality consists of only atoms and void. Thus the gods cannot be anything other than wholly corporeal, cannot be anything other than subject to the same physical laws as all other matter, and cannot be immortal--although we may grant that they could live a longer, or shorter, time than men do. They, like all matter --including man and the world--will suffer a breakdown of structure (followed by a restructuring of their atoms) because of the constant and violent interaction of corporeal entities in the universe. This is but a consequence of the previously outlined atomic cosmology.¹²

But, if "divinity" does not imply "immortality", we must still address ourselves to the question of why Democritus used the term "divine"

on several occasions.¹³ We may cope with this apparent dilemma if we consider the sense in which he used the term.

The answer is to be found in the well established practice of Ionian rationalism to salvage religious terms so long as: (a) they can be adapted to the exigencies of naturalistic logic; and (b) they do not inhibit rationalist criticism of magic. ...That is how Democritus appears to treat the term divine. He does not mould his view of nature to satisfy religious longings. On the contrary, he takes religious terms like ambrosia and Hades and offers a rather disconcerting naturalistic explanation. He is content to say, "the gods give men all good things' ...so long as men remember that 'sharp-eyed intelligence (sc. of men themselves) directs most things in life' ...so that if, for example, it is health men want, they will have to get it by intelligent self control.

In that spirit Democritus speaks of the soul as 'divine'. 'The soul is the dwelling-place of the daemon' ...means in effect, 'in the soul you will find the only daemon there is to find'. So we can now...imply 'dovote to the soul that supreme concern you have been taught to give to things divine.' But religious promises of immortality precluded by the laws of atoms and the void are sharply demounced... Exalting the soul's moral (and...poetic) dignity, the term 'divine' does not cast so much as a shadow¹⁴ of other-worldliness across Democritus' naturalism.

We may therefore resolve the apparent discrepancy between atomic metaphysics and subsequent terminology if we keep in mind Gregory Vlastos' capsulized elaboration of the Democritean meaning of "divine":

any natural entity whose moral value is not less than that traditionally attached to supernatural entities of popular religion. ¹⁵ In this sense the soul, though mortal, is divine.

It is only in this manner that we may avoid the problems of attempting to reconcile a wholly materialistic metaphysics with "divine" god(s).¹⁶

RELIGION

If the "gods"--as we have seen--are neither transcendental nor divine, rather corporeal and mortal, we may leave the concept of divinity to further examine their functions (or perhaps "non-functions" would be a more appropriate term) within the larger issue of religion.

We may begin with the obvious speculation that the gods cannot be "creators" of the world or universe. The world is in no need of a creator because there is no need of any external force to mold and/or create matter. Because motion is inherent in the atoms themselves, we have no need to postulate any other "cause" of the origin of the world. Thus Democritean materialistic mechanics removed the need for creator gods.¹⁷

Gods not only are banished from the processes of cosmology, but are also deprived of interference in the affairs of men. To ask for the intervention of a divinity into the affairs of men is merely to pray to "air":

Of the reasoning men, a few, raising their hands thither to what we Greeks call the Air nowadays, said: 'Zeus considers all things and he knows all and gives and takes away all and is King of all.'¹⁸

The term "reasoning men" in this pronouncement is reflective of the esteem Democritus holds for the pursuer of knowledge:

(I would) rather discover one cause than gain the kingdom of Persia.¹⁹

He is saying that in seeking explanations, men (logically--in the circumstances and extent of their limited knowledge) attributed the cause of natural phenomena to the handiwork of "gods".²⁰ Their striving for explanation is admirable; however they were in error. The process took the following form: Men were from primordial times subject to, and pro-

bably frightened by, natural phenomena such as lightning, wind, etc. In attempting to understand what was happening around them, they invented a deity who was responsible for the phenomena which they witnessed. Thus we have the advent of "Zeus" who is a mighty "king" who "controls" the physical world much as an earthly king controls the actions of his subjects.²¹ The myth was perpetuated and the present state of affairs is that men beseech this non-existent deity to exercise control over not only "His" domain, but also over the affairs of mortal men. For example:

Men ask in their prayers for health from the gods, but do not know that the power to attain this lies in themselves; and by doing the opposite through lack of control, they themselves become the betrayers of their own health to their desires.²²

All of this effort is, of course, utterly futile. Men must simply abandon prayer and take control over their own destiny.²³

If we cannot appeal to the gods for favor or assistance, then it is apparent that they (if "gods" exist) should not expect any appeasements from us. After all, if "gods" cannot affect the destinies of men through direct intervention, then "virtue" need not be practiced because of any "divine" ordinances. If it is to be practiced at all, it should be practiced for self-benefit.

Thus on the whole it is clear that though sometimes Democritus spoke of 'gods' in his writings, he did not really believe either in the gods of Greek mythology or in a supreme ruler or in any immaterial existence, but only in atoms and space. Denying as he did that there was any other life than this present one, he thought that it should be lived to the best advantage, that is, in the cultivation of wisdom and virtue which bring happiness. This doctrine, in his view, needs no divine sanction but is complete in itself.²⁴

The logic of this becomes even clearer if we remember that Democritean atomism precludes the possibility of life after death.²⁵

DESTINY

If we have succeeded in freeing ourselves from divine ordinance, this does not, however, preclude the possibility that man may be wholly controlled by corporeal necessity. Specifically; does the Democritean concept of mechanical causation in fact necessitate subscription to a belief in mechanical necessity? This conclusion appears possible, however it is erroneous.

By way of illustration, we may refer to Diogenes, as quoted in Kirk and Raven:

The whirl or vortex is called necessity because it produces the necessary (mechanical and theoretically determinable) collisions and unions of atoms.

We may avoid a serious misreading of statements of this nature if we are punctilious not to confuse "destiny" with "order". Order is simply natural law. And natural law does not pre-determine men, rather it merely defines the limits within which they may manipulate their affairs. One obvious, and important, limitation would be that men cannot invoke a deity to reverse or put in abeyance any natural law.

Thus, if we wish to say a baby is "destined" to grow into manhood and die at some date, we may do so. But we have not made any revealing observation. If, on the other hand, we note that natural law will ensure that a process of maturation will take place in infants, we may then begin our attempt to ensure that we influence the process in a manner which will result in the final product (the adult) becoming not only the wholly "destined" entity (i.e. the physically mature individual) but also the desired product of, for example, parental guidance. Thus natural law provides the limits of our aspirations (i.e. you cannot hope to remain young forever) but it also allows room for maneuvering within

those limits. Thus we shall all become old one day; but we shall be different old people. It is this interpretation which adds even further depth to the significance of:

Nature and instruction are similar; for instruction transforms ~~the~~ man, and in transforming, creates his nature.²⁷

We may now appreciate how a broad "human nature" is imposed upon us by mechanical causation (i.e. we are "destined" from the moment of conception to become a human--and only a human, not animal--fetus) yet this is a very precarious tenet upon which to claim our future is wholly "destined". The process of maturation exposes us to so many experiences that the actual course of our maturation becomes incalculable. And even if one insists upon the "theoretical" possibility of such a calculation it must be noted that the possibility of two persons undergoing exactly parallel development brings our contemplations into the realm of the absurd.

We are therefore much better served by the observation of Aetius:

(On the nature of necessity) Democritus means by ²⁸ it the resistance and movement and blows of matter.

We may therefore reject the notion of "destiny" as a fruitless concept and instead concentrate on understanding the true dynamics of cause and effect. If we understand these we shall fall heir to a wisdom which allows us to seek cures for disease rather than pray for an impossible (because it is not corporeal nor is it true to mechanical causation) divine intervention to save us from our follies.²⁹

The same sort of reasoning, carried in the opposite direction, might falsely lead us into an over-emphasis on the concept of "chance". Thus, whereas one person may foolishly pray for divine assistance--or

trust in his own "destiny" to deliver him from misfortune--his neighbor may abandon all effort to control the course of his existence as he perceives himself a victim of events beyond his control (i.e. he is a victim of "chance").

Again, this is a gross misconception of the notion of chance. For Democritus:

...chance is not only consistent with physics...it can only be correctly explained through the physics. It enjoys the same kind of status as, eg. color: Neither exists absolutely in the atoms themselves. Both exist in relation to our own sentience or action--and this is not in spite of atomic law, but because of it. As the author of On Nutriment speaks of 'spontaneous' organic processes, 'spontaneous with regard to us, but not spontaneous with regard to the cause', so Democritus speaks of chance events. Ignoring this distinction, 'bastard knowledge' attributes color and chance absolutely to being. In the case of chance this is more than error; it is 'rationalization'. The fiction of chance excuses, and therefore confirms, our own stupidity and helplessness...Thus the misunderstanding of the relative reality of chance means an absolute reduction in our own natural power. Hence Democritus' preoccupation with chance in the ethics.³⁰

Within this framework, we may understand the following surviving

Democritean pronouncements:

Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be³¹ set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness.

Fools are shaped by the gifts of chance, but those who understand these things by the gifts of wisdom.³²

Cast forth uncontrollable³³ grief from your benumbed soul by means of reason.

PROGRESS

From an appreciation of the Democritean rejection of both inflex-

ible destiny and uncontrollable, random, chance as factors in the human experience, we are in an excellent position to consider the dynamics of societal growth and evolution within the atomist's scheme.

We may profitably begin with a brief reconsideration of the importance of "instruction" as a factor in shaping the human mind.³⁴ Instruction, however, can only be understood within the framework of "experience".³⁵ This is merely to say that men learn from their environment --both social and physical. Indeed, nature is perhaps the greatest pedagogue of all.

We are all pupils of animals in the most important things: the spider for spinning and mending, the swallow for building, and the songsters, swan and nightingale, for singing, by way of imitation.³⁶

However, the crucial concern is to be receptive to innovation and discovery. By carefully noting the wealth of experiences around you, great benefits may befall. Thomas Cole considers it a form of "inventing":

Something very similar to the inventive process as conceived in our texts is present in the fragment ...which suggests an explanation for the origin of breeding mules: a chance meeting of mare and jackass was once observed by a man who proceeded to "take instruction" from ~~th~~is and to develop the custom of raising mules.³⁷

Cole's perception is accurate because he correctly recognizes the key element of the Democritean notion of social "progress"--"chance". This is "chance" understood within the framework of the preceding discussion. The human condition was improved (through, in this case, an addition of a new beast of burden) because a man (or men) was willing to take "instruction" from an apparently "chance" event (coming upon a copulating mare and jackass) and then deliberately introduced an "innovation" (the

breeding of mules) into society thereby "transforming" the "nature" of that society (i.e. men would now be freed of some burdens of labor.)

It must be stressed that this is an ongoing process, and all members of society contribute to it.

The workings of the cultural process as Democritus views them are analogous to those of a democratic assembly: individual suggestions are brought forward, then taken up, modified, and amended by other speakers, and finally accepted or rejected by the whole...³⁸

At this point we may readily see that the rate of "progress" is a function of (a) the number of incoming suggestions for innovation and (b) the speed with which society is willing to examine and accept "beneficial" innovations. Thus society must remain "open" in the Popperian sense of the word³⁹ to ensure the steady inflow of suggestions; must be constantly willing to quickly consider the new suggestions; and must be willing to adopt desired innovations into the social structure (i.e. society must be constantly willing to change its "nature"). The deepest significance of this is to be found in what is, in effect, the other side of the coin. Not only does society "progress" through adoption of innovations; but it must be ready to reject outmoded practices to make room for newer--and more "progressive"--practices. Thus, clearly, vested interests cannot be allowed to interfere with the need for constant readiness to innovate.

With the foregoing in mind, we may profitably conceptualize "progress" as a "trial-and-error" procedure in which men learn from nature (and other men), make suggestions and recommendations which are adopted by society, and these innovations are in turn abandoned when an improved innovation is proposed. Theoretically, the process can go on for as

long as men exist. After all, there is not a "perfect" way of doing anything as there is not, as we have seen, any transcendental "purpose", "reason", or "logic" responsible for the universe and mankind.⁴⁰ Everything is a combination of atoms, and restructuring of combinations produces change.⁴¹ In precisely the same manner, restructuring of societies through innovations is a process analogous to the "transforming" of a man's "nature" through "instruction".⁴² We are therefore left with a strikingly Darwinian model of social evolution at the conscious level. How far Democritus carried this line of reasoning is lost to posterity, but the very detailed and penetrating work of Thomas Cole led him to conclude that Democritus could at least conceivably have applied it to the evolution of language:

There is thus no evidence against, and some evidence for, the assumption that Democritus envisioned a gradual growth of language through piecemeal, conventional accretions.⁴³

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

At this point, it is glaringly apparent that Democritus envisioned social interactions as a potential benefit for the individual and his society. After all, the individual is capable of proposing possibly beneficial "innovations" to society, and society in turn becomes a "better" society resulting in a more desirable social environment for the individual. It is in this sense that Thomas Cole accurately characterizes the relations of men to men and men to society as a "system of reciprocal relationships". Briefly:

The social aggregations...rest, in the first place, on a certain natural affinity between man and man: the atomic principle of like-to-like operates here as it does on all levels of existence. But this affinity in its purely natural form is very weak:

the first men, though they may feel more comfortable among their fellows than elsewhere, are almost as likely to eat each other as not. A fully developed social feeling comes only later, as a product of the habit of association which man's physical weakness and sexual needs force upon him, and of a quite calculating realization that cooperation is more advantageous than aggression. Once acquired, however, this sociability is capable of intensification and extension.⁴⁴

The essence of understanding the "social bond" between men rests upon the key phrase "calculating realization". That is, it is demonstrably advantageous to favor social over anti-social behavior. The reason for the advantage is to be found in consideration of the previously outlined⁴⁵ formula that "progress" is a function of both incoming suggestions for innovation and speed of societal response to new proposals. This is obviously a de facto prescription for "cooperation". The result of such cooperation is a changing environment which maximizes utilization of the individual's intelligence and rewards him with a constantly improving societal environment. The essence of the resulting relationship is "happiness", which leads us into Democritean ethics.

ETHICS

Before a consideration of atomic ethics, we must dispel a prevalent myth: the myth that Democritean ethics are not based upon (or at least have no necessary correlation with) his metaphysics. The viewpoint is a common one.⁴⁶ Usually, the largest concession made to Democritus' continuity and consistency is that the ethics do not actually contradict the physics.

Democritus' ethics are not explicitly based upon atomist physical preconceptions, and atoms are not mentioned. The ethical fragments express, in a graphic and highly developed gnomic form, the Hellenic sentiments of restraint, common sense, and

sanity. Yet no irrational sanctions of behavior are introduced, no Justice or Nature that could not be resolved into the interplay of atoms and void.⁴⁷

In part, the problem is one of lack of authoritative sources. A large part of the fragments attributed to Democritus consist of his Maxims,⁴⁸ and these are a notoriously questionable source.

John Stobaeus, the fifth-century A.D. anthologist, assembled in his Anthologium educative extracts from the whole range of Greek literature, but with special emphasis on ethical sayings. Many Presocratic fragments (notably of Democritus) are preserved by him, often in a somewhat impure form. Stobaeus' main sources were the handbooks and compendia which proliferated in the Alexandrian period.

.....

To conclude these notes on the sources of direct quotations, it must be emphasized that the author of a direct quotation need not have seen the original work, since summaries, anthologies and compendia of every kind, produced in large numbers in the three centuries following the foundation of Alexandria, were regarded as an adequate substitute for most prose originals of a technical nature.⁴⁹

Indeed, there is disagreement with Diels, upon whom we are relying, on whether all or part of the Democritean ethical statements cannot be attributed to another philosopher--Democrates.⁵⁰

Be that as it may, we are still able, if we exercise due caution, to approach at least a fundamental understanding of Democritus' ethics. We may begin with conceding that which is commonly held: Democritus encouraged the individual to pursue a condition he called "cheerfulness":

The cheerful man, who is impelled towards works that are just and lawful, rejoices by day and by night, and is strong and free from care. ...⁵¹

The best way for a man to lead his life is to have been as cheerful as possible and to have suffered as little as possible. ...⁵²

Cheerfulness is created for men through moderation

of enjoyment and harmoniousness of life. ...⁵³

However, we shall argue that it is incorrect to consider that

'Cheerfulness' is put forward by Democritus as the state of mind at which men should aim, in a perfectly simple and naive spirit.⁵⁴

The interpretation we are in agreement with is undertaken by Gregory Vlastos:

For the technical Democritean term which denotes the physical ground of this resilient, undisturbable cheerfulness, we must look to 'well-being' ... In literary usage this means broadly 'prosperity'. But to an atomist... 'being'... can mean only one thing: atoms and the void. And when we recall how self-conscious Democritus is in terminological matters, how boldly he bends language to the needs of his philosophy... He could adopt it as a general cognate of 'cheerfulness' ... only if it meant the soul's 'well-being' in an ontological, i.e. physical, sense. We can then understand why motions of wide amplitude are precluded: because they are prejudicial to the order and integrity of the atomic soul-cluster.⁵⁵

We have now successfully hurdled several stumbling blocks on the path to comprehending Democritean ethics: We see that "cheerfulness" is a state of "being"--that is, it has a very specific ontological denotation. This understood, we may rapidly comprehend the distinction between "pleasure" and "happiness", which so often appear in reference to Democritean ethics. For example, if we contrast

Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial.⁵⁶

with,

Happiness, like unhappiness, is a property of the soul.⁵⁷

we may readily understand Cyril Bailey's concern with differentiating the two terms. "Happiness" becomes a goal to seek whereas "pleasure" is a fleeting sensual phenomena.⁵⁸ However, "happiness" is also a sensory phenomena. We feel happy. And the reason we feel happy is because we

have reached an ontological state of well-being (i.e. "cheerfulness").

We thus have our connection between physics and ethics. "Cheerfulness" is an ontological condition which produces the sensory phenomena of happiness to be enjoyed by the soul and augmented and facilitated (but not replaced) by auxiliary sensory phenomena called "pleasures" which are perceived by the other bodily organs. Therefore our efforts must be directed toward maintainance of that condition called "cheerfulness".

At this point we may disagree with Kathleen Freeman, who maintains that Democritus' "...ethical position was that happiness is the goal ...".⁵⁹ Happiness is not the "goal"; it is merely a guage which tells us if we have succeeded in maintaining our state of "well-being". Just as the color blue is the result of a particular combination of a particular group of atoms, so is happiness a result of a particular combination of soul/mind atoms. The name of that combination is "cheerfulness" or "well-being". But to say that we pursue happiness is like saying we are pursuing the color blue because we wish to redecorate. What we really mean is that we are after a particular combination of atoms which will result in the physical phenomena of blue-colored paint. Thus to seek "blueness" or "happiness" is to err as both are resultant phenomena caused by a more basic state of affairs.

With this in mind, the ethical fragments of Democritus make sense-- and reveal a necessary correlation with his metaphysics--because they are concerned with an elaboration of how the condition of "well-being" may be maintained. If we can maintain that condition, the necessary result (because of the laws of mechanical causation) will be the sensation of happiness.

Ironically, we already have the answer to our inquiry. If we recall, the soul is constantly being "squeezed" out of the body and constantly trying to replenish itself.⁶⁰ Thus the soul is in a constant state of disruption and constantly in danger of being depleted to the critical point at which death comes. Democritean ethics are simply considerations of how to assist the soul in maintaining itself.

The process is complicated by our recollection of the fact that the soul is an organ⁶¹ but a very delicate (because it is composed of extremely mobile spherical atoms⁶²) and important (because it is the source of bodily motion⁶³ and is responsive to the most discrete of all stimuli⁶⁴) organ. It is therefore obviously the easiest organ to damage as well as being the organ we should be most concerned about (due to the aforementioned ability to respond to extremely delicate stimuli and to provide locomotion).

We may therefore offer the soul its greatest benefit if we pursue a course of life which is wholly free from excesses of any sort. This is because the soul is constantly in a flux between opposing tensions. At any given moment it is either trying to absorb as many soul atoms from the air (inhalation) or trying to keep as few atoms from being "squeezed" out of itself (exhalation). Between these excesses, we may assume there is a state of equilibrium.⁶⁵ However, we must not think of the state of equilibrium as a state of "rest". (We shall recall that the soul atoms are the most mobile of atoms.⁶⁶) It is rather a state of "dynamic equilibrium"⁶⁷ wherein both loss and gain of soul atoms is equal and the process is not taxing upon the body's constitution.

And it is precisely this "taxing" of the physical system which Democritean ethics caution us against. Only in this way does the con-

stant warning for "moderation" make sense.

In all things, equality is fair, excess and deficiency not so, in my opinion.⁶⁸

(Democritus said): If the body brought a suit against the soul, for all the pains it had endured throughout life, and the illtreatment, and I were to be the judge of the suit, I would gladly condemn the soul, in that it had partly ruined the body by its neglect and dissolved it with bouts of drunkenness, and partly destroyed it and torn it in pieces with its passion for pleasure--as if, when a tool or a vessel were in a bad condition, I blamed the man who was using it carelessly.⁶⁹

The self-control of the father is the greatest example for the children.⁷⁰

Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure.⁷¹

Poverty and wealth are terms for lack and superfluity; so that he who lacks is not wealthy, and he who does not lack is not poor.⁷²

At this point, we have an appreciation of the respective roles of pleasure and happiness. Happiness (a symptom, recall, of a "cheerful" soul) can only be gained by the stringent regulation of pleasure. This is necessary because an over-excess in any direction will eventually result in a disturbed equilibrium. Thus over-eating (though momentarily pleasurable) eventually results in a weight condition which results in respiratory and circulatory illnesses (thereby affecting respiration which necessarily results in upsetting the process of replacement of soul atoms). The opposite phenomena (over-exercising) can be equally undesirable. We need only consider the susceptibility of professional athletes to heart attacks in their later years.

In this manner, we can see the simplicity of Democritean ethics because they reflect the simplicity of their objective--assisting the organ called the soul to maintain itself. And how do men learn to

achieve that objective? The same way they learn to do all else--through the aforementioned "experience",⁷³ which allows men to gain "wisdom" in regulating their lives.

Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions.⁷⁴

Thus we see a very distinct foreshadowing of Jeremy Bentham.⁷⁵ We must calculate how to achieve true pleasure (happiness) and avoid the errors of pursuing short-term (and eventually undesirable) pleasures.

If one oversteps the due measure, the most pleasurable things become most unpleasant.⁷⁶

We may therefore wholly agree with one of Felix M. Cleve's observations on Democritus:

What he teaches is an art of measuring pleasures.⁷⁷

And we may also at one point fully agree with Cyril Bailey:

A more precise idea can now be formed of the means by which 'cheerfulness' may be attained; pleasures which involve the pain of desire must be avoided, the pleasures of the soul preferred to those of the body, the beautiful must be the object of contemplation and enjoyment, and the mean observed between excess and defect.⁷⁸

Yet a few short pages later, we must object to Bailey's conclusion:

The moral teaching of Democritus is not based on any profound metaphysical or ethical basis, nor is it, as far as we can judge from detached fragments, in any sense a complete system: it does not attempt to grip together the whole of life in any reasoned deductions from a single principle. The gospel of 'cheerfulness' was, it would appear, enunciated by its author as a good practical guide to life, and the many maxims and aphorisms which have survived were designed to show in which ways a man could best become and remain 'cheerful'.⁷⁹

Indeed Democritean ethics are a "practical guide"; but one firmly rooted in atomic physics. Perhaps our problem lies in seeking something very complicated in his ethics. If we recall that Democritus has no true

hierarchy in his metaphysics (everything is atoms and void), then the soul (being simply another organ) is cared for in a wholly physical manner. To make the soul "special" in some way is to completely ignore the crux of materialistic thinking found in Democritus. If the soul is special, it is special only in that it is the most delicate of the bodily organs, thereby requiring an extra amount of care and attention.

However, this concept has profound ramifications for the social activities of individual men.

PUBLIC LIFE

To be wary of excesses is advice directed not only toward the affairs of the body, but toward political activity. At a time when the terms "citizen" and "public official" overlapped,⁸⁰ Democritus warned:

The man who wishes to have serenity of spirit should not engage in many activities, either private or public, nor choose activities beyond his power and natural capacity. He must guard against this, so that when good fortune strikes him and leads him on to excess by means of (false) seeming, he must rate it low, and not attempt things beyond his powers. A reasonable fullness is better than overfullness.⁸¹

Presumably this is due to the fact that time is a limited commodity, and an overly-zealous pursuit of public concerns will result in ignorance of ones own private matters:

It is shameful to be so busy over the affairs of others that one knows nothing of one's own.⁸²

The reasoning behind this stress on moderation follows the precise line of logic which favors moderation of physical pleasures: over-indulgence will eventually result in physical stresses.⁸³ In the case of public affairs, the man who leaves no time for his private affairs may one day discover that his wife has left him, his children barely know him,

and his financial affairs are a mess. Is not the result then anxiety and tension? And does not this have a readily apparent, and medically undesirable, physical manifestation? The result is therefore a threat to the physical condition of the soul because, again, the body is upset.

We are not quite through with our evaluation of the political functions of men according to Democritus, but we may best understand his viewpoint if we consider his opinions on the importance of the family.

THE FAMILY

Firstly, the family is the most important unit found within the State: but only partly because the sex drive is instinctive,⁸⁴ and therefore must be integrated into any social structure. More importantly, it is a benefit to both children and parents. Thomas Cole accurately perceives the Democritean viewpoint thusly:

Both men and animals beget children in obedience to the same natural law; animal parents, however, seek no reward for the affection and care which they lavish on their offspring. Among men, on the other hand, 'there has come into being an established usage (nomizon)' whereby the parents derive benefit from the child as well. Here the principle governing the parent-child relationship is neither instinctive nor paternalistic. It falls within the realm of nomos and has its origin at a given point in time; moreover, it represents an exchange of services, not the rendering of obedience to a superior.⁸⁵

Democritus himself phrased it thusly:

For human beings it is one of the necessities of life to have children, arising from natural and primeval law. It is obvious in the other animals too: they all have offspring by nature, and not for the sake of any profit. And when they are born, the parents work and rear each as best they can and are anxious for them while they are small, and if anything happens to them, the parents are grieved. But for man it has now become an established belief that there should be also some advantage from the offspring.⁸⁶

What we therefore have is a reciprocal relationship which is of benefit to all parties. This benefit would be lost through an over-indulgence in the affairs of state at the expense of familial concerns. Again, we see a "calculation" attempting to allow the maximum benefit to accrue. It is in attempting to maximize this benefit that we can make good sense out of Democritus' advocacy of adoption.⁸⁷

Perhaps we may now appreciate the affinity between affairs of state and affairs of home. The reciprocal relationships among family members provide the greatest immediate satisfactions for an individual, while the reciprocal relationships between a person and his government (i.e. participating in public affairs) provides the greatest social benefit (i.e. security, adoption of beneficial social innovations, provision of a desirable total social environment, etc.). Both are absolutely necessary (like eating) but one, if pursued in disregard of the other, will eventually result in an undesirable effect (as overeating will result in obesity).

The ideal is, again, a balance between familial and public affairs.⁸⁸ It is in this light that we must understand the stress Democritus put on public life:

Learn thoroughly the art of statesmanship, which is the greatest, and pursue its toils, from which men win great and brilliant prizes.⁸⁹

Because of the benefits a well-run state will offer:

One must give the highest importance to affairs of the State, that it may be well run; one must not pursue quarrels contrary to right, nor acquire a power contrary to the common good. The well-run State is the greatest protection, and contains all in itself; when this is safe, all is safe; when this is destroyed, all is destroyed.⁹⁰

Yet, as we have seen, there is the ever-present call for moderation.⁹¹

LAW

To assist men in maintaining this moderate level of public and private activity, help is required. This is because, remember, the quantity of activity must be moderate. We should not engage in "...many activities, either private or public..."⁹² This is reasonable because to concern oneself with a great number of activities which lie only in the respective spheres of domesticity and public affairs is in itself a form of excess. After all, there are other activities such as literature, travel, rest, education, physical exercise, etc. If we keep this in mind, we may comprehend the Democritean reverence for law. It is the social tool which frees us from making constant, daily, decisions on "public" and "private" matters by standardizing obviously desirable modes of social behavior. Law is that rationally calculated median between excesses which allows society to derive maximum possible benefit for its citizens. Law is the definition which recognizes the extremes to be avoided and is therefore the society's statement of how "well-being" may be achieved. It accomplishes this by precluding the possibility of anxiety for the citizens. Cyril Bailey recognizes this.

...if the citizens are to live the 'cheerful' life, they must be freed from all forms of molestation external and internal and the principle must be rigidly applied. And this is the purpose of the existence of laws:....⁹³

However, we must not assume that such laws are infallible. The principle of the "open society" to allow the maximum influx of beneficial ideas into the public forum (as well as an existent public machinery to allow swift implementation of such ideas) is in no way being compromised. However, the necessity is a willingness of men to exercise caution and wisdom in finding out if the new proposal is truly beneficial:

Freedom of speech is the sign of freedom; but
the danger lies in discerning the right occasion. ⁹⁴

Obviously, an enlightened populace is necessary:

The cause of error is ignorance of the better. ⁹⁵

We may perhaps even have enough evidence to tackle the question of the "origins" of this state of affairs. Thomas Cole speculates:

The initial human group as he conceives it is a loosely organized collection of individuals whose only common activity is self-defence in times of danger. In the absence of such danger the only individuals linked to each other by a close relationship would be parents and children, since the young mammal's inability to provide for itself makes such relationships inevitable. It would thus be natural to expect patterns of social behavior involving parents and children to be among the first to arise. Once the exchange of services between parent and child has been regulated by a system of cooperation advantageous to both, the principle of reciprocity might well be carried over into other types of relationships. The normative parent-child relationship is thus a model for other forms of koinonia, though not, of course, the only model. The friendship established between the giver and receiver of aid in moments of danger would doubtless have the same archetypal character. ⁹⁶

Cole is admittedly projecting this sequence upon Democritus from Polybius, however he feels there is an existent correlation. ⁹⁷ Certainly there appears to be nothing here that would contradict Democritean metaphysics. Again, we should note the importance of a reciprocal arrangement benefiting everyone.

And equally important is the recognition that there is more than one possible influence on development. This is important because it allows societies to develop alternative systems of conduct. Therefore, for example, while a settlement within a fertile region may consider emphasis on hunting skills a "deviance", an infertile region rich in game would have to compensate for this by a greater emphasis on hunting,

rather than agricultural, skills. This is simply to say that the median of moderation is not static, and varies with socio-historical-economic circumstances. For men, as for societies,

It is unreasonableness not to submit to the necessary conditions of life.⁹⁸

We therefore have to appreciate that there is some difference and some "subjectiveness" to the form different societies take.

However, this does not imply absolute tolerance. "Excess" is measured within the specific existent social structure. Thus it is a relative term. Indeed one can envision circumstances where to be "moderate" would in fact amount to carrying on activities which would be considered "excessive" anywhere else. Thus the physical hardships Eskimo communities may constantly undergo in a never-ending search for food would certainly be excessive on a tropical island rich in fruit and small game.

We are now in a position to understand both how laws are "relative", and yet must be ruthlessly enforced.

Those who do what is deserving of exile or imprisonment or other punishment must be condemned and not let off. Whoever contrary to the law acquits a man, judging according to profit or pleasure, does wrong, and this is bound to be on his conscience.⁹⁹

The man who challenges the law does not break a universally valid prescription, but he does threaten the mean (the law) thereby becoming a danger which threatens the delicate "balance" the law has established.

...Democritus saw the origin of society's attitude toward criminals in man's early struggle for survival against other species. The malefactor is someone who, by his violation of the laws of society, has in effect put himself outside society and must be destroyed like the animals which threaten its existence.¹⁰⁰

The reason the balance is delicate is because it is calculated to reflect the specific needs of the community.

The actual laws therefore embody that mean, and serve their purpose only if there is total agreement on their validity. For Democritus,

The aim of law is to create unity of outlook and aims within the State; all the great undertakings of a State, including war, depend for their success on internal unity. The well-run State is the strongest protection for its members; if it is lost, all is lost. Therefore the good of the community must be placed first; private quarrels and power-seeking must not be allowed to interfere. ¹⁰¹

Thus any threat which upsets this mean is equal to a physical attack as, in the end, physical effects will befall the society.

As has been laid down (by me) regarding beasts and reptiles which are inimical (to man), so I think one should do with regard to human beings: one should, according to ancestral law, kill an enemy of the State in every ordered society, unless a law forbids it. ...¹⁰²

It must be stressed, again, that the "criminal" can logically only be someone who either refuses to go through the proper "channels" for advocating legitimizing his conduct (i.e. introducing a "social innovation"¹⁰³), or someone who, once his attitude is found by society to be undesirable, ignores the dictum of the society. That is, in the latter case, he refuses to see--or acknowledge--the decision by the community to reject his proposed innovation. We should therefore see that the Democritean notion of "law" is hardly intended to instantly still any form of open dissent. Indeed, the community encourages unorthodox proposals and is willing to consider and adopt those which the public forum recognizes as beneficial.¹⁰⁴ However, since the system itself is so open, those who choose to go outside it cannot be viewed with pity.

Again:

Those who do what is deserving of exile or imprisonment or other punishment must be condemned and not let off. ...¹⁰⁵

The reason for maintaining a very "open" system to hear and implement innovative ideas is to ensure "progress" of the society.¹⁰⁶ The reason for "drawing the line" at some point--and doing so ruthlessly--is to ensure that the law not only fulfills its function of being the de facto "mean" for the society, but also fulfills its function of fostering cooperation among society's members.¹⁰⁷

Cooperation holds a central place in Democritean thought. Just as atoms "cooperate" (i.e. they interlock to produce a new entity) so must people in society cooperate if they wish to create new entities which they could not affect by themselves (i.e. a very strong unit of defense in the form of a state). In this light, what else is the model of a society which encourages suggestions for improvements, discusses these suggestions publicly and, if accepted, quickly implements them¹⁰⁸ if it is not a society which is the embodiment of the concept of cooperation?

We must therefore be very careful to keep the punitive aspect of law in proper perspective. It is society's last control upon its members (or outsiders) who threaten the ties of cooperation among the society's members. Clearly, punishment is subordinate to the understanding reached through cooperation.

The man who employs exhortation and persuasion will turn out to be a more effective guide to virtue than he who employs law and compulsion. For the man who is prevented by law from wrongdoing will probably do wrong in secret, whereas the man who is led towards duty by persuasion will probably not do anything untoward either secretly or openly. Therefore the man who acts rightly through understanding and knowledge becomes at the same time brave and upright.¹⁰⁹

The result shall be, as Thomas Cole accurately notes, a stronger society--stronger because it seeks to avoid, to the greatest degree possible without endangering itself, authoritarianism. Society expands and

grows peacefully because:

Cooperation and friendship are stronger bonds than force and fear; hence they will be able to hold together larger numbers of people.¹¹⁰

Thus, we have again clearly recognized the principle of a mutually beneficial network of reciprocal relationships, rooted in cooperation and friendship.

Similarity of outlook creates friendship.¹¹¹

HAPPINESS

It is within such a society, governed by such laws, that we shall find the "happy" man. He is happy because his society recognizes that it is not material comfort which is essential. Rather it is a society which recognizes that the social standard is the sought for balance between excesses which is the direct concern of citizens' "well-being" (in the ontological connotation of the term). Thus man cares for his soul privately, and is helped through society.

Men find happiness neither by means of the body nor through possessions, but through uprightness and wisdom.¹¹²

Happiness, like unhappiness, is a property of the soul.¹¹³

Happiness does not dwell in flocks of cattle or in gold. The soul is the dwelling-place of the (good and evil) genius.¹¹⁴

It is through society that we are able to control the broadest aspect of the environment for our benefit and thereby avoid becoming victims of apparently (to us) random chance.

The same things from which we get good can also be for us a source of hurt, or else we can avoid the hurt. For instance, deep water is useful for many purposes, and yet again harmful; for there is danger of being drowned. A technique has

therefore been invented: instruction in swimming.¹¹⁵

For mankind, evil comes out of what is good, if one does not know how to guide and drive correctly. It is not right to place such things in the category of evil, but in that of good. It is possible also to use what is good for an evil end if one wishes.¹¹⁶

Now it is apparent that everything is a means to an end. That end is the well-being of the soul. If attained, that end will result in the maximum accrual of pleasure for the individual members of society. This is because the health of the soul--through proper allocation of temporary pleasures--will result in the greatest long-term advantage for enjoying all pleasures. Only with this long-term view in mind, and only through appreciating that the greatest pleasures come from the soul's well-being (the "pleasure" of happiness¹¹⁷ and the proper rationing of other sensory pleasures to ensure maximum enjoyment thereof¹¹⁸) can we appreciate the full significance of:

Pleasure and absence of pleasure are the criteria of what is profitable and what is not.¹¹⁹

This type of "pleasure" is the antithesis of the momentary indulgence.

All who derive their pleasures from the stomach, overstepping due season in eating or drinking or sexual pleasure, have pleasures that are but brief and short-lived, (that is), only while they are eating and drinking, but pains that are many. For this desire is always present for the same things, and when people get what they desire, the pleasure passes quickly, and they have nothing good for themselves except a brief enjoyment; and then again the need for the same things returns.¹²⁰

It is, rather, the true echo of the Benthamite orientation.¹²¹ The concern is to go to the very core of pleasure (the well-being of the soul) and, upon properly administering to it, all auxiliary pleasures shall follow. Thus,

For all men, good and true are the same; but
pleasant differs for different men.¹²²

recognizes the common heart of true pleasure while admitting of many lesser, and subjective, pleasures. The "good and true" is simply the calculated balance of excesses which will result in the well-being of the soul, followed by the resultant practices called for (i.e. moderation).

Untimely pleasures produce unpleasantness.¹²³

Violent desire for one thing blinds the soul to
all others.¹²⁴

Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial.¹²⁵

If Democritus was indeed the "laughing philosopher",¹²⁶ we can understand why from the foregoing. The soul's well-being--and a just, equitable, and evolutionary society--had been reconciled with an unashamed love of life.

People are fools who live without enjoyment of
life.¹²⁷

People are fools who yearn for long life without
pleasure in long life.¹²⁸

ANACHRONISM AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

It serves us well to pause at this point of our explication to address ourselves to a central methodological problem in intellectual history. The claim that ideas can only be understood in reference to the "social milieu" and "social consciousness" of the epochs which must confront those ideas¹²⁹ gives rise to a corollary axiom which recognizes that the historian himself is under the cultural influences of his epoch. Therefore a dangerous tendency to judge history in the light of our own historically determined perspectives is everpresent. The practical result of this bias very often takes the form of an overly critical

examination of historical characters and their ideas and actions. That is, the modern historian may, in retrospect, perceive what are apparently gross "errors", "inadequacies", etc. in his subject. Often it is difficult to understand why this was not perceived by the historical subject (be it a person, a society, a culture, or an ideology).

The answer lies not necessarily in the conclusion that the subject was somehow of shallow intellectual depth. Rather, we suggest, the historian himself does not possess a proper comprehension of the strength of the socio-historical contingencies which dominate any particular historical epoch.

Democritean atomism is a case in point. In the following pages we shall argue that there are only two things which would mar a claim that Democritus is the archtypical humanist; his views on slavery and women--both apparent contradictions to his total philosophy.

This is true only in retrospect. Such an accusation would not have been, we suggest, comprehensible to the intellectuals of the Democritean era. The reason for this is to be found, again, in the peculiarities of the social milieu of fifth century Greece. It is our belief that George Thomson comes closest to illuminating the predominant aspect of the Greek social milieu--it is a slave owning society.

The truth is that, just because they were based on small-scale production, the Greek city-states, having grown up in conformity with the new developments in the productive forces, especially iron-working and the coinage, were able, under the democracy, to insinuate slave labour surreptitiously into all branches of production, and so create the illusion that it was something ordained by nature.¹³⁰

The key to Thomson's insight is found in the term "nature". The institution of slavery so permeated the social milieu of Athens (and all

of Greece) that it ceased to be a phenomena subject to critique--i.e. it was a "natural" aspect of the social environment. This was a perception shared by all the non-enslaved classes.

Freemen had no interest in combining with slaves against their common exploiters; rather, their aim was to buy slaves of their own, and this they could hope to do, so long as they were cheap.¹³¹

Democritus seems to have shared this unquestioning attitude; an attitude that is markedly repugnant from our historical vantage point. However, from the perspective of his era, his orientation is at least understandable.

His reflections on the status of women are subject to the same limitations and also reflect the common Hellenic sentiment.

We therefore caution the reader that the following discussions on slavery and the status of women are critical constructions not unlike the Weberian notion of "ideal type".¹³² The Democritean world view is being presented in a refined form; refined in the sense that modern criteria of consistency and the requirements of formal logic have been applied to his thought. These were methodological tools simply not available to Democritus himself.

However, in spite of our cautions about the following two sections, we feel that the remainder of our treatment of Democritean social concepts does not acutely suffer from such a limitation, and would be recognized and embraced by Democritus himself.

SLAVERY

Use slaves as parts of the body: each to his own function.¹³³

The above statement appears to be a blanket endorsement of the institution of slavery. As a result, Democritus is commonly viewed as a

supporter of slavery,¹³⁴ and this certainly adds credence to the claims of those who see his ethical statements as mere reflections of general Greek mores.¹³⁵ Yet the above pronouncement is strangely out of harmony with the rest of his philosophy.

To begin, we may consider that all men are equally materialistic products, and there is no "consciousness" in the universe to directly anoint some to be a "chosen few". Yet we concede that it is possible that the process of birth may result in some congenital "inferiority" such as physical deformation, obvious brain damage, hereditary disease, etc. But this is the exception, and hardly a basis upon which to build a system of slavery. We may also speculate that an obvious differentiation among men--i.e. skin color--could be seen as the result of a difference in atomic composition between races, and therefore indicative of the inferiority of one race. Yet a thorough-going rationalist like Democritus would surely put the burden of proof of "inferiority" upon those who consider themselves to hold a "superior" position. And lastly, perhaps slavery was seen to simply be a "necessity" to Democritus.

His pronouncement on slavery is also glaringly incompatible with other statements on the human condition, all of which show a profound sympathy for fellow humans:

It is proper, since we are human beings, not to laugh at the misfortune of others, but to mourn.¹³⁶

In a shared fish, there are no bones.¹³⁷

Poverty under democracy is as much to be preferred to so-called prosperity under an autocracy as freedom to slavery.¹³⁸

When the powerful prevail upon themselves to lend to the indigent, and help them, and benefit them, herein at last is pity, and an end to isolation, and friendship, and mutual aid, and harmony among

the citizens; and other blessings such as no man could enumerate.¹³⁹

Those to whom their neighbours' misfortunes give pleasure do not understand that the blows of fate are common to all; and also they lack cause for personal joy.¹⁴⁰

And, at the level of his personal praxis, we have rumors which allege that Democritus rescued Protagoras from menial labors and made him his secretary and pupil; and the stories which credit him with rescuing Diagoras of Melos from slavery and making him a pupil.¹⁴¹

Indeed, it seems that here rumor better serves history than scholarship. The offending fragment appears to challenge the philosophical consistency which rumor ironically reinforces.

For one thing, we may recall the role of innovative proposals for social action--they were eagerly sought.¹⁴² To maximize input of suggestions (thereby maximizing the chances for the best ideas being advocated) it seems necessary to allow all community members the unequivocal right to be heard. To allow this right, yet to differentiate between the ideas proposed by two men because one is "master" while the other is "slave" is to allow the possible prejudice of the open discussion of ideas. Thus slavery would be detrimental to optimal rates of social evolution.

The argument that slavery is "necessary" as it provides laborers for the menial tasks of society is also apparently invalid if we note that Democritus

...does not appear to have had any of the Athenian contempt for craftsmanship;...¹⁴³

Thus, at least at the level of the craftsman, we do not see a basis for a Democritean differentiation of superiority and inferiority among

men based on a model of division of labor. This is further reinforced by his constant emphasis on his belief that pursuit of worldly goods should be a secondary consideration for men.

Poverty and wealth are terms for lack and superfluity; so that he who lacks is not wealthy, and he who does not lack is not poor.¹⁴⁴

If your desires are not great, a little will seem much to you; for small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth.¹⁴⁵

He is fortunate who is happy with moderate means, ¹⁴⁶unfortunate who is unhappy with great possessions.

As for any slaves which did exist in the community, we can certainly assume that they would not be happy with their lot. After all:

Poverty under democracy is as much to be preferred to so-called prosperity under an autocracy as freedom to slavery.¹⁴⁷

Endorsing slavery seems to be a blatant contradiction to the Democritean tenet that force is an inferior form of social control when compared to the free cooperation of society's members:

The man who employs exhortation and persuasion will turn out to be a more effective guide to virtue than he who employs law and compulsion. For the man who is prevented by law from wrongdoing will probably do wrong in secret, whereas the man who is led towards duty by persuasion will probably not do anything untoward either secretly or openly. Therefore the man who acts rightly through understanding and knowledge becomes at the same time brave and upright.¹⁴⁸

Therefore, it appears that slavery is in fact a constant source of potential social disruption (because it relies on force) as well as a mechanism for hindering societal evolution (by cutting off a potentially rich source of innovative ideas). Yet, as luxury is eschewed (money is to be shared with the community, not hoarded¹⁴⁹), and manual work is not looked down upon--to say nothing of the need for a moderate amount of

physical exertion to promote physical health--slaves become unessential. The conclusion is therefore that the fragment which apparently gives blanket endorsement to institutionalized slavery is an aberration within an otherwise consistent philosophy.

(Yet, if one begins to question authenticity, obviously the same counter-criticisms may be applied to most--if not all--of the Democritean fragments. We shall therefore be content to point out the inconsistencies and close by noting that Epicurus apparently worked through this enigma to arrive at a much more enlightened viewpoint¹⁵⁰ while adhering to the essence of the Democritean atomic doctrine.)

STATUS OF WOMEN

Democritus exhibits the same inconsistency in his views on the status of women:

A woman must not practice argument: this is dreadful.¹⁵¹

To be ruled by a woman is the ultimate outrage for a man.¹⁵²

A woman is far sharper than a man in malign thoughts.¹⁵³

An adornment for a woman is lack of garrulity. Paucity of adornment is also beautiful.¹⁵⁴

Again, the same line of counter-reasoning prevails as utilized in our discussion of slavery. Again, we can only conclude that we have another inconsistency in Democritus' philosophy. And, again, we may thank Epicurus for correcting this viewpoint.¹⁵⁵

EDUCATION

Democritus' views on education are an accurate reflection of his metaphysics;¹⁵⁶ especially, of course, his epistemology.¹⁵⁷

Firstly, we learn through experience:

The rules of investigation contained in the 'Canon' of Democritus have long since been lost and forgotten. We can only deduce them to-day from his practice, or rather from the criticism which that practice entailed. His chief critic was Aristotle, who deserves our best thanks in that respect, though we cannot always subscribe to his views. One reproach, indeed, directed by Aristotle at the method of Democritus is changed in our eyes into a title to the highest honour. He blamed the philosopher of Abdera for proposing in the ultimate resort no other solution of the problems of natural processes than 'it is so or it happens so always,' or 'it has happened heretofore likewise.' In other words, Democritus recognized experience as the ultimate source of our knowledge of nature.¹⁵⁸

The significance of this is to be found in the fact that new experiences constantly occur, therefore we are continually learning new things. Perhaps we may refer back to the example of the origins of the practice of mule breeding.¹⁵⁹ The first mules, obviously, will differ from each other physically; so we have the notion of "improving the stock" by careful parental selection. We also very soon learn that mules are sterile, so all kinds of physiological speculations are brought up. Needless to say, cross-breeding of other species of animals also is not difficult to project. And what changes in agricultural and transportation techniques will follow from the possession of a strong, easily domesticated, and sturdy beast of burden; on this issue we can only speculate.

"Education" is therefore, in one sense, the study of "successes" our experience has recorded. The study of one "success" leads to speculations which give rise to another "success" and so on. Thus education becomes a highly innovative activity which is quick to reject what is outmoded and eager to exploit that which is demonstrably superior to the

outmoded.

Nature and instruction are similar; for instruction transforms the man, and in transforming, creates his nature.¹⁶⁰

Thus the concept of a "fixed" curriculum would be unthinkable to Democritus. Just as in a world devoid of divine intervention into nature the thought of a halt to "experience" is inconceivable; so is the concept of a curriculum which hesitates to incorporate the latest beneficial "experiences" noted by men unthinkable. Epicurus understood this with his rejection of the primacy of "cultural" education--which is essentially the study of tradition--in favor of a more "scientific"--i.e. seeking to broaden the base of observable "experiences"--education.

Epicurus had a system of education devised for the promotion of happiness as he conceived it: well-being, serenity, freedom from fear.

.....
 ...A hint of this is contained in a letter to a young disciple of whom he was very fond:

'As for every sort of culture, my dear soul, take to your yacht and flee from it.'

By 'culture' is meant the ordinary literary education: rhetoric, poetry, music, writing. In this letter he offers the young man a substitute, namely the study of science, especially astronomy and meteorology, and he outlines how it should be pursued and for what purpose.

Epicurus, then, advocated the study of what he called Physics, that is, natural science, in place of the usual curriculum, and in particular the Atomic Theory of Democritus, because science offers a rational explanation of everything; all mystery is done away with and there is no longer any ground for superstitious fear, the great enemy of serenity.¹⁶¹

We therefore see that education is a very radical process for Democritus. Its intention is not the perpetuation of any knowledge simply because it is enveloped in tradition. Quite the opposite; "knowledge" is

constantly rejected as valid because a systematic study of "experience" will show us where we have erred in our perceptions of reality. After all, were not, a short time ago, men "...raising their hands thither to what we Greeks call the Air nowadays,..."¹⁶² They did so because they misunderstood their own "experiences" and therefore gave themselves an improper "education".

Thus the curriculum must be constantly changing. It must be changing because, remember, there are no eternal transcendental truths. Therefore one does not "discover" any truths which indicate any "purpose" in the universe.

The inner logic of the Atomist theory, therefore, led straight to the conclusion that consciousness and perception, as they are known in ordinary experiences, are epiphenomena, determined and accounted for completely by the states and rearrangements of components not themselves capable of consciousness or perception. ...It followed that the whole history of the universe was determined, if at all, by a 'meaningless' necessity inherent in the laws governing the collision and rebound of atoms, a force which was devoid of any inherent tendency to the better, or of any regard for the wishes and requirements of such accidental by-products as conscious beings.¹⁶³

All one can do is to try to uncover the "meaningless necessity" Edward Hussey refers to. What is being advocated is, of course, a recognition that the laws of nature are the proper study of mankind. We must not seek to uncover the "purpose" that the "gods" infused into the cosmos. We must instead seek to understand the principles of mechanical causation which allow nature to have order.

However, care must be taken to not interpret this as a dictum which would force everyone to study physics, chemistry, or some other "natural science". We already know that the pursuit of domestic affairs,¹⁶⁴

statesmanship,¹⁶⁵ and civic concerns,¹⁶⁶ are all the rightful pursuits of people who seek to be educated.

And, of course, this reflects also the concern with moderation. To plunge headlong into the study of biology is to show the same form of "excess" that a total dedication to exercise would show. We may therefore easily see how a "well-rounded" education is desirable. It is an education which very early in life stresses "experience".

The self-control of the father is the greatest example for the children.¹⁶⁷

It is an education which requires one to actively practice what he has learned.

One should emulate the deeds and actions of virtue, not the words.¹⁶⁸

And one should pursue knowledge in order to gain mastery over his own fate.

The cause of error is ignorance of the better.¹⁶⁹

The result is a form of understanding which will protect us from "chance".

Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity....¹⁷⁰

This understanding will ensure that we will be free from needless tragedy.

The foolish learn sense through misfortune.¹⁷¹

At the same time, we shall understand the "necessities" that are part of being a wholly corporeal organism within a wholly corporeal universe.

It is unreasonableness not to submit to the necessary conditions of life.¹⁷²

GOVERNMENT

We may complete our overview of Democritean social concepts by briefly alluding to the role of government. We have covered the essence

of the matter in our discussion on law,¹⁷³ and the "open society".¹⁷⁴ However, there are further important considerations which we must take care to note.

Firstly, just as individual men must avoid excess in favor of moderation, so must whole societies. This may be understood within the same reference points as individual moderation. Too much energy expended in any one direction will eventually result in an imbalance which will take even more energy to correct. (For example; over-exercising requires great effort which initially produces superior strength for the individual. However, this comes about at the expense of over-taxing the heart muscles. The heart must therefore work much harder to ensure circulation, and eventually it is overworked to the point of giving way in the form of a heart attack.) Therefore, beyond a certain point (the moderate median) activity becomes self-defeating.

The implications for government are significant. Governments, like men, should follow the "golden rule" of moderation.

In general, wherever self-sufficiency appears in the context of social relations the mood 'be content with what you have, don't ask for more' predominates in Democritus.¹⁷⁵

We can readily see how Democritus would therefore not support the concept of an actively empire-building state because it is precisely such an excessive activity. To build an empire requires great energy from the citizens, thus "private affairs"¹⁷⁶ are ignored. Maintaining an empire necessitates the subjugation of colonial peoples (at least initially) and this is rejecting self-control in favor of a punitive legal structure, which is also not acceptable.¹⁷⁷ And, of course, we must ask the purpose of empire-building. If it is to increase the wealth of the imperial heartland, this is not a desired goal as we know Demo-

critus denounced overt concern with oppulence.¹⁷⁸

The function of the state appears, therefore, to precisely reflect the purpose of the state's laws. (And, indeed, how can it be otherwise?) Namely, it is the social embodiment of the virtues practiced at the level of the individual. The chief virtue is, of course, moderation. The picture of the state which emerges from atomic philosophy is therefore one of a state which is large enough to provide security for its citizens¹⁷⁹ and is self-sufficient in providing the basic needs of life.¹⁸⁰ Yet it is small enough to ensure citizen participation in a wholly democratic public forum where ideas are debated¹⁸¹ and is free from the desire to seek self-aggrandizement because it would rather concern itself with the "well-being"¹⁸² of its citizens.

This completes our investigation of the Democritean perception of the individual and society. The question now to be posed is: how compatible is such an orientation with the fifth century Athenian viewpoint? We must begin to seek the answer through an historical reconstruction of Athenian society.

Footnotes

¹See Freeman, Ancilla, pp. 91-120., and Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 293-299. We must remember, however, that absolute certainty cannot be attributed to the veracity of any statement of Democritus. The main source for atomic metaphysics and cosmology are Aristotle and his followers (see Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 299) while an attempt was made by the scholar Thrasyllus to catalogue the works of Democritus into "tetralogies". However, it is possible that these are a collection of works from the entire literature of fifth and fourth century B.C. Abdera; not necessarily the work of only Democritus (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 295). Similarly, we can only speculate on the validity of the remaining sources. Especially of concern to our study are apparent contradictions found in the Democritean "Maxims"; however, again, there is a possibility that some, or all, of the "Maxims" are not genuinely Democritus' statements.

"It is a tantalizing misfortune, and a reflexion of later taste, that the considerable number of fragments that have survived (not all of which are certainly genuine) are nearly all taken from the ethical works."

Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 404.

The result is that:

"Of his works, over three hundred quotations or alleged quotations have survived. Of these, a few can be assigned to the books given as Democritean by Thrasyllus; but the majority come from unspecified works. There is also a large collection of Gnomae, pithy phrases mostly of a practical ethical turn, ascribed to 'Democrates', but usually believed to be by Democritus. Finally, there are the fragments which purport to come from works by Democritus revealing the magic lore of the East or of Egypt."

Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 294-295.

²We must contend, of course, with the well-known denial of Epicurus of any debt to Democritus. This, however, has been wholly rejected by scholars.

³See pp. 27-28.

⁴Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.

⁵This follows from the "accidental" nature of our creation. Our consciousness is a result of such a "chance" collision of atoms. Thus we cannot assume that our perceptive and intellectual abilities are superior to all consciousness. For a discussion of the ability of men to perceive reality see Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 310-311. Especially of interest is her accurate notation that although we have five senses, many more are theoretically possible. Therefore the existence of "superior" creatures around us could possibly be imperceptible to us, further compounding the problem.

⁶This follows from the speculation that there are in fact countless worlds scattered throughout the Democritean universe. See the preceding discussion of Democritus' cosmology, pp. 23-25.

⁷Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.

⁸Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, trans. by Laurie Magnus. Vol. 1 of A History of Ancient Philosophy (4 vols.; New York: The Humanities Press, 1955), p. 367-368.

⁹Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.

¹⁰Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, pp. 367-368.

¹¹Hussey, The Pre-Socratics, p. 148.

¹²See pp. 23-25.

¹³"What a poet writes with enthusiasm and divine inspiration is most beautiful."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 97.

"Homer, having been gifted with a divine nature, built an ordered structure of manifold verse."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 97.

"He who chooses the advantages of the soul chooses things more divine, but he who chooses those of the body, chooses things human."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.

¹⁴Gregory Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in Democritus, I," Philosophical Review LIV (1945), pp. 581-582.

¹⁵Gregory Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in Democritus, II," Philosophical Review LV (1946), p. 63.

¹⁶An interesting example of an insistence upon maintaining the notion of an immortal diety within atomic philosophy may be found in Roy Kenneth Hack, God in Greek Philosophy to The Time of Socrates (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1931). His assertion is that

"...there is some reason to believe that divinity was never effectively banished from the Ionian scheme of the world."

Hack, God, p. 2.

The argument, in relation to the atomic school, is essentially as follows: After a discussion of the apparent uniqueness of the soul/mind atoms, he concludes:

"The Spherical Forms are therefore endowed, according to Leucippus and Democritus, with the highest degree of causative power. The Spherical forms are God."

Hack, God, pp. 134-135.

The difference between soul/mind atoms and other atoms is a functional, not an ontological difference. That is:

"In fact, the Indivisible Beings are objects of thought, devoid of all sensible quality and substance; and they are not bodies, subject to perception and change, but are themselves the causes of all bodies; they are not magnitudes such as are studied by the mathematician, and necessarily subject to division, but are Imperishable Forms which consist of pure Being, and though they are separated by void, they are not divisible by void or by anything else. ...It is quite true that the perfection of the divine Spherical Forms, as portrayed by Leucippus, carries with it an implied criticism of all other Forms, which are inevitably endowed with a lower degree of causal power, simply because their Forms are other than Spherical. In other words, all Forms are divine, because all Forms consist of the Being of God; but some are lower than others, and the name of God is reserved by Leucippus and Democritus for the Spherical Forms, precisely as Heraclitus identified his supreme god with Fire, and not with the lower forms of Fire."

Hack, God, pp. 136-137.

The result, for Hack, is that Leucippus had in fact not espoused materialism, rather that his "atoms" embodied the notion of consciousness, essence, and rational causality. Speaking of Leucippus, he feels that:

"He had improved upon the Eleatic supreme god by restoring it to full causal activity and a direct relation with phenomena. He had assumed that the Spherical Forms would have the highest degree of causal power; but he never imagined that the Spherical Forms could be regarded as operating mechanically, or in 'obedience' to laws external to themselves. The Spherical Forms were themselves divine

Reason; and as for the Necessity of which Leucippus speaks, it had from the earliest days of Greek thought been associated with the supreme divine power, not as external to that power but as identical with it or as one of its principal attributes.

....

The Spherical Forms, who were all Thought and Being, were the supreme god of Leucippus. It is now fairly clear that these Forms do not in the least resemble 'matter', in either the ancient or the modern acceptations of that term."

Hack, God, pp. 140-141.

This argument is obviously not compatible with the vast majority of opinion, nor is it compatible with Democritean metaphysics.

¹⁷Freeman, God, pp. 35-36. See also: Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 315.

¹⁸Freeman, Ancilla, p. 98.

¹⁹Freeman, Ancilla, p. 104.

²⁰See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 175-176.; Freeman, God, p. 37.; Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 314-315.; and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, p. 355.

²¹This concept is inspired by the speculation of Thomas Cole: Thomas Cole, Democritus and The Sources of Greek Anthropology Vol. XXV of Philosophical Monographs. ed. by John Arthur Hanson (Princeton: Western Reserve University Press, 1967), pp. 203-204. It is not, however, a true reflection of the intentions of his statements. Cole's argument is much broader and centers, in this particular instance, on the hypothesis that:

"...Democritus regarded the idea of divinity as somehow related to that of kingship."

Cole, Democritus, p. 203.

²²Freeman, Ancilla, p. 112.

²³See Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 315., and Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 175.

²⁴Freeman, God, p. 38.

²⁵Ibid., p. 37.

²⁶Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 412.

²⁷Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.

²⁸Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 413.

²⁹See pp. 41-42.

³⁰Vlastos, Ethics II, p. 56.

³¹Freeman, Ancilla, p. 104.

³²Ibid., p. 110.

³³Ibid., p. 118.

³⁴This concept is more fully discussed on pp. 74-78.

³⁵See pp. 39-40 and pp. 74-78.

³⁶Freeman, Ancilla, p. 106.

³⁷Cole, Democritus, p. 56.

³⁸Ibid., p. 162.

³⁹Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).

⁴⁰See pp. 24-25 and pp. 43-44.

⁴¹See pp. 22-25.

⁴²This process is more fully discussed on pp. 74-76.

⁴³Cole, Democritus, p. 69.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 131-132.

⁴⁵See pp. 47-50.

⁴⁶See Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 186 and p. 212.; Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 402.; Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 425.; and Scoon, Greek Philosophy, pp. 219-220.

⁴⁷Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 425. Scoon feels that the ethics are borrowed from what were existent general Greek mores. Scoon, Greek Philosophy, p. 227.

⁴⁸Maxims comprise fragments 35-115 in Freeman, Ancilla, pp. 99-103.

⁴⁹Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 2-3.

⁵⁰See Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 402.

⁵¹Freeman, Ancilla, p. 108.

⁵²Ibid., p. 109.

- ⁵³Ibid., p. 109.
- ⁵⁴Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 191.
- ⁵⁵Vlastos, Ethics I, p. 583.
- ⁵⁶Freeman, Ancilla, p. 101.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., p. 107.
- ⁵⁸See Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 190.
- ⁵⁹Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 315.
- ⁶⁰See. p. 28.
- ⁶¹See pp. 27-28.
- ⁶²See p. 27.
- ⁶³See p. 27.
- ⁶⁴See pp. 27-28.
- ⁶⁵Here we may perceive the influence of Heraclitus.
- ⁶⁶See p. 27.
- ⁶⁷Vlastos, Ethics I, p. 585.
- ⁶⁸Freeman, Ancilla, p. 103.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., p. 106
- ⁷⁰Ibid., p. 111.
- ⁷¹Ibid., p. 111.
- ⁷²Ibid., p. 117.
- ⁷³See pp. 47-50.
- ⁷⁴Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.
- ⁷⁵Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation intro. by Laurence J. Lafleur (Darien, Conn: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948).
- ⁷⁶Freeman, Ancilla, p. 112.
- ⁷⁷Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 404.
- ⁷⁸Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 196.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 212.

⁸⁰It has been calculated that, in Athens, at any given moment one citizen in four or five was formally engaged in public service. See; W. Agard, What Democracy Meant to the Greeks. (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942) pp. 71-72.

⁸¹Freeman, Ancilla, p. 92.

⁸²Ibid., p. 101.

⁸³See pp. 55-57.

⁸⁴See Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 322.

⁸⁵Cole, Democritus, pp. 112-113.

⁸⁶Freeman, Ancilla, p. 117.

⁸⁷"The rearing of children is full of pitfalls. Success is attended by strife and care, failure means grief beyond all others."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 116.

"I do not think one should have children. I observe in the acquisition of children many great risks and many griefs, whereas a harvest is rare, and even when it exists, it is thin and poor."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 116.

"Whoever wants to have children should, in my opinion, choose them from the family of one of his friends. He will thus obtain a child such as he wishes, for he can select the kind he wants. And the one that seems fittest will be most likely to follow on his natural endowment. The difference is that in the latter way one can take one child out of many who is according to one's liking; but if one begets a child of one's own, the risks are many, for one is bound to accept him as he is."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 116.

⁸⁸See Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 320., and Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 199.

⁸⁹Freeman, Ancilla, p. 106.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 114.

⁹¹See pp. 51-58.

⁹²Freeman, Ancilla, p. 92.

⁹³Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 209.

⁹⁴Freeman, Ancilla, p. 112.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 102.

⁹⁶Cole, Democritus, pp. 115-116.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 115.

⁹⁸Freeman, Ancilla, p. 118.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 115.

¹⁰⁰Cole, Democritus, p. 124. (Cole acknowledges his debt to Havelock and von Fritz for this perception.)

¹⁰¹Freeman, God, p. 121.

¹⁰²Freeman, Ancilla, p. 115.

¹⁰³See pp. 47-50.

¹⁰⁴See p. 49.

¹⁰⁵Freeman, Ancilla, p. 115.

¹⁰⁶See pp. 47-50.

¹⁰⁷Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 319-320.

¹⁰⁸See pp. 47-50.

¹⁰⁹Freeman, Ancilla, p. 108.

¹¹⁰Cole, Democritus, p. 116.

¹¹¹Freeman, Ancilla, p. 109. Bailey is also diligent in noting

that:

"Friendship must be based on common thoughts and interests."
Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 207.

¹¹²Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 107.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 107.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 107.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 107.

¹¹⁷See pp. 52-56.

118 Because, again, excess will eventually result in an adverse physical effect.

119 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 92.

120 Ibid., pp. 112-113.

121 Bentham, Principles.

122 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 101.

123 Ibid., p. 101.

124 Ibid., p. 101.

125 Ibid., p. 101.

126 Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, p. 368.

127 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 110.

128 Ibid., p. 110.

129 See pp. 1-5.

130 George Thomson, Studies in Ancient Greek Society, Vol. II: The First Philosophers (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1955), p. 204.

131 Ibid., p. 197.

132 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch with a foreword by Edward A. Shils (New York: The Free Press, 1949).

133 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 116.

134 See, for example, Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 206.; Freeman, God, p. 123.; and Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 322.

135 See, for example, Kirk and Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 425.

136 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 103.

137 Ibid., p. 105

138 Ibid., p. 114.

139 Ibid., p. 114.

140 Ibid., p. 118.

141 Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 292.

142 See pp. 47-50.

143 Freeman, God, p. 177.

144 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 117.

145 Ibid., p. 117.

146 Ibid., p. 117.

147 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 114.

148 Ibid., p. 108.

149 Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 321.

150 For an insight into the Epicurean view of slavery, in contrast to what was the predominant view of that time, see Benjamin Farrinton, The Faith of Epicurus, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), pp. 22-23 and p. 30.

151 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 103.

152 Ibid., p. 103.

153 Ibid., p. 116.

154 Ibid., p. 116.

155 Although we do not know their exact status, we do know that women were in residence at Epicurus' school. See; Norman Wentworth DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 95-96. Certainly we have no basis upon which to suspect that they were excluded from instruction and discussions. If this were the case, then it seems reasonable to assume, that Epicurus would exclude them from the school, thereby alleviating some of the adverse public reactions which DeWitt notes.

156 See chapter 3.

157 See pp. 25-29.

158 Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, p. 363.

159 See pp. 47-49.

160 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.

161 Freeman, God, pp. 200-201.

162 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 98.

163 Hussey, The Pre-Socratics, p. 148.

164 See pp. 58-60.

165 "Learn thoroughly the art of statesmanship, which is the greatest, and pursue its toils, from which men win great and brilliant prizes."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 106.

166 See pp. 58-59.

167 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 111.

168 Ibid., p. 100.

169 Ibid., p. 102.

170 Ibid., p. 104.

171 Ibid., p. 100.

172 Ibid., p. 118.

173 See pp. 61-66.

174 See p. 49.

175 Vlastos, Ethics II, p. 59. (This comment appears as a footnote.)

176 See pp. 58-59.

177 See pp. 63-66.

178 See pp. 66-67.

179 "...The well-run State is the greatest protection, and contains all in itself; when this is safe, all is safe; when this is destroyed, all is destroyed."
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 114.

180 This is another extrapolation from footnote #172, above. The context may be found in Vlastos, Ethics II, p. 59.

181 See pp. 49-50.

182 See pp. 66-67.

CHAPTER V

HISTORY OF ATHENS TO THE SECOND PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Athens' prestige and power culminated in the fifth century, which may be described both as a "democratic" and "imperialistic" era. Her's was a unique achievement in Greece--reflective of her unique historical development. The essence of that achievement is to be found--we suggest and shall attempt to illustrate--in the Athenian success at compromising atagonistic interests. Specifically, the ideology of the aristocratic class was successfully appropriated into a newly emergent middle class. This was the link which provided an underlying stability among the divergent sections of the Athenian social milieu.

The nature of that ideology shall be fully discussed in chapter six. It is our intention herein to outline the historical sequence of events which preceded the Peloponnesian Wars of 431 to 404.

ATTICA TO THE TIME OF SOLON

For our purposes, the most significant aspect of the history of Athens up to the seventh century is the transition from monarchy to aristocracy. This was the first step in a diffusion of power--over a period of centuries--which was to result in the "democracy" of fifth century Athens.

Limiting the king's military power appears to have been the first

success of the aristocrats. This was accomplished through the institution of the office of polemarch (supreme military commander). The post was filled with someone elected from the ranks of the nobility. However, the office of archon (regent)--a subsequent development--was much more significant. It was invested with all the major powers of the king, and thereby gave the aristocrats de facto rule. Originally the title was held for life and only members of the Medontid family were eligible. The term of office was later reduced to ten years and opened to all the nobles. Although we cannot be certain of the chronology of this sequence of events, it does appear that by 683 the office of regent became an annual term. The institution of kingship degenerated with loss of actual power into an elected office with a one year term.¹

Early in the seventh century, then, the Athenian republic was an aristocracy, and the executive was in the hands of three annually elected officers, the archon, the king, and the polemarch.²

Such was the composition of the executive of the Athenian government at the opening of the seventh century. The actual day to day functions of the government were carried out through a Council of Elders, presided over by the king,³ and it must be noted that all political offices and powers were in the hands of the nobility.

If we examine the division of society along the lines of social class, we find the citizen population divided into three classes. The nobles (Eupatridae) occupy the top of the hierarchy; the small land owners (Georgi) are next in wealth, status, and prestige; and the public workers and artisans (Demiurgi) fall into the final category. It must be stressed that all of the above were citizens of the Athenian state.⁴

There was, however, great disparity between these three groups. The nobles were the owners of large estates,--situated on the most fer-

tile land,--and derived a large income from their holdings. The small landowners were generally confined to the poorer land of the hillsides and had a much more difficult time of working the land. This economic disparity was accompanied by political inequality: only the nobles had political rights; the small landowners did not. (And, needless to say, this meant that the public workers were without rights.)⁵

Other free, but not holding citizenship, classes were found below the social status of the citizen but above the level of the slave. (at this time, slavery was minimal.) Agricultural workers who worked the estates of the nobles, craftsmen employed by the Demiurgi, and various producers of goods on a very small basis fell into the free but non-citizen classes.⁶

These were very old social divisions and they ensured that political power rested in the hands of the nobility--which was also the wealthy group. The source of aristocratic wealth lay in the appropriation of the vast majority of fertile land in the time of a solely agrarian economic system. The perpetuation of this system was ensured through limitation of noble title to those who inherited it.

By the middle of the seventh century, however, economic changes necessitated a social restructuring. The first change saw the replacement of an aristocracy of birth with an aristocracy of wealth. Four citizen classes emerged: The Pentacosimedimni could produce the equivalent of more than 500 measures of corn, oil, and wine; the Knights produced less than 500 but more than 300 measures; Teamsters produced less than 300 but more than 200 measures, and Thetes produced less than 200 measures yearly. This last class consisted of peasants owning small, subsistence producing, patches of land; and handicraftsmen. The Team-

sters were more affluent peasants who were able to employ oxen in the cultivation of their land. Knights were those who were able to maintain a horse and armor, and the Pentacosiomedimni were the old nobility.⁷

We therefore see that, in the mid-seventh century, some social gains had been made through the economic advance of, particularly, members of the Georgi class, and less spectacular successes were recorded by isolated members of the Demiurgi class. The Georgi would profit from the newly lucrative export of olive oil, while the craftsmen of the Demiurgi class found new markets at home and abroad for their products.⁸

We see then that, in the middle of the seventh century, society in Attica is undergoing the change which is transforming the face of all the progressive parts of Hellas; wealth is competing with descent as a political test; and the aristocracy of birth seems to be passing into a timocracy. The power is in the hands of the three chief archons, who always belong to the class of wealthy nobles, and the Council of Areopagus, which is certainly composed of Eupatridae. But the classes outside the noble Clans, the smaller proprietors and the merchants, are beginning to assert themselves and make their weight felt;

However, we must be careful not to conclude that a general redistribution of wealth among all citizen classes was taking place. Quite the opposite. While some of the more affluent members of the non-aristocratic classes greatly improved their social and financial lot, the lowest citizen class--the Thetes--suffered a severe economic oppression. This process began to accelerate alarmingly in the mid-seventh century and reached crisis proportions by the close of that century.

That was a period of great unrest which was reflected in a variety of social, economic, political, and demographic manifestations.¹⁰ However, our main concern is the effect produced upon the lowest classes. The Thetes were particularly unsuited to withstand economic vicissitudes.

Being subsistence farmers, they became increasingly often forced to borrow money (which was a new development and quite scarce) to carry them through into the next growing season. The interest rates for such loans were extremely high, and foreclosures became common. Thus what had once been a large class of small landowners was now becoming dispossessed. These small patches of land became absorbed by the large estates, giving them all that much more economic power. The lot of the agricultural laborers (who, we recall, were not of the citizen class) was even worse. The usual manner in which they earned a living was by retaining one-sixth of the produce they extracted from the land of the noble who employed them. The other five-sixths went to the landowner. However, during the economic chaos of the late seventh century, this portion of revenue was often not enough to support the laborer and he had to borrow. As the only property he possessed was his body, this became the security for loans. Slowly but surely this class of free laborers fell into slavery.¹¹

The situation had become critical, and there was the very real possibility of wholesale revolt by the lowest--and most populous--classes. Reform had to be instituted; whether it came through attempts at tyranny such as undertaken by Cleon circa 632, or in the form of law reforms such as Dracon's Code circa 621.¹² But measures such as these were either abortive or inadequate. They did not stop the polarization of Athenian society into one very wealthy and one very impoverished group.

Thus while the wealthy few were becoming wealthier and greedier, the small proprietors were becoming landless, and the landless freemen were becoming slaves.¹³

It was this situation which faced Solon when he served as archon

from 594 to 593.

THE SIXTH CENTURY

The first response of the sixth century to the difficulties outlined above was undertaken by Solon.¹⁴ He was particularly well-suited for the task as he was a noble by birth, yet had engaged in trade.¹⁵ Apparently this dual role--combined with his personality--helped to make him an acceptable arbitrator in the eyes of the Athenians. In his term as archon--during which the office was temporarily endowed with extraordinary powers--he undertook a reform of the Athenian social structure. We need not concern ourselves with the totality of his reforms,¹⁶ rather we will address ourselves to those which we feel had particular significance for future developments in Athenian history.

Solon's virtue (i.e. acceptability to a large spectrum of the citizens) was to eventually give rise to the central weakness in his reforms. That is, by being a "compromise" candidate, he--in the fulfillment of his role--really satisfied no-one. He could, and did, recognize the grossest inequalities and acted toward their alleviation. Thus, in a spirit truly supportive of the demand for a broadening of political powers, he did eliminate some of the most oppressive actions of the nobility. Yet, at the same time, his aristocratic heritage was revealed in his attitude toward the least privileged groups of citizens. In a word, he mistrusted them. To give them too much power would be a mistake, as they were simply incapable of handling it.

It is clear that Solon considered the rapaciousness of wealthy landowners to be the greatest evil of the day. He was therefore determined to get the poor out from under their crushing debts. On the other hand, he had distinct reservations about these same

much-abused people. He had refused to be moved by their clamor for a redistribution of the land, and he further let it be known that he had no confidence in the judgment of common men who enjoy too much prosperity. When he came to reorganize the government, he says that he gave to the common people only a limited responsibility, as much as he thought they could handle.¹⁷

There are five reforms of Solon which are of particular interest to us.

By changing the Athenian coinage from the Aeginetan to the Corinthian standard, trade was greatly stimulated. Now the western Mediterranean was a much more accessible market for Athenian enterprise.¹⁸ This was a crucial innovation benefiting the emerging mercantile class, and was to contribute greatly to later Athenian commercial prosperity.

The same mercantile interests were assisted through changes in the citizenship laws. For the first time, a citizen from another city-state was eligible for Athenian citizenship. Specifically, artisans were attracted to Athens through the offer of Athenian citizenship--if they agreed to reside there permanently with their family.¹⁹ These artisans were destined to greatly contribute to Athens' fame and prosperity through the goods they produced for export.

Internal disquiet was somewhat alleviated through the banning of grain as an export product.²⁰ The immediate result of this was an end to artificial famines, and stability of food prices. Domestic reform also included setting free laborers who had fallen into slavery. However, no provisions were made for their care, and these people were utterly without land and resources.²¹ Therefore this segment of the population was still extremely discontent.

Solon's reform of the judiciary is a most crucial event in Athen-

ian history. The justice courts were opened to all citizens--sitting in the capacity of jurymen. Therefore--while it is true that they were excluded from eligibility to become elected magistrates--the Thetes could now sit in a new Assembly to which the right of appeal of magistrates' decisions existed.²²

This is an important development and warrants further explication. Firstly, we must note that the Thetes comprised the numerically largest class²³ and now had political power (as members of a popular court of appeal). And equally crucial were the contingencies which influenced the executive of this assembly. Not only were the judges chosen by lot (therefore even the lowest citizen was eligible) but a magistrate could, after his term of office expired, be called to account for his actions before the Assembly.²⁴

Administrative and legislative functions also began to pass slowly into the hands of the new Assembly.²⁵ Although a new Council of Four Hundred (one hundred representatives from each tribe) was limited in membership to the top three classes and directed the daily affairs of state, it must be noted that it was required to place larger issues before the Assembly for a vote.²⁶ Thus:

...the people possessed theoretically the sovereignty of the state; and the meting out of more privileges to the less wealthy classes could be merely a matter of time.²⁷

The terms "theoretically" and "matter of time" are worth pondering as they help to illuminate the events of the rest of the sixth century. To begin, we may note that politics is a pragmatic art and thus to "theoretically" possess power and to actually exercise it may be two different things. In the case of the Thetes, we note their eligibility to sit in the popular Assembly, and their ineligibility to hold the office

of magistrate. This presents a twofold problem:

Since the Council was in the hands of the upper three classes, the fourth class of poorest citizens still had no chance for radicalism. In other respects too, so far as both the Assembly and the courts were concerned, what the poorer citizens had been given in theory was very likely different from what they had in practice. For one thing, they would be the least likely to spare the time from making a living to come into the city and participate in government business. Their lack of experience in public affairs, their depressed circumstances, and their inability to afford any education must also have discouraged large numbers of them from taking steps to claim their rights. Indeed, under the Solonian constitution it was apparently not expected that they would. While Solon has always been credited with giving the common people a place, it has been plain that he intended them to have only a limited role in the government and did not by any means intend that they should have the last word. More than a century would pass before a more experienced and better-informed majority would take the ultimate power for themselves.²⁸

Thus, while apparent conciliation had been attained, political and economic unrest was still deeply rooted. In effect, Athenian society was becoming polarized into three ideological groups through Solon's reforms. The large landowners (consisting almost exclusively of the old nobility) were unhappy with the new order. The small farmers were only mildly helped, and they were still hard-pressed to eke out an existence from their poor soil. And the mercantile class--still young but growing in size and power--really had little in common, or sympathy, with the first two groups.²⁹ These interest groups we may characterize as "the people of the plain", "the people of the hill" and the "people of the coast". And it is with reference to this political typology that we may profitably examine the turmoil of the sixth century.

The men of the coast, fishermen, city craftsmen, were inclined to abide by Solon's arrangements.

In this party were many of the newer citizens, who had recently come to Athens, and in fact they served as a counterpoise to the men of the plain, the landed nobility. Democratic and oligarchic leanings were here balancing each other. The decision, the danger, now lay with the third party, the men of the hills, turbulent shepherds who had expected a redistribution of property.³⁰

Peisistratus is the opportunist who was successful in exploiting the central weakness in Solon's reforms: the old nobility, for all practical purposes, remained a law unto itself.³¹ From earliest times the original four tribes of Athens (Geleontes, Argadeis, Aigioreis and Hopletes), each led by a tribal king, formed the basis of the Athenian political structure.³² Solon did not attempt to put an end to the rivalry between these four tribes.³³ This rivalry for political supremacy continued long after the tribe ceased to be the primary political unit. It was to be the leading families of the clans comprising these tribes who would provide the leadership for the successive attempts to establish "tyrannies".

Peisistratus was able to seize power because he managed to appeal to a fairly broad spectrum of Attic society. Not only did he have a secure power base in the "people of the hill", but he was able to attract the support of the free laborers and the extreme democrats.³⁴ Such a group of followers--both country and city dwellers--was not organized by any of his noble opponents.³⁵ He was therefore able to utilize one of Solon's undesirable legacies (economic unrest) to rally the masses in sufficient numbers to give him the power to nullify the tensions produced by Solon's neglect of the problem of clan rivalry.³⁶ He accomplished this through a political and economic programme which directly aimed at crippling the power of the nobles and enriching the poor at their expense.

Peisistratus is an excellent type of the statesman despot. His hand lay heavily on the nobles alone. Those nobles who were too independent in spirit or too ambitious to submit were forced into exile. The estates of such persons were confiscated and divided among the poor. Thus was solved the problem of the poor farmer. To those in need he gave seed and work animals for stocking their farms. This numerous, thriving agricultural class remained prosperous long after his family ceased to rule. His tax of one tenth, afterward reduced to a twentieth, on produce was burdensome only to the most sterile farms. The prosperity of the countryside was matched by an equal growth in the city. Attic wine and oil, for example, were now shipped in lovely vases to Etruria, Egypt, Asia Minor, and the Black Sea.³⁷

His ascent to power was not a smooth process, and after he seized control (in 560) he was twice exiled. However, by 546, he was secure in his position and ruled without difficulty for almost two decades until his death.³⁸ His sons, Hippias and Hipparchus, continued in his place --and in his style--until the assassination of Hipparchus in 514.³⁹ This action caused the brother to change his mode of governing and several years of paranoia and intrigue in the highest echelons of government eventually resulted in his removal from power in 510.⁴⁰

The tone of government during the years 546 to 514 under the "Peisistratidae"--as the dynasty is commonly called--set precedents which were to prove to be watersheds in Athenian political history.

Firstly, Athens started to assert herself in the Hellenic world. This did not take the form of belligerent military action; rather diplomacy was usually the chosen course of action. In order to secure a market for Athenian goods (thereby bringing increased prosperity to the mercantile classes) and to ensure an uninterrupted supply of grain (thereby helping to keep the poorest citizens content) a network of alliances with the eastern city-states was established.⁴¹ Athens was be-

ginning to become truly cosmopolitan in her "foreign" policy.

The discontent of the country population was alleviated through the mechanism of land redistribution. In order to relieve the poor farmer of the necessity of coming into the city to settle legal disputes, Peisistratus required judges to make "circuit tours" of the countryside. This was a benefit to the farmer (who saved time which he could put toward working the land) and it was also a boon to the orderly working of government. Peisistratus had in fact instituted a smoothly running central government.⁴²

The focus behind this policy was the attempt to increase the standard of living among the lower citizen classes,⁴³ in an effort to ensure their continued support. In this he was successful. However other, less material, results also followed.

Emergence of religious solidarity was one of these benefits. The gods of the lower classes were courted by the state. Athena was glorified, Zeus was honored, Demeter and Dionysus were brought into the city from their country homeland, Delos was elevated in importance, and soothsayers were popular. (Significantly, Delphi was not courted as it was a religious stronghold of entrenched aristocratic religion. This is understandable as Peisistratus' strength lay with the lowest, not highest, strata of the Greek citizens. Thus a god like Dionysus--a "peasant" god--would naturally be promoted over the favorite aristocratic deities.)⁴⁵

All of these gods needed homes, and a flurry of activity in the form of temple building took place. And all of these gods needed worship, so new religious holidays were instituted. Not the least important result of this policy was provision of work--in the form of build-

ing of new temples--and promotion of organized recreation in the form of religious holidays.⁴⁶ Thus public works gave the poorer citizens more money and public religious holidays allowed them time to enjoy the changing face of their city. (We note that religious shrines were not the only form of public work. Many purely utilitarian projects were also undertaken.) And finally, to complement the activities of the religious holidays, all forms of the arts were encouraged.⁴⁷

All these changes indeed resulted in Athens changing

...from what was little more than a village into a city, and a flourishing and beautiful city at that.⁴⁸

What we are witnessing here is important because it is the emerging germ of true "civic pride" (for lack of a more suitable term) among the citizens of Attica.⁴⁹ And a crucial element in this process was the attitude of Peisistratus toward other city-states. By securing trade relations with the eastern city-states he not only ensured grain import and a market for artisans' goods; he also succeeded in fixing the attention of Athenian citizens on affairs outside the bounds of Attica. Thus internal disputes could often be relegated to secondary importance due to issues of "international" status. This forced Athenians to face Hellas as a single people.

...Peisistratus used his power with moderation and skill. Like all usurpers who seize power after a period of internal struggles he found a policy of external conquest the best way to divert the energies of his fellow citizens. He was the real founder of Athenian greatness, the forerunner of the imperialist generals of the fifth century, and like them was wise enough to realize that his country's future lay on the sea.⁵⁰

The building of a navy to support this policy was an obvious necessity, and the task was undertaken. This proved to be yet another

method of improving the lot of the lower classes. The navy came to be staffed by citizens belonging to the lowest class--the Thetes.⁵¹ An immediate result of compiling such a force of men--drawn from a class found in both the city and the country--was again a fostering of civic identity. It is not difficult to imagine the tales of "Athenian glory" told by sailors home from their adventures. A distinctly "Athenian" consciousness was beginning to emerge.

Here we have the crux of Peististratus' contribution to Athenian history. The "demos" became aware of itself and began to take an active part in the affairs of Athens. The aristocrats were no longer able to treat the city as a forum for realizing clan ambitions. Rival factions within the aristocratic camp were subordinated to the will of the citizens at large.⁵²

However, Peisistratus' method of rule was not without flaw. In essence, he was able to control the aristocrats. But he did not institute changes which would constitutionally reduce their power. He instead relied on personal popularity (and such short-term measures as exile and holding of hostages⁵³) to ensure the subordination of the nobles to himself and the lower classes. After his death, his son Hippias proved incapable of retaining power using such a strategy. In 510 the Alcmaeonidae--one of the noble families in Athens--enlisted the aid of Sparta and the Peloponnesian League to seize power. They were successful, and immediately undertook measures to restore a system of aristocratic privilege. One such measure was the revision of the citizenship lists to exclude many enfranchised by Solon and Peisistratus.⁵⁴

However, the effects of the years under the Peisistratidae had taken root. The people of the hills and the people of the coast had

prospered and grown in self-confidence between 546 and 510.

The political scene was quite different from that of two generations earlier. Then the problem was the conflicting aims of the men of the coast, plain, and hills. The people of the hills, however, had meanwhile won their farms; the men of the coast, city artisans and others, had grown strong and prosperous under the tyranny. These beneficiaries of tyranny were in fact ready for democracy.⁵⁵

This large group was not prepared to bow before the aristocracy as it once had. It was an explosive situation, and one which provided an excellent political opportunity for anyone who dared to rally these masses. Cleisthenes, himself an Alcmaeonid, was ready to risk the wrath of the nobility. He rallied the disenfranchised population by promising to reinstate their political rights, and in 508 became tyrant of Athens.⁵⁶ Under his rule the mechanism of constitutional reform was utilized to deal a crushing blow to the power of the nobles from which they would not recover for over a century.

We must note that Cleisthenes had no special powers and worked his reforms by securing the cooperation of the Assembly. This was the beginning of the first "democratic" process in Athens.⁵⁷ Cleisthenes was in fact shaping the nature of the Athenian democracy which is so much a part of the western world's political tradition.

There were to be constitutional and social changes, but Cleisthenes had provided the essential framework for two centuries of Athenian democracy.⁵⁸

He accomplished this by addressing himself to the problem which was evaded by Solon, and not adequately dealt with by the Peisistratidae. Through reform of the constitution, he sought to undermine the basis of political power which the nobility had for centuries exploited. He took the bold action of dismantling the traditional tribal political division

to replace it with an artificial political division. Three aspects of this constitutional reform are of concern to us.⁵⁹

Firstly, the traditional four tribes were replaced with an artificial division of Attica into ten new tribes. This is particularly significant if we consider that this reform also sought to break up traditional allegiances by eliminating kinship and religion as criteria for tribal membership. The new criteria was residence in a deme.

Demes were units of population which were grouped into "Thirds". The number of demes in a Third may vary, but three Thirds would constitute a tribe. It is important to note that whereas the demes comprising the Third came from the same geographical area, the Thirds which formed a tribe were purposely picked from different geographical areas. Thus a tribe was much less of a homogenous unit than it once was, as it represented a large cross-section of the population--from both the city and the country.

Lastly, Cleisthenes replaced the Council of Four Hundred with a new Council of Five Hundred. This consisted of fifty members from each tribe who were, significantly, chosen by lot for a one year term. The demes contributed members to serve on the Council in proportion to their population.

These reforms had a two-fold purpose.

In creating the ten phylae, Cleisthenes was chiefly guided by two principles: one was that the phylae should be roughly equal in population, the other that each should represent a mixture of all classes, a cross-section of the whole people. If that were achieved, it would mean the destruction of the preponderance, local as well as general, of the large landowners, most of whom belonged to the Eupatrids, and would create the unity of state and people which the country so badly needed.⁶⁰

The first objective--lessening the power of the nobles--was achieved. The second objective--fostering unity among the populace--was only partially realized. A unity of sorts emerges, but it is one which the nobles never fully embrace, and one which is more or less imposed by the political advantages the constitutional reforms allotted to the mercantile classes in the city.

Cleisthenes' desire to ensure that each tribe represented a cross-section of social classes caused him, as we have noted, to draw the Thirds which made up each tribe from different geographical areas. In the countryside this worked well. Here the Thirds were made up of farmers--but either poor peasants or well-off holders of large estates. However, the city Thirds consisted mainly of a mercantile group and, as such, the interests of the city dwellers were much more complementary. At the same time, as the population of the city was rapidly increasing, the fact that the Council of Five Hundred drew its members from demes on the basis of population meant that the city soon began to increase its numerical representation in this body. Thus the city dwellers were favored by Cleisthenes' reforms and their political strength grew.⁶¹

We therefore feel it is correct to say that Cleisthenes' reforms were a true landmark in the Thetes' struggle for political emancipation. The composition of this class (previously noted) clearly indicates that it had the most to gain from trade, and it is this group which now has the power to effectively advocate an expansion of naval operations and increased trade with other city-states.⁶² We have noted that it is this group which resides in the city and is rapidly growing in size. We recall that Solon's reform of citizenship qualifications encouraged an influx of artisans into the city and they, of course, became Thetes.

The character of the next century was now clearly cast; only minor changes will take place. Rather the emphasis will be on development of the social trends already set in motion. Specifically, Athenian politics were now dominated by a mercantile class which pursued an actively expansionist policy which would stimulate trade.

Before we continue into the next century, we may note two main limitations in Cleisthenes' reforms.⁶³ He did not provide payment for the performance of public duties--and this tended to keep the poorest out of politics. This was remedied in the next century, thereby giving yet more encouragement to the poorest Thetes. Secondly, as government was located in the city, the farmers--especially the poorest ones--found it more difficult to exercise their political rights. This again favored the mercantile group as it resided within the city. Thus we can readily see how at any given moment--on the criteria of sheer attendance--the Assembly would tend to disproportionally represent the mercantile class.

THE PERSIAN WARS

The Athenians never forgot their victory at Marathon and they never let anyone else forget it.⁶⁴

It was the conflict with Persia which was to mold the finished form of the fifth century Athenian character. That same conflict was the logical outcome of Athenian "foreign" policy at the close of the sixth century.

We have noted Peisistratus' policy of strengthening Athenian ties with the eastern Greek city-states in an effort to secure both a source of grain and a market for Athenian goods. Several decades of this policy

resulted in what a modern political commentator might describe as an Athenian "presence" in the eastern Aegean.

In the late sixth century and all through the fifth century B.C. Athens became the center of a great commercial "empire" that stretched its tentacles from the Black Sea to Egypt, from Ionia to the Adriatic Sea.⁶⁵

Persia, by the close of the sixth century, became a threat to that status quo. The Persian Empire had managed to assimilate Lydia, and consequently the Greek city-states on the eastern Aegean coast, by 540.⁶⁶ Three decades later the Persians could no longer be ignored, as they increasingly imposed their will on the Asia Minor Greeks. Stability of Athenian economic concerns demanded that the issue be addressed.

The initial Athenian response, undertaken by Cleisthenes, was to seek an alliance with the Persians. The terms demanded proved to be too harsh for the Athenian palate, and the situation was at a stalemate. However, in 499, a crucial event in the form of an uprising of the Asia Minor city-states took place. Athens contributed twenty ships (which were later recalled) to the war effort. This act was not forgotten by Persia, and in 490 (four years after the crushing of the revolt) she set out to punish Athens. At this point the Athenians had no choice but to fight.⁶⁷

A spectacular Athenian victory at Marathon in 490⁶⁸ was the highlight of the Persians' campaign. The power of the demos proved more than a match for the numerical superiority of the invaders.⁶⁹ The prize of victory went to the members of that demos. War, no longer an exclusively aristocratic privilege, allowed the common citizen to drink out of the heroic warrior's cup.

As the technology of the Classical Age made the

ordinary foot-soldier essential to war, patriotism made the aristocratic concept of war apply to all. A man's worth was measured by his valor in battle.⁷⁰

The Athenian state, governed by the new Assembly, showed itself to be the equal of the most formidable Empire in the Mediterranean. The expansionist policy of the new democracy seemed to be vindicated--first economically and then militarily. These were the lessons the demos drew from the failure of the first Persian invasion. It was this attitude which enabled the mercantile interests to successfully continue advocacy of an expansionist policy.

...by 480 B.C., when the Persians came again in great force, the growth of Athenian trading interests seems to have thrown the democratic party, now representing largely the mercantile interests,, into conflict with Persia. The resistance at Salamis was inspired and led by a democrat, Themistocles, and from this time forward the democratic or mercantile party comes forward as the party of expansion and of the overseas empire: ...⁷¹

The naval victory over the Persians at Salamis in 480⁷² was the final proof that a union of military and economic interests combined well with democratic government. The demos was a source of good soldiers and sailors--Marathon and Salamis proved that. Trade with the eastern city-states may have contributed to the conflict with Persia, but then the victory brought glory to Athens--and trade brought her prosperity. All in all, the new democracy seemed to possess strength. A force was in motion. It started in the sixth century, passed the acid test in the Persian confrontations, and would culminate in the Athens of Pericles--an Athens he inherited, not created. Pericles

...was not the creator of Athenian democracy or Athenian empire; he was rather the artist who molded them to their consummate form. Under him each attained its height; ...⁷³

Athenian history between the time of the Persian defeat and the ascent of Pericles is really a continuation of an already (by 480) well established mercantile expansionist policy.

Athenian society...was characterized by production for the market. Mining became an important industry: silver and lead at Sunium, copper at Chalcis in Euboea, iron in the Peloponnesus, Boeotia, and the Cyclades. A system of handicraft industries developed, producing in fairly substantial quantities such articles as pottery, armor, and clothes. Olive oil and wine attained an increasing importance as exports. Grain was brought in more and more from abroad.

Production for the market brought growing trade. The society of fifth-century Athens was strongly mercantile, and Athenian ships and Athenian commercial arrangements dominated the Aegean. The greater use and wide diffusion of coined money forms an important indication of the extent to which commerce was diffused and flourished.⁷⁴

And we must not think that emphasis on mercantile interests was wholly imposed by the city artisans and merchants on the population as a whole. Athens needed safe trade routes as she had to import food. Although half the population of Attica was to be found in the countryside, these people could not feed the entire population.⁷⁵ Thus physical necessity (the need for a food supply) was also very much supportive of the "foreign" policy of the Athenian democrats. This fact becomes particularly significant when we note the very high (for that time) population-density of Attica--three hundred inhabitants per square mile.⁷⁶

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE: 480 - 431

We may profitably examine the period of 480 - 431--the period of Athens' greatest wealth and power--from the vantage point of three considerations.

Firstly, there was an immediate increase in trade after the Persian Wars. The sea lanes to the Black Sea (after the capitulation of Sestos and Byzantium, and the decline of Phoenician power) were now controlled by Athenian ships. And equally important is the economic decline of Miletus and Megara--two major competitors of Athens. This left Athens without serious competition in her trade with the western Aegean city-states.⁷⁷ One consequence of this was an influx of merchants into Athens, and these aliens prospered in the lucrative market.⁷⁸ Another result was the increased luxury and prosperity of Athens. She had become the commercial hub of the Greek world.⁷⁹

A high level of economic prosperity was maintained partly by the Athenian artisans' ability to produce economically competitive goods, and partly through an artificial means of generating revenue. This brings us to our second consideration: Athens was the head of an empire.

Military leadership and economic prosperity began to work hand in hand to increase the political power of Athens, and this worked at least equally the other way, that is to say, politics fostered economy. Athenian policy was moving towards imperialism, ...⁸⁰

The vehicle for the establishment of the Athenian empire was the Delian League. Ostensibly the Delian League was an alliance, headed by Athens, of autonomous city-states seeking mutual protection against further Persian encroachment.

Between 479 and 462, as before 479, political debate at Athens was focused, it would appear, on foreign policy. Superficially it was still the same debate, whether or not to fight Persia, but in a very different context and with very different emphasis.⁸¹

In reality, Athens intimidated the members of the Delian League into contributing to the Athenian treasury. The treasury of the Delian

League was transferred from Delos to Athens, and the military leader of an alliance quickly established herself as an "imperial city".⁸² It was during this era that magnificent Athenian public buildings and temples were erected, festivals expanded, and payment for performance of public duty instituted. All this was paid for, in significant part, by tribute monies collected from city-states within the Delian League.⁸³

To ensure Athenian dominance, naval strength was always a prime concern to the Athenian state. The process culminated under Pericles when Athens had a huge fleet and recognized the importance of the sea with the building of the "Long Walls". The navy was a crucial appendage of the state as it not only ensured Athenian supremacy within the Delian League, but also guaranteed safe routes for the import of critically needed grain.⁸⁴ The era of Pericles (461-429) was therefore marked by a policy of "power politics" aimed at control of Athens' allies, and marked by colonization.⁸⁵ This made the continued strengthening of Athenian naval power all that much more necessary, and resulted in a build-up of a surplus in the Athenian treasury⁸⁶ (in spite of massive expenditures by the Athenians).

Such an ambitious policy (one city-state attempting domination of the Aegean) becomes more comprehensible if we recall the intoxication of Athens with her victory at Marathon.

During the first three or four decades of the fifth century, the spirit of Marathon set the tone. There was an emphasis on strength of mind and body, including all the great Homeric virtues. The poets Aeschylus and Pindar remained attached to the romantic notions of heroism. This idealism was to be expressed not only in poetry, but in sculpture. The qualities of Aeschylus' hero and Pindar's winner were blended in the minds of the sculptors who created the statues of athletes which became characteristic of this era.⁸⁷

The Athenians saw no limit to their potential. They had overcome the greatest of odds in the Persian campaign and now had the Aegean in their grasp. Under Pericles, Athens and her citizens seemed to believe they had accomplished the impossible--a superhuman feat.

The cardinal point of his creed was a belief in the divine character of Athens. For Pericles she was more than the "citadel of the gods," as Pindar called her. He saw her in a special light and felt that in their moments of glory her sons resembled the gods. So he declared that those who fell in the Samian War had become immortal like the gods: ...⁸⁸

This brings us to our third consideration; the nature of the demos within such a haughty environment.

As might be expected, the demos no longer had any lack of confidence in its power and ability. Various indicators, such as the removal of power from the last vestige of aristocratic privilege (the Council of the Areopagos) in 462 and the use of the tool of ostracism (instituted by Cleisthenes but not used for twenty years) starting in 487 point to the confidence of the Assembly in taking full control of the state--and having the power to do so.⁸⁹

It was this attitude which justified the exploitation of the members of the Delian League by the Athenian demos; it had proved its worth and deserved the tribute and respect it extracted from the whole Aegean.

A nation of noblemen is a luxury for which somebody has to pay. Athens, in Pericles's memorable phrase, was "the school of Hellas". It was right, he thought, that the Hellenes should sacrifice something for their education. ...

.....
The physical means to this end was the control of the sea.⁹⁰

This arrogance had many other manifestations. Whereas, since the time of Solon's reforms, Athens encouraged immigration of artisans by

rewarding them with citizenship, now the prize was too great and those seeking it too numerous. Therefore the practice was stopped.⁹¹ In 451 Pericles restricted citizenship to only those who could prove that both parents were Athenian citizens.⁹² Just as the aristocrats once guarded their privileges against the encroachment of the demos, the demos now clung to its prerogatives with equal tenacity.

It was one of the vices of the democracy that the more powerful and prosperous it became, the more jealously it guarded its privileges.⁹³

It was, however, still a dynamic body of citizens; very conscious of their duty to the state. And the demos revered law and lived by it. Indeed, to be a citizen meant accepting responsibility not only to obey laws, but to actively support and enforce them in any one of a number of public functions.⁹⁴ But consolidation of power by the demos led not only to the previously alluded to self-infatuation, but also to conservatism. To be a citizen and to participate in the Athenian democracy was a privilege; perhaps as great a privilege as any held by the aristocrats of a former era.

Never was there a clearer case of a "democracy" of special privilege, based upon the miseries of slave labor...and the political subjection of the allies to the "tyrant city".⁹⁵

The inevitable result was that this group of people, this now all-powerful demos, would seek preservation of the status quo.

...the average Athenian after 462 was a conservative, anxious to preserve what he had, not to initiate anything new; this for the simple reason that in all important ways what he had was what he wanted.⁹⁶

Such was the general character of the Athenian demos in the fifth century. However, we must be careful not to conclude that the "conservatism" of the demos in fact ossified to the point of fusing Athens into

a monolithic society. We must not forget that Attica consisted of a wide spectrum of peoples, with varying interests, living in an often uneasy co-existence. All these interests comprised the mosaic that is "Athenian society".

...as a necessary consequence the development of Athenian history was marked by sharp political conflict--between landowners and dispossessed, great landowners and small peasants, great landowners and wealthy merchants, landed patricians and the democracy, merchants, usurers, peasants, and artisans. The alliances and quarrels between these various groups constitute the warp and woof of Athenian political history.⁹⁷

This "political history" resulted in a social milieu which was rich in diversity. True, a popular "democracy" favored certain political, economic, military and social programmes, but the Athenian love of free speech (for citizens) ensured that no dissent need go unheard. Indeed, the democratic Assembly became the forum for exchange of ideas which came from all corners of Hellas, let alone Attica.⁹⁸

And we must not forget the commercial lure of Athens. As the most prosperous city-state (and one which had become a showplace of public temples, theatres, festivals, etc.), Athens attracted persons from all walks of life. The artisans found a ready market for their goods and services; the philosophers found patrons willing to support their schools. Thus the city attracted merchant and pedagogue, opportunist and philosopher, with the same power. Indeed, the cultural and intellectual achievements of Athens were often the work of non-Athenians.

The political and artistic fame of Athens might mislead us on this point for the city was for a long time merely a meeting-place for thinkers coming from every corner of Greece.⁹⁹

THE APPEARANCE OF THE CRITICAL ORIENTATION IN ATHENS

The significance of the commercial lure of Athens warrants our closer attention. It was this factor which was primarily responsible for Athens' ability to attract intellectuals, artists and artisans from all over Greece. In a word, they found a ready market for their wares. Furthermore, one's success in Athens would ensure the making of a reputation which would spread throughout the "allied" city-states.

One consequence of the influx of people into Athens was the emergence of what we term the "critical orientation". Here we are referring to modes of thought which stress what has alternately been termed "relativism" and/or "materialism". The terms are not synonymous, and we shall develop them separately, but they do share one affinity: they reflect an Ionic influence. The critical orientation flowered in Athens during the time of Pericles. In his court Ionian intellectuals were welcomed and allowed to make their views known.

To facilitate our understanding of the dynamics of this critical intellectual orientation in its diverse manifestations, we may profitably use three representative "arch-types": sophism, Euripides and Anaxagoras. The sophists greatly influenced political and educational life, Euripides' influence was greatest in the artistic and cultural arena, while Anaxagoras represents the most purely philosophical concerns.¹⁰⁰

THE SOPHISTS

The well-known sophistic differentiation between "custom" and "nature"¹⁰¹ was a challenge to virtually the whole of traditional Greek thought. To insist that all of social convention was just that--convention--was to undermine any unquestionable legitimacy that law or morality

may attempt to invoke. Relativism quickly became the corner-stone of this orientation, and individualism--at the societal and personal level--became not only acceptable but indeed reflected the true order of human society (custom). That was the message of the sophists.

The fact that access to the political machinery was now open to all citizens provided an impetus for the individual citizen to investigate this position. Both merchant and noble sought to master the "art of persuasion" as both could plead their interest before their fellow citizens. The "virtue" or "truth" of a viewpoint now lay in its "strength" (i.e. internal logic and ability to persuade the listener). The arbiter was the Athenian demos.

...the Sophistic movement of the Vth century represents a sum of independent attempts to satisfy the same needs by similar methods. The needs are those of a time and a country in which every citizen can have a share in the management of the business of his city, and can obtain personal predominance by words alone; where the competition of individual activities gives rise to numerous conflicts before the popular law-courts; where every man wants to assert, in the eyes of all, the superiority of his "virtue"
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Such an orientation necessitates, obviously, a different emphasis on education. If one cannot discern the propriety of any course of action from an a priori position (be it the authority of a tract from Homer or the invoking of aristocratic privilege) then one must persuade a fellow citizen into agreement. Thus education was deemed to prepare the individual to convincingly put forth his personal (i.e. "individual") ideas (i.e. the "custom" which he feels is most fortuitous). In short, "oratory", "debate", "polemics", etc., became weapons available to all citizens to wield in the political arena.

EURIPIDES

If one perceives a certain amount of cynicism creeping into the sanctum of the political forum, one may perceive the same sort of skepticism in the theatrical arts. The best known representative of this outlook is the dramatist Euripides:

...to judge from extant pieces, what chiefly preoccupied Euripides in his later work was not so much the impotence of reason in man as the wider doubt whether any rational purpose could be seen in the ordering of human life and the governance of the world.¹⁰³

We may rephrase the above to say: "Nature does not exist: everything is convention". The sophistic influence is clear, and is particularly evident in Euripides' criticism of religion and mythology.¹⁰⁴

ANAXAGORAS

"Materialism" is introduced most dramatically into Athenian intellectual circles via the philosophy of Anaxagoras. His presence in Athens is particularly relevant for us as his materialism is strikingly close to Democritean atomism.

Anaxagoras retains a transcendental element in his philosophy-- nous (i.e. "mind"). However, this guiding principle (nous) acts upon wholly corporeal elements (i.e. "particles"), and it is these "particles" which constitute the universe. The relationship between nous and the "particles" is most significant for our discussion.

...Nous is not omnipotent. Nous is only "the most powerful."

Nous' power is not boundless, in that Nous can by no means deal with the ruled elements by arbitrary will. For they have the cause of their existence in themselves, exactly as Nous has the cause of its existence in itself. If they were not from all eternity, Nous would not be able to create them...since they

exist already, Nous cannot annihilate them...

Consequently, Nous cannot make out of the elements whatever it may please. For not even the possibilities of their development are created by Nous. (There is no genuine creationism, in the biblical sense, in Greek thought.) And whatever is discordant with these mechanical possibilities which lie in the elements is unaccomplishable.¹⁰⁵

We can, with careful insight, see the affinity of Anaxagoras' system with the Democritean--in spite of the transcendental quality of nous. Nous serves the same function as the "void" of the Democritean system. Just as the void is the medium in which the atoms exist and interact, so is the nous the medium in which the "particles" exist and interact. The crux of the issue lies in the fact that nous and "particles" are equal ontological partners (as are atoms and void) and their co-existence becomes the theoretical springboard from which we may explain the multiplicity of appearance in the world from a corporeal form of existence ("atoms" or "particles").

If we approach Anaxagoras' philosophy from this perspective, we can see that he was disseminating a type of materialism in Athens which has much affinity with Democritean atomism. This is not to belittle the differences between the two philosophers (they are significant), but one must be equally careful not to obscure the similarities.

THE STRENGTH AND DURABILITY OF THE IONIAN INFLUENCE

If we note the political relativism (i.e. law is "custom") espoused by the sophists; the religious skepticism of Euripides; and the philosophical materialism of Anaxagoras, we begin to appreciate the inroads that elements of thought found in the Democritean system were making into Athens. All of these elements are found in the previously outlined

Democritean worldview.

This is important for three main reasons: Firstly, we now have a more complete picture of that mosaic which was the Athenian social milieu of the fifth century.

Secondly, we have to ascertain whether or not the Democritean form of materialism (i.e. atomism) was known in Athens. This is an issue which shall be more fully explored in the section immediately following. What is at least apparent at this point is that much of what is found in Democritean atomism was being disseminated in Athens; albeit in fragmentary form. But nonetheless a form of "atomism" was emerging and had its supporters in very diverse (and broad) sectors of the Athenian culture. If we note that Anaxagoras, Euripides, and the pre-eminent sophist Protagoras were contemporaries of Democritus, we can see that which is inherent in his (Democritus') philosophy is becoming a widespread point of view.

And lastly, we may attempt to gauge the support that this critical orientation receives from the Athenians. This is certainly a difficult task. The degree to which Ionian influence depended upon the patronage of Pericles is a matter of conjecture. The fact that we only have substantial extant fragments of philosophers writing after the Second Peloponnesian Wars makes it difficult to assess the intellectual current of events before that time. And the degree to which the events of the fourth century (culminating in the "Hellenization" programme of Alexander the Great) distorted all that had come before cannot be known.

But we do know that a reaction to the main proponents of the above viewpoints (typified by the sophists, Euripides, and Anaxagoras) did take place in the fifth century.

...the most striking evidence of the reaction

against the Enlightenment is to be seen in the successful prosecutions of intellectuals on religious grounds which took place at Athens in the last third of the fifth century. About 432 B.C. or a year or two later, disbelief in the supernatural and the teaching of astronomy were made indictable offences. The next thirty-odd years witnessed a series of heresy trials which is unique in Athenian history. The victims included most of the leaders of progressive thought at Athens--Anaxagoras, Diagoras, Socrates, almost certainly Protagoras also, and possibly Euripides. In all these cases save the last the prosecution was successful: Anaxagoras may have been fined and banished; Diagoras escaped by flight; so, probably, did Protagoras; Socrates, who could have done the same, or could have asked for a sentence of banishment, chose to stay and drink the hemlock. All these were famous people. How many obscurer persons may have suffered for their opinions we do not know. But the evidence we have is more than enough to prove that the Great Age of Greek Enlightenment was also, like our own time, an Age of Persecution--banishment of scholars, blinkering of thought, and even (if we can believe the tradition about Protagoras) burning of books.¹⁰⁶

These attempts to suppress the viewpoints of the Ionians--with their noted Democritean sympathies--at least makes clear two things: Some elements of Athenian society found these ideologies undesirable and wished to suppress them; and these ideologies were sufficiently well-rooted that formal political action was necessary to accomplish the task.

ATHENS AND ATOMISM

We have noted the existence of social thought, in Athens, which at least indicates an influence of the Democritean worldview. We may now consider the question of whether his philosophy itself was directly known to Athenian intellectuals.

Certainly Aristotle knew of Democritus' views, and we can assume that these views--because of Aristotle's efforts toward a rebuttal of them--were known to the educated Athenian citizen. The question is, do

we have to accept that it was only in Aristotle's time that the atomic perspective became well known?¹⁰⁷ The answer appears to be "no".

Certainly we have to address ourselves to the fact that Plato makes no reference to Democritus. However, Plato is notorious for not mentioning the sources of his ideas--especially if he is concerned with refutation of a thesis. In this respect he differed from Aristotle, but not, ironically, from Epicurus. Indeed, there is speculation that Plato not only knew of Democritus' views, but actually wished to have his works destroyed.¹⁰⁸

Be that as it may, there is ample evidence to suggest that Democritean philosophy was known to Athenians in Democritus' lifetime, and before the Peloponnesian War--therefore before Plato's birth.

Firstly, we must appreciate that which has already been alluded to: the economic currents in Athens assured the importation of ideas from other cities. The Athens of the fifth century was a city of travelers. Trade made the Athenian standard a common sight in every port in the Aegean Sea.¹⁰⁹ In conjunction with the phenomena of Athenian residents travelling widely on trade missions, we have the further foreign influence of residents of other cities flocking to Athens. Their main purpose in coming, as we have noted, was commercial. The result was a growth of the "metic" class.¹¹⁰ And the commercial pursuits of this class were not restricted to the crafts and trades. Very significantly, teachers, philosophers, orators, poets, and other practitioners of the liberal arts attempted to sell their services and knowledge to the prosperous citizens of Athens. Two of the historically most significant members of this non-citizen class were sophists, like Protagoras and Gorgias.

Therefore, the wealth of Athens, as well as the nature of her economy (commercial), made it inevitable that the views of other city-states would be imported.

Certainly the activities of the founding atomist, Leucippus, facilitated the process of spreading his ideas. He was a widely travelled man,¹¹¹ thereby allowing us to reasonably assume that he personally disseminated the seeds of his philosophy at least throughout Ionia.

And the list of those who appear to have known of the atomic doctrine is impressive. Perhaps foremost is Anaxagoras, who spent a considerable length of time in Athens in the early and middle years of the fifth century.¹¹² Anaxagoras' presence in Athens is significant because his theories are, as we have suggested, perhaps the closest to Democritus' viewpoint.¹¹³ In view of Democritus' visit to Athens, and his criticisms of Anaxagoras' teachings,¹¹⁴ it seems hardly likely that Anaxagoras would ignore the Abderite--or that Democritus' challenges to Anaxagoras would not be noted by other thinkers in Athens.

The sophist Protagoras knew Democritus,¹¹⁵ and certainly must have discussed him in Athens. And Hippocrates probably met Democritus; and the former's extensive travels¹¹⁶ would have facilitated the spread of the thoughts of the latter.

However, we must not forget Democritus' personal actions which helped spread his ideas. To begin, we know that he travelled very extensively.¹¹⁷ His travels even took him to Athens.¹¹⁸

The visit to Athens is a particularly relevant issue.

On the evidence of the fragment

I came to Athens and no one knew me.¹¹⁹

Some scholars, such as Kathleen Freeman, pursue a literal interpretation

and presume that Democritus went to Athens but kept his identity a secret.¹²⁰ Others, such as John Burnet, make reference to the fragment from a different perspective:

If he said that, he meant no doubt that he had failed to make such an impression as his more brilliant fellow citizen Protagoras had done.¹²¹

We subscribe to Burnet's interpretation. We do so because the character of Democritus seems to be so incompatible with the image of one who would take the role of a wallflower. After all, would not the "laughing philosopher" who was of a wealthy and cultured family and who was engrossed with travel and the discovery of knowledge be the most unlikely sort of person to shun the opportunity to engage in lively discussion with fellow intellectuals? And he was certainly not shy about making his views known:

If any man listens to my opinions, here recorded, with intelligence, he will achieve many things worthy of a good man, and avoid many unworthy things.¹²²

And that he believed in reciprocal exchange of opinions is evident from:

Wise men when visiting a foreign land must silently and quietly reconnoitre while they look and listen to find out the reputation of the wise men there: what they are like, and if they can hold their own before them while they secretly weigh their words against their own in their minds. When they have weighed and seen which group is better than the other, then they should make known the riches of their own wisdom, so that they may be prized for the sake of the treasure which is their property, while they enrich others from it. But if their knowledge is too small to allow them to dispense from it, they should take from the others and go their way.¹²³

Certainly he considered himself not to be one whose "knowledge is too small" to be of benefit to others:

I have travelled most extensively of all men of my time, making the most distant inquiries, and have seen the most climes and lands, and have heard the

greatest number of learned men; and no one has ever surpassed me in the composition of treatises with proofs, not even the so-called Arpedonaptae of Egypt; with them I passed eighty years on foreign soil.¹²⁴

However, the most tenable argument for the assertion that atomic philosophy was known to Athenians is to be found in a consideration of the well known intellectual preference of Pericles. Pericles and his mistress Aspasia were very much preoccupied with the business of attempting to introduce the Ionian culture to Athens.¹²⁵ That Pericles should not have known of the controversial theories of Democritus is hardly plausible. That he would ignore or suppress them is even more unlikely. And that Ionian materialism was making headway into Athenian intellectual circles is readily apparent from Sophocles' tribute to Ionia's accomplishments in Antigone.¹²⁶ That the process was causing some concern among the citizenry is evident from Euripides' defenses, and support, of Anaxagoras.¹²⁷ The fate of Anaxagoras (persecution and banishment) reflects not only the extent of the controversy, but also the difference between the world-views of the eastern Greek city-states and Athens.¹²⁸

THE ATHENIAN SOCIAL MILIEU

Concluding our discussion of Athen's history, we may go on to examine the social consciousness of her citizens; and the compatibility of that consciousness with the atomic perspective.

Before going on to this task, we must stress that the diversity of opinions found within the Athenian populace is in no way being ignored. Yet, in spite of the divergent forces at work throughout her history, we note a certain congruency of attitudes emerging during her "empire" days. We shall explore the nature of that homogeneity, and its ideolo-

gical and institutional manifestations. Atomism, like many other orientations, was introduced into this social milieu from without and had to confront the dominant ideology of the fifth century Athenian social milieu.

Footnotes - Chapter V

¹Bury, A History of Greece, pp. 169-170.

²Ibid., p. 171.

³Ibid., p. 172.

⁴Ibid., pp. 173-174.

⁵Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization During the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 52.

⁶Bury, A History of Greece, p. 174.

⁷Ibid., pp. 175-176. We note that reliance on Bury means that we have given the classes an agricultural basis of interpretation. The alternative is the military interpretation. In the latter scheme the upper class remains the same, but the "Knights" are "hippeis" ("horsemen") and form the cavalry. "Teamsters" are indeed "owners of oxen", but are more properly termed "zeugitai" and identified as those who comprise the hoplite sector of the military. "Thetes" did not fight. See A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants, a Vol. in Hutchinson's University Library: Classical History and Literature, ed. by H.T. Wade-Gery (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1956), p. 87.

⁸Bury, A History of Greece, p. 174.

⁹Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁰For a brief overview, see Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, pp. 54-60.

¹¹Bury, A History of Greece, pp. 180-181. For a detailed and penetrating analysis of both the causes and manifestations of social tensions in Attica up to the time of Solon, see W.J. Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator: A Study of the Agrarian Problem in Attica in the Seventh Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1938).

¹²Bury, A History of Greece, pp. 178-180.

¹³Ibid., p. 181.

¹⁴For a brief overview of Solon's life see Leslie White Hopkinson, Greek Leaders, a Vol. in Essay Index Series, ed. by William Scott

Ferguson. (Freeport, New York: Books For Libraries Press, 1969), pp. 1-17.

¹⁵Finley Hooper, Greek Realities: Life and Thought in Ancient Greece (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 139.

¹⁶A capsulization of Solon's reforms may be found in George Willis Botsford and Charles Alexander Jr., Hellenic History, revised by Donald Kagan (5th ed.; London: The Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 89-92.

¹⁷Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 139.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 140.

¹⁹Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, p. 90.

²⁰Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 140.

²¹Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, p. 92.

²²Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 140.

²³Ibid., p. 140.

²⁴Bury, A History of Greece, p. 184.

²⁵Ibid., p. 185.

²⁶Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 141.

²⁷Bury, A History of Greece, p. 184.

²⁸Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 141.

²⁹Ibid., p. 142.

³⁰Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, pp. 92-93.

³¹Ibid., p. 92.

³²Bury, A History of Greece, p. 170.

³³Ibid., p. 186.

³⁴Ibid., p. 192.

³⁵For a brief discussion on Peisistratus and his main opponents refer to Andrewes, Greek Tyrants, pp. 102-106.

³⁶Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, pp. 74-77. Here Ehrenberg concisely illuminates the turmoil of the early sixth century--to the time of Peisistratus' emergence as victor--in the context of economic discontent and class rivalry.

- ³⁷ Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, p. 93.
- ³⁸ Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 143.
- ³⁹ Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, p. 95.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 94-95.
- ⁴¹ Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 144.
- ⁴² Andrewes, Greek Tyrants, p. 111.
- ⁴³ Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, p. 81.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 81-82.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 82.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 82.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 82-84.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 83.
- ⁴⁹ Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 145. We note that Hooper in fact views Peisistratus as concerned with "civic unity" rather than "civic pride".
- ⁵⁰ Jean Hatzfeld, History of Ancient Greece, revised by A.C. Harrison, ed. by E.H. Goddard. (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966), pp. 75-76.
- ⁵¹ Bury, A History of Greece, pp. 176-177.
- ⁵² Andrewes, Greek Tyrants, pp. 113-115.
- ⁵³ Ibid., p. 113.
- ⁵⁴ Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, pp. 94-95.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 95.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 95.
- ⁵⁷ Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, p. 87.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 99
- ⁵⁹ All three aspects of this constitutional innovation are discussed in Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, pp. 95-97.
- ⁶⁰ Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, p. 90.
- ⁶¹ Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, pp. 95-96.

- 62 Andrewes, Greek Tyrants, p. 89.
- 63 Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, pp. 97-98.
- 64 Hooper, Greek Realities, p. 157.
- 65 Alban Dewes Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought, (New York: The Dryden Press, 1940), p. 67.
- 66 W.G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy 800 - 400 B.C., a Vol. in World University Library, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 204.
- 67 Ibid., p. 204.
- 68 Ibid., 204.
- 69 Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, pp. 130-137.
- 70 Richard Carlisle Smith Jr., "Hellenistic Attitudes Toward War" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1961), p. 195.
- 71 Winspear, Genesis, p. 70.
- 72 Forrest, The Emergence, p. 204.
- 73 Hopkinson, Greek Leaders, p. 55.
- 74 Winspear, Genesis, pp. 65-66.
- 75 Hatzfeld, History of Ancient Greece, pp. 121-122.
- 76 Ibid., p. 121.
- 77 Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, p. 170.
- 78 Hatzfeld, History of Ancient Greece, p. 128.
- 79 Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, p. 240.
- 80 Ibid., p. 192.
- 81 Forrest, The Emergence, p. 207.
- 82 C.M. Bowra, Periclean Athens, a Vol. in Crosscurrents in World History, ed. by Norman F. Cantor (New York: The Dial Press, 1971), pp. 89-105.
- 83 Charles Alexander Robinson, Jr., Athens in the Age of Pericles, a Vol. in The Centers of Civilization Series, (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), p. 32.
- 84 Ibid., p. 105.

⁸⁵ Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, pp. 238-239.

⁸⁶ Hooper, Greek Realities, pp. 218-219.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 197.

⁸⁸ Bowra, Periclean Athens, p. 110.

⁸⁹ Forrest, The Emergence, pp. 209-220.

⁹⁰ William Scott Ferguson, Greek Imperialism, Vol. IV of Graeco Life and Times Series, (New York: Biblio and Tannen, 1941), pp. 65-66.

⁹¹ Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, p. 90.

⁹² Bowra, Periclean Athens, p. 93.

⁹³ Hopkinson, Greek Leaders, p. 46.

⁹⁴ Forrest, The Emergence, p. 221.

⁹⁵ Winspear, Genesis, p. 68.

⁹⁶ Forrest, The Emergence, p. 221.

⁹⁷ Winspear, Genesis, p. 66.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 75-160. Here Winspear examines the diversity of Hellenic thought within the categories of "The Conservative Philosophy" and "The Progressive Philosophy"--which are his chapter headings for this section of his work. His emphasis is primarily philosophical, however a clear indication of the social implications (politics, education, religion, etc.) of the competing schools of thought is given.

⁹⁹ Hatzfeld, History of Ancient Greece, p. 144.

¹⁰⁰ The following discussion emerged from conversations with Dr. H. Garfinkle of the University of Alberta during the course of the writing of this thesis. In particular, the section dealing with Anaxagoras--especially the discussion of the affinity of his system to the Democritean--owes the largest debt to Dr. Garfinkle.

¹⁰¹ See E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Beacon Paperback ed.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 182-183.

¹⁰² Leon Robin, Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit, translated by M. R. Dobie, a Vol. in The History of Civilization, ed. by C. K. Ogden (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 138.

¹⁰³ Dodds, The Irrational, p. 187.

¹⁰⁴ See Paul Decharme, Euripides and the Spirit of His Dramas, translated by James Loeb (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906), pp. 43-73.

105 Felix M. Cleve, The Philosophy of Anaxagoras: An Attempt at Reconstruction (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1949), p. 25.

106 Dodds, The Irrational, p. 189.

107 This is the view of Kathleen Freeman. See Freeman, God, pp. 93-94.

108 See Cleve, The Giants, II, p. 443. Cleve also suggests that logistics was the decisive factor in not destroying the works of Democritus: too many volumes were in circulation in Athens.

109 See Winspear, Genesis, pp. 65-66. For a fuller account of commerce in the fifth century, see Laistner, Greek Economics, pp. 314-329.

110 See Laistner, Greek Economics, pp. 315-316.

111 See John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, (3rd ed.; New York: Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 330-332. Burnet also concisely outlines the difficulty of making definite statements about the life of Leucippus.

112 See Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 362-365.

113 For an exposition of Anaxagoras' views, see Kirk and Raven, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 362-394.

114 See Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 291.

115 There is much confusion about the precise relationship of Democritus and his slightly older contemporary, Protagoras. That they did not know of each other's work intimately is very difficult to believe. However, difficulties in establishing a reliable chronology prevents us from understanding their true relationship. See John Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Part I, Thales to Plato, (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1924), pp. 112, 194, and 197. Also see Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 343-345.

116 Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, p. 316.

117 Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 291.

118 Ibid., p. 290.

119 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 103.

120 Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 290.

121 Burnet, Thales to Plato, p. 195.

122 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 99.

123 Ibid., pp. 119-120. It must be noted that Freeman considers this fragment of doubtful authenticity. She does note, however, that

Comperz considers the fragment to be genuine. Certainly it is in keeping with previously outlined Democritean views on education.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 119. Again, Freeman considers this fragment of doubtful authenticity. She also notes that "eighty" should probably read "five".

¹²⁵See B.A.C. Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I: Thales to Democritus (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923), pp. 207-212.

¹²⁶See Farrington, The Faith of Epicurus, p. 48. The text referred to may be found in Lewis Campbell, Sophocles: The Seven Plays in English Verse, Vol. CXVI of The World's Classics, (London: Oxford University Press, 1906), pp. 13-14.

¹²⁷See Farrington, The Faith of Epicurus, p. 49, and Decharme, Euripides And The Spirit of His Dramas, pp. 22-31.

¹²⁸See Cook, The Greeks in the East, p. 131. For an excellent overview of the clash between the Ionian and Athenian world-views in fifth century Athens, see Farrington, The Faith of Epicurus, pp. 43-52.

CHAPTER VI

THE ATHENIAN SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The atomic social perspective is, it will be seen, in conflict with both the actual Athenian societal reality, and the accompanying perception of social reality held by the Athenian citizen.¹ Fortunately, the social milieu of Athens is well documented, rather widely taught in Canada (usually in history, classics, and philosophy courses), and therefore may be readily described and discussed. And it is perhaps again worth stressing that the concept of "social milieu" is not intended to be an exhaustive sociological and/or social-psychological capsulization of the entirety of the Athenian social orientation and social structure. It is, rather, an attempt to isolate several "fundamental" or "core" elements of the Athenian culture, and from there to consider the implications for the stability of these core social elements should the atomic orientation be introduced into the culture. These core elements would be viewed by virtually all sociological theories and historical methodologies as being of primary import for the understanding and analysis of societies.

SENSE OF HISTORY

Athens' perception of historical reality--to which any sentiments of tradition must ultimately be linked--reveal much of her social consciousness. It is true that attempts to reconstruct the development of the Athenian historical perspective are hampered by the fact that the

extant remains of "historians" essentially limit us to the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides.² However, a peoples' sense of history is not merely a mirror-image of the philosophical and methodological preferences of what is now recognized to be the discipline of history. Rather, it is the peoples' perception of their past reality which is a central factor in shaping their present social consciousness. In the case of Athens, therefore, we shall turn to the "lessons" Athenians took from what they perceived to be their "history".

We may begin with the oldest form of Greek historical narrative, the epic. In so doing we must remember that the epic poems were, in fact, treated as factual history by the Greeks. These epic poems--specifically the Homeric poems--have four facets which reflect both their ideological orientations and their import for social structure and consciousness.³

Firstly, the epic had a religious flavor to it, as it promoted reverence for the ancestors of the modern (i.e. fifth century) Greek. As such, it complemented the religious practice of ancestral worship, about which more shall be said shortly.

Ancestral reverence was translated rapidly into snobbish pedigree as cities attempted to link themselves to the activities of the heroes of the epics. Thus the founding clans of a city, if they could "document" their lineage back to the hero of an epic, would give a whole new dimension of "civic pride" to their city-state.

However, we should also note an element of immediate practicality in the historical significance of the epic. At a time when states were still attempting to establish themselves, we see the Iliad being used as an authority to settle territorial disputes. Thus territorial claims could rely on the authority of the Iliad; and this authority would be

treated as legitimate.

The fourth feature of the historical significance of the epic may be linked to the preceding observation. There would naturally be a very strong temptation for rulers to change the epics to reflect their own interests. As the epic is an oral tradition, we can readily see the possibility of this.

But any inference to be drawn from the above should reveal an appreciation of the pervasive lessons of history for the Greeks. History was not seen to be mere chronology, but rather a link with the past which elicited both patriotic (i.e., emotional) and practical results. The meaning of this becomes clearer when we remember that the "genealogical poets" (Hesiod being the prime example) undertook an historical task no less encompassing than the linking of gods, epic heroes, and the aristocratic families (through the founding clans of a particular city).⁴

At this point we may clearly see that this type of "history" is dealing in a larger-than-life dimension. Hesiod is merely following through the tendency found in Homer: namely, the concern of "history" is to record the activities of ancient aristocrats. The common man is not of import.⁵

And it is here that we may briefly note the sometimes ironic uses of history. If, as we have already mentioned,⁶ the Ionians drew lessons of a practical import from the Homeric heroes, we shall soon see that the Athenians instead drew ideological lessons from the same texts. Specifically, while the "human" aspects of someone such as Odysseus (i.e. the ability to work with his hands and exhibit a down-to-earth self-reliance) were considered important to the Ionians, the Athenians (and, indeed, all of mainland Greeks) instead interested themselves with the drama of the

Homeric plot. This naturally required an elevation of the Homeric character to make him a worthy subject of such a haughty role.

We therefore see history strongly infused with elements of morality.⁷ Chronology only documented what was the object lesson of the historical process. That lesson is to be found in the appreciation of the personal drama of the hero-aristocrat. This is hardly a firm basis upon which to build an historical perspective, and it is in this sense that we fully support J.B. Bury's conclusion that Greek history never shook the mantle of being a de facto mythology.⁸ And we must also agree with him that the impetus for writing critical, accurate, and de-mythologized histories came from Ionia in the latter sixth and early fifth centuries.⁹ The social-historical background of Ionia¹⁰ appears to have nurtured not only materialistic philosophies, but also critical historical methodologies. Just as divine interference in nature was questioned by the Ionians, so were the influences of the "gods" on the historical process.¹¹

Both these tendencies (divinity working in the historical process and the tendency toward Ionian materialistic objectivism) find a curious blend in Herodotus. Yet, significantly, he always give primacy to the divine element.

And yet Herodotus, for all his tentative straying into rationalisation, remains a thoroughgoing believer in divine intervention. 'Many things prove to me', he says, 'that the gods take part in the affairs of man'.¹²

His "history" therefore, is closer to the previously alluded to "mythology" than to our modern concerns with the "objectivity" of historiography. We may note that his style of writing is obviously influenced by the epic and lyric traditions.¹³ And we may note that Herodotus per-

sonally was a firm believer in the Eleusinian Mysteries and the Delphic Oracle.¹⁴ As such, his history is permeated with the concepts of fate and chance, acting as causal agents.¹⁵ Therefore, in the end, Herodotus gives us not history but drama. He has:

...the profound conviction that the course of events is ruled by fateful means. Men are doomed to meet their ends, and their disastrous decisions are pre-determined.¹⁶

We may perhaps empathize more fully with Herodotus if we keep in mind the strength of the tradition he had to work within. In his day, and long before, "history" was not meant to be read privately; rather it was digested at public readings. Thus to please the public in the form of offering an entertainment is surely a central concern for an aspiring "historian". Herodotus was clearly in that tradition, and his works were meant to be read publicly; indeed, he read them personally at Athens and Olympia.¹⁸ It is in this context that we may appreciate J.B. Bury's observation of the historian's role in the eyes of Herodotus. Herodotus:

...esteemed the aim of the historian to be the same as the aim of the epic poet--to entertain an audience. So long as it was written from this motive, it is clear that history was not likely to make truth and accuracy its first consideration.¹⁹

And a final consideration of Herodotus must allude to his personal bitterness toward Ionia. Although an Ionian himself (having been born in Halicarnassus) he resented the Ionian efforts to come to peaceful terms with Persia.²⁰ To what extent this influenced his methodology is difficult to ascertain. An equally difficult but perhaps more intriguing question centers on the extent to which all of Athens resented anything "Ionian" due to Ionia's essential neutrality in the conflict between Persia and the rest of the Greek world. But it is certainly not difficult to see how Athens would be very receptive to a form of "history"

which treats the city as a "hero" who faces up to Persia. The above considerations form the core of some historians' criticisms of Herodotus' treatment of the Persian Wars.²¹

We have dwelt at length on Herodotus because, in large measure, the Athenian sense of history is precisely the type of orientation found in his writings. The tradition he inherited is a long one, and he only served to exemplify it, and perhaps bring it to new heights of refinement.

It is in the works of Thucydides that we may perceive real change in historical consciousness and methodology. We must not, however, make the mistake of thinking that Thucydides was "objective" in our understanding of the term.²² He does, however, introduce a concern with historical accuracy, and therefore we see a shift away from mythology.²³

It is also with Thucydides that we have the introduction of the concept of history as current events; not an examination of the remote past.²⁴

It is in this sense that Thucydides'²⁵ writings are an irony. The first historian to combine accuracy of report with a current "historical" subject turned out to be the person who in fact recorded the decline of Athens. The Peloponnesian Wars were a tragedy from which Athens was never to recover. By the same token, the Athens of Herodotus' time was indeed the invincible heroine who seemed destined to rule all of Hellas.

EDUCATION

Let us summarize five of the major elements comprising the Athenian "sense of history" previously discussed:

1. History supported an intense ancestral reverence.
2. The historical characters were aristocrat-heroes.
3. Moral lessons were drawn from history. These were centered

- upon the human condition as it is affected by fate and chance.
4. The historical "plot" was therefore dramatic and the historical characters were subsequently tragic figures.
 5. A definite element of patriotism pervaded the Athenian historical literature.

It shall be found that all of these sentiments permeated the educational system of Athens.

William Barclay succinctly describes the Athenian educational ideal:

The aim of Athenian education was to produce Athenians, who loved beauty and who loved Athens, and who were prepared to serve Athens in peace and in war. It was a great ideal. Paul Monroe points out that from the very beginning of Greek history, right back to the days of the Iliad and the Odyssey there had always been a twofold ideal of Greek education. On the one hand there was the man of valour, typified by Achilles, and on the other side there was the man of wisdom, typified by Odysseus. But in the Athenian ideal these two ideals were united, and, at its highest, the Athenian ideal united these two ideals and sought to produce the man, who, at one and the same time, was the philosopher and the man of action. ²⁶

Barclay's capsulization is important as it nicely captures the twin aspects of the Athenian educational ideal: Education is the preserve of an elite; and the nature of that education is reflective of the life style of an aristocrat-warrior. The historical roots of that ideal reveal the political development of Greece:

...the political and social life of all Greek city-states was up to the fifth century B.C.--in Sparta up to the fourth century B.C.--dominated by a hereditary elite that stemmed from conquering and land-owning warriors as we find them in Homer. The exclusive education of these aristoi...consisted of learning the use of arms, practicing gymnastics combined with ritual dance, and rehearsing the cult of gods and ancestors.²⁷

If the actual power of a very small, aristocratic, clique was somewhat tempered by the more democratic political climate of fifth century Athens, it does not necessarily follow that the educational aspirations and practices of the Athenians reflected this political shift. Indeed, in the "democratic" fifth century, the need for warriors was still great. Not only did Athens have the Persian threat to contend with, but the constant expansion of her empire necessitated that she be eternally on military vigil. To this end, she evolved the military service called the "ephebia", which was a compulsory military service for youths between the ages of eighteen and twenty. At first supplementing the ephebia, then complementing it, were the regular physical exercises which were part of the normal education of the Athenian child. These exercises were in fact viewed as a training for war.²⁸

But more than a training for combat, physical education, like all aspects of the curriculum, strove for a consciously explicit ideal--the ideal of partaking in a very exclusive cultural existence. The existence attainable only by a warrior-aristocrat-hero.

The "warrior" is not differentiated from his fellow men by only his prowess in battle. Much more importantly, he is privy to an exclusive moral code. He is a man apart.²⁹ His activity centered around religious ceremony, spontaneous and organized sport, chivalry in combat and deference to women.³⁰ This orientation--the ideal of the "warrior"--never disappeared from Athenian educational ideals. The chief forms of imitation of this ideal, in the fifth century, are found in the love of sport and the extremely masculine mode of life.³¹

The aristocratic element of this ideal is obvious: One cannot pursue the activities of the warrior without a great amount of leisure



time as well as funds for weapons, armour, and horses. The situation did not significantly change in the fifth century. Although training solely for war was replaced by a concentration on sports, the same constraints of time and money prevailed.

Firstly, to wholeheartedly pursue a training in sports requires leisure time. Secondly, the most respected sports (primarily horse-racing, chariot-racing, and hunting) required a large expenditure on equipment. Thus "education" was still as aristocratic as it always had been.³²

And the objectives of the warrior-aristocrat remained unchanged also. These objectives may be summed up in the concept of "valour". The term, however, must be understood

in the chivalric sense of the word--the quality of the brave man, the hero.³³

This ideal spread throughout the middle and upper classes of Athens. Sports became a preoccupation with free Athenians. Naturally, as the non-aristocratic classes simply could not meet the requirements of leisure time and money, they concentrated on less expensive sports--running, discus and javelin throwing, jumping, wrestling, and boxing. Thus, what had happened, was that the non-aristocratic classes simply appropriated the aristocratic ideal of valour as expressed through sport.³⁴

Thus:

With the spread of this ideal, and of the culture which it inspired, the whole system of aristocratic education spread too, and became the standard type of education for every child in Greece.³⁵

And now we may turn to the "hero" component of the warrior-aristocrat-hero ideal.

The Homeric hero lived and died in the effort to embody a certain ideal, a certain quality of existence, ...³⁶

That "ideal" we have seen to be valour.

Now, glory, the renown recognized by those who know, the company of the brave, is the measure, the objective recognition, of valour. Hence the impassioned longing for glory, the longing to be hailed as the greatest, ...Homer was the first to represent this consciously; from Homer the men of antiquity received with rapturous applause the idea that life was a kind of sporting competition in which the great thing was to come first...There can be no doubt that the Homeric hero and hence the actual Greek person of flesh and blood was only really happy when he felt and proved himself to be the first in his category, a man apart, superior.³⁷

It was through sport that this ideal was sought in the fifth century. And it is in this sense that Athenian education never lost its aristocratic essence.

The result of this orientation was that Athenian education was never addressed toward any practical pursuit. It was, rather, only aimed at the individual who had money, and leisure time--the aristocrat; or one who was wealthy to the point of being a de facto aristocrat.³⁸

However, the pursuit of this educational ideal was not merely a corollary of the amount of time and money individuals might possess. These were merely illustrative, really a sort of "proof", of a much more fundamental reality of existence.

The deeper reasons for the exclusiveness of the privileged must be explained by the Greek concepts of arete (goodness) and kalokagathia (unity between beauty and virtue). Both were thought to be unachievable for men who have to struggle with the necessities of life.....
Goodness is here the generic term for the noble qualities as they appear in a person who has a liberal education and is generous, strong in body, and appealing in appearance.³⁹

Thus the fact that one was an aristocrat, and had an abundance of leisure time and money, was "proof" of his qualitative superiority over other men. This is much like the viewpoint of the nineteenth cen-

ture Protestant who viewed financial success as a "proof" of moral righteousness. The consequence was an ennobling of the leisured existence and a denigration of all that is any way utilitarian.⁴⁰

This attitude was also directly reflected in the Athenian's disdain for the slave and the craftsman.⁴¹ And it is in this context that we may understand the horror of the aristocrat at the sophistic practice of offering to teach anyone who is able to afford the fee. One simply cannot teach everyone. In order to learn, one has to be a certain kind of man--noble by birth. Education should be the preserve of a limited worthy few, as only a few are able to receive it.⁴²

This orientation is embodied in the curriculum. However, we must clarify two aspects of Athenian education which give the term "curriculum" a meaning which is not synonymous with our understanding of the word.

Firstly, education was a private matter. Therefore there was no prescribed date at which a child must enter school, nor any minimal amount of education he must receive. Thus the financial status of the parents determined both the length of their child's education and the quality (if we can equate the "quality" of instruction with the fees charged by the instructor).⁴³

We may perhaps readily see how such a state of affairs would tend to perpetuate the division between the education of the wealthy and the poor. We may also perhaps appreciate how the lack of a state enforced standardization of the curriculum would reinforce the notion that different kinds of education are appropriate for different kinds of persons (i.e. training for "culture" is appropriate for the aristocrat and training for a trade is appropriate for the lower classes). The only standardization of curriculum to be found is through custom and convention.

And such a curriculum had three core elements:

But although education was uncontrolled by the state, there was nevertheless a standard system and curriculum which was to all intents and purposes universal. Almost every Greek boy went to three teachers who taught him the three basic subjects of education. He went to the Grammatistēs, who taught him reading, writing, and a little arithmetic, and with whom he learned to read the great poets, and to learn their poetry by heart. He went to the Kitharistēs, with whom he learned to play the seven-stringed lyre and to sing the songs of the lyric poets. He went to the Paidotribēs, who cared for his physical development, and from whom he learned wrestling, boxing, the pankration, running, jumping, throwing the javelin and the discus. That was the basic curriculum of Greek education.⁴⁴

If we remember that the duration of such an education was dependant upon family finances (indeed, most Athenians of the non-citizen classes could barely--if at all--read and write), let us see the type of education which a child, if fortunate, would be exposed to.

Firstly, we must remember that the concern of the "grammar" component of the curriculum was not to develop an intricate mastery of the written word. The purpose of literacy was rather to allow one to appreciate the poets.

When the Greek boys were taught the works of the great poets, they were not much troubled with questions of grammar and syntax and vocabulary and the like; they were taught them for their beauty.⁴⁵

We therefore see literacy being viewed in the same light as it was viewed in the eighteenth century A.D. British "Sunday School"--merely as a tool to enable one to appreciate the bible.⁴⁶ And the analogy is very apt as the Greeks in fact had what could be equated to our Bible--Homer's works.⁴⁷

Arithmetic is given the same status. Just enough is learned to allow one to function in Athenian society.⁴⁸

But if we ask what was considered to be the "object lesson" of the grammar component of the curriculum (since it is neither literacy nor proficiency in arithmetic per se), we must seek a moral lesson which these tools of literacy enable us to draw from the written word.

It was not primarily as a literary masterpiece that the epic was studied, but because its content was ethical, a treatise on the ideal.⁴⁹

It is this aspect of the curriculum with which the Athenian state showed some concern:

...it is certainly true that, whether or not education was compulsory in the primary stage, it was certainly universal. It is equally true that such regulations as the state did lay down were in no sense technical; they had nothing to do with the curriculum of the school, and the academic qualifications of the teacher; they were only concerned with the moral welfare of the boy.⁵⁰

And it is recognition of this concern which allows us to understand why there was such a great emphasis on memorization of the works of the Greek poets from the very beginnings of a child's school career.⁵¹

The greatest of the poets was Homer.⁵² His lesson for Athenians was a moral one:

Homer's real educational significance lies...in the moral climate in which his heroes act; in their styles of life.⁵³

The character who exemplifies this morality is the hero:

This is the secret of Homer's education: the heroic example...⁵⁴

And to make certain the lesson was readily accepted, an appropriate amount of enthusiasm was generated:

Not only did the Greek boy memorize; he also recited; and for the Greek recitation was not simply a repetition of the words; it was a living and an acting of the part. ...And the sensitive boy threw himself heart and soul into the passage which he

was reciting. Here he had his model in the rhapsodies, the professional reciters of Homer.⁵⁵

It is perhaps now apparent how the Greek boy was indoctrinated with the ideological legacy of the Athenian "sense of history". We may now perhaps begin to recognize the reasons why the "educated" Athenian considered himself a man apart from the mainstream of humanity which must toil miserably for its daily existence. It is with this background in mind that we may appreciate the full significance of Barclay's assertion:

Greek education certainly did one thing--it turned out boys soaked and saturated in the poets of the past, and with their minds stored with greatness.⁵⁶

Grammar--with its emphasis on memorization of the poets--certainly contributed to instilling this "sense of greatness". And we have already seen how sports focused on the same ideal. Whether as a child in school or as a free man of the city, the objective pursued through sports was the same.

This leaves only "music", as a part of the curriculum, to consider. Here, logically, we encounter the same situation. We need but note that music (specifically, the ability to play the lyre) was not an end in itself. The purpose of learning to play the lyre is to allow one to set the great poets to music.⁵⁷ Thus, like literacy, music was a tool to give one access to a more noble "knowledge".

It was in this sort of an educational climate that a youth lived until he was approximately sixteen years of age. From there he went into compulsory military service for a year, perhaps two.⁵⁸ That this final phase of a young man's education did not clash with his training to that point is clear from the oath the epheboi took:

I will not disgrace my sacred weapons nor desert the comrade who is placed by my side. I will fight for

things holy and things profane, whether I am alone or with others. I will hand on my fatherland greater and better than I found it. I will hearken to the magistrates, and obey the existing laws and those hereafter established by the people. I will not consent unto any that destroys or disobeys the constitution, but will prevent him, whether I am alone or with others. I will honour the temples and the religion which my forefathers established. So help me Aglauros, Eneualios, Ares, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone.⁵⁹

Beyond this, the student--now a man--could avail himself of the educational services of a philosopher. Again, this required money and time. That is perhaps why the sophists were so slow in spreading any egalitarian elements that may be found in their philosophy. The Athenian democrats in fact recruited leaders from the aristocracy. This is the same aristocracy which was in a unique position to appropriate the services of the sophists as it was one of the few social elements in Athens which could afford the sophists' fees.⁶⁰

In closing, we should perhaps draw attention to the fact that our discussion on education has been solely concerned with the education of men. This merely reflects the educational realities of fifth century Athens. Women were simply not "educated"--in any meaningful sense of the word. They were kept ignorant, led a cloistered existence, and did not have any activities outside the home.⁶¹ Their situation illustrates the degree to which Athens was a city permeated with an inflated sense of masculinity which precluded any contributions from the female half of her population.

HERO WORSHIP

If we reflect upon the Athenian historical tradition, and the form of its embellishment within the educational system, we readily see a profound concern with the ideal of extreme individualism. It is in

this sense that we may appreciate Marrou's insight into the Greek's mentality. He was:

...happy when he felt and proved himself to be the first in his category, a man apart, superior.⁶²

The embodiment of that orientation was the "hero".

The hero represented much more than merely someone who excelled at specific performances; he was rather a link between gods and men. As the gods were the actual founders of the Greek races, through their offspring, we see that every city, every tribe, and every family could trace its descent back to super-human deities.

...every family, every tribe traced back its origin to a 'hero', and these 'heroes' were children of the gods, and deities themselves.⁶³

This was the goal of every "noble" Greek. He felt a call to "prove" himself worthy of his perceived heritage. It is here that the elitist attitudes of the Athenian citizen find their support. To be one of the "common hoard" is to be less than human. It is for this reason that Homer was held in such high esteem.

In general the structure of Homeric society is strongly aristocratic in tone and temper. The common people hardly figure at all; only twice in the two poems do we have mention of individuals outside the charmed circle of aristocratic heroes and chieftans. In one case the swineherd, Eumaeus, turns out to have been a king's son carried off years before by Phoenician slave raiders; the other, Thersites, is depicted in a very unfavorable light,...

And it is this ideal which never allowed the Athenian sense of history to transcend the format of mere personal drama. When an historical event occurred, it occurred for a "reason" which was always conceptualized anthropomorphically. "History" is merely a backdrop for the actions of larger-than-life individuals--i.e. "heroes". That is why Herodotus is

preoccupied only with the individual's motivations which will be the causal factors to result in the making of "history". He is simply unable to conceive of societal factors.⁶⁵

This is the reality of the Greek's consciousness. He must pursue a mode of life which will allow him to partake of the existence of the ancient heroes. It is a lofty ideal, attainable only by a few, and marked by constant striving for greater and greater "excellence".

This ideal can be defined in one phrase: it was an heroic morality of honour. Homer was the source, and in Homer each succeeding generation of antiquity re-discovered the thing that is absolutely fundamental to this whole aristocratic ethic: the love of glory.⁶⁶

EMPIRE

It was this quest for glory, combined with an inbred sense of superiority, which pushed Athens on the road of empire-building.

The claim of the empire was that it provided Athenians with something to live for. Many no doubt appreciated its opportunities for making money, but others welcomed its challenge to action, even if this meant war. It appealed to beliefs in the value of action as a test of manhood and helped to make the Athenians feel superior to other Greeks because they took greater risks and won more successes. The empire did much for Athenian prosperity; it did more for Athenian confidence and pride. In this, as in other respects, democratic Athens prolonged and strengthened a spirit that had already existed in the aristocratic age. It gave to its free citizens the sense of authority and freedom which the old order gave to landowners and rich merchants. The humblest Athenian saw himself as equal to the most prominent citizens of other states, and better than most of them.⁶⁷

And this attitude caused Athens to become increasingly arrogant and belligerent, which in turn became a prime cause of the Peloponnesian Wars.⁶⁸

At this point it is very easy to see how the concept of individual heroism can find vicarious satisfaction in a nationalistic expression which would see Athens as the "heroine" of Hellas. This is precise-

ly what Herodotus was doing in his "histories". And this attitude is precisely what Pericles recognized and exploited:

To a traditional Greek theme Pericles gives a new variation. So much of Greek behavior at all times was shaped by the desire for glory and the honor which comes from success that there is nothing new in Pericles' notion that the Athenian empire will have a renown comparable to that of the great heroes of the past. The Athenians of his time were much concerned with finding a modern equivalent to the heroism of the legendary past. They believed that in the Persian Wars they had equaled the achievements of heroes long dead, but they saw that any modern equivalent would have its idiosyncrasies, since a man lived not for his own honor but for his country's, and this called for a different type of behavior. Athens set out to be superior to the other cities of Greece, and her superiority lay partly in her being above such common weaknesses as sensitivity to criticism or resentment at abuse. In this respect Pericles sees her not only as one city among many but in glorious isolation. This attitude he fostered. If Athens was to be true to the divine spirit which infused her being, she must be remote and formidable.⁶⁹

Particularly susceptible to these emotions would be the newly emergent mercantile classes, who could not lay claim to an old and "honorable" heritage. This was not the case with the old landed aristocracy. The aristocratic "sons" of the Homeric heroes knew their pedigree and were under less of a constraint to prove it: nouveau riche are not quite so secure in their status. The mercantile classes prospered in direct proportion to the size and strength of the military fleet⁷⁰ and were quick to utilize this newly found power to "prove" their "worth" and satisfy their striving for the aforementioned heroic ideals--as well as to enhance their own already considerable wealth.

Pericles, although an aristocrat himself, was sensitive to these orientations and had to respond to the expansionist demands of the more radical sections of his party.⁷¹ It is he who, in the end, becomes sym-

bolic of the "imperial" Athens. C.M. Bowra sees this attitude capsulized in the three speeches Thucydides attributes to Pericles. Although the content of the speeches is specific, they are based on an implicit three-fold attitude.⁷²

Firstly, an empire enhances Athen's ability to fight wars. In both personnel and finances, empire offers resources unavailable to a regional, agricultural, city-state. Secondly, the building of an empire is a very difficult achievement. This implies that the present Athenian generation--as a whole--had in fact succeeded in performing an "heroic" action. That this had never before been accomplished in Hellenic history showed that Athens was capable of transcending the Greek norm. And lastly, with typical aristocratic snobbery, we have a degrading of those outside of the "chosen few" (in this case, the "few" are all free Athenians). Simply put, if Athens does not forcefully control her subordinate states, they will turn on her. Therefore they must be kept in their place--i.e. in subordination.

Thus Athens succeeded in welding a widespread aristocratic idealism with mercantile economics through nationalism and imperialism. Consequently politics was brought to a new height of importance as the affairs of state became more and more complex.

GOVERNMENT

It is the increased burdens of running an empire which now direct us to examine the Athenian concept of government, and the political orientation which nurtures this concept.

We may begin by stating that which cannot be overstressed: only the citizen took part in Athenian politics, and the concept of citizenship cannot be divorced from its political functions. These aspects of

the Athenian conception of government may be profitably examined through the concepts of "liberty" and "class".

Liberty, for the Athenian, was not licence to act spontaneously; quite the opposite. To be free was, rather, to be free to participate in the governing of the polis. The nature of this participation was defined within political, religious, and economic perimeters.⁷³ These perimeters in fact ensured that the size of the citizen class was small enough to allow, theoretically, all citizens to personally know each other to a greater or lesser degree.⁷⁴ In this manner, citizens formed a large political "club". The sphere of activity of this "club" covered the entire spectrum of political action:

...in the Greek view, to be a citizen of a state did not merely imply the payment of taxes, and the possession of a vote; it implied a direct and active cooperation in all the functions of civil and military life. A citizen was normally a soldier, a judge, and a member of the governing assembly; and all his public duties he performed not by deputy, but in person.⁷⁵

This leads us to our concern with class. In terms of simple logistics, one can see that government would become chaotic if all residents of the city had an equal voice in governing--so of course a numerical limit is desirable. However, more importantly, leisure time is required to pursue political activity. This necessitates a freedom from the toils of daily subsistence. Therefore a natural qualitative differentiation between men was enshrined by the state through the concept of liberty.⁷⁶ Liberty--a property of the citizen--freed him for political service. Lack of "liberty" (in this sense of the term) was a property of the non-citizen classes who were deemed to be the providers of the means of subsistence for themselves and the citizens. This distinctly aristocratic perspective was accepted by citizen and non-citizen alike as a "natural"

inevitability.⁷⁷

Thus we see the Athenian notion of "liberty" in fact rested upon a philosophy and social structure founded in a belief in the basic inequality of men. This notion--in its political context--had an interesting historical development. In the blatantly aristocratic society of Homer, "equality" referred to merely the distribution of war booty and to the question of inheritance rights.⁷⁸ Solon, reflecting the political pressures that the lowest-ranking residents of Athens were exerting on the aristocracy, at least has to concede that other, non-aristocratic, people have to be included in any definition of the term. Thus he speaks of the dues each class is entitled to.⁷⁹ We therefore see how the notion of equality underwent a change from an "arithmetical" to a "proportional" definition.⁸⁰

It is through this form of rationalization that the affairs of the state permeated all aspects of Greek life. An individual started life by being placed before his/her father for acceptance. An unfit (i.e. deformed) infant could be left to die from exposure to the elements. Thus the family was seen to be secondary to the state. An individual family might well be able to financially support and care for an unproductive (because of deformity) member of society, but that is a luxury the state as a whole could not afford.⁸¹ When a man was himself ready to marry and have children in turn, his concern was for the legitimacy (i.e. eligibility for full citizenship rights) of his future children. In view of this, marriages were arranged by parents with a concern not for emotion but for lineage and finances.⁸²

Such was the power of the Athenian state over its inhabitants. All men, from aristocrats to slaves, knew their place in the hierarchy.

The mechanisms for governing of the state ensured the perpetuation of this hierarchy. The permanence of this state of affairs was ensured by the deeply seated Athenian notion of what constitutes "authority".

AUTHORITY

It should be evident, at this point, that the Athenian citizen never saw his personal self as the source of legitimacy for any action. As a citizen he was part of an "order" of life which was larger than himself. He gladly accepted the functions that this order imposed (although he would certainly not agree with my term "imposed") upon him because that order was perceived to be wholly legitimate. The nature of that legitimacy may best be understood by examining what he viewed as adequate "authority" for adherence to any belief or course of action.

There are only two sources of unquestionable authority for the Athenian citizen: tradition, and more specifically, religion.

The beginnings of the Greek tradition of authority may be traced to the Homeric society. Here the world of the gods was structured on the model of the patriarchal family. Zeus became the "father" and all were subordinate to him. To avoid his will, trickery was the only available tool for both other gods, and men. But nonetheless Zeus' actual authority was supreme.⁸³ This orientation of course reflected the Homeric social structure (patriarchal families of warrior-aristocrats). As time progressed, clan tradition solidified and the ancient customs themselves became the elements which defined beliefs and consequent action.

Traditional clan authority--through custom and tradition--enjoyed a lengthy tenure. It was able to survive because it incorporated within itself not only what we would term purely political functions (i.e. enforcing clan "justice" and "law", defence, regulation of wealth, etc.),

but retained for itself religious functions. In this manner the political and religious sphere became a relatively homogenous single entity.

The result was that up to the fourth century one cannot clearly discern between political and religious functions. To be a "public" official was to perform both "political" (in our understanding of the term) and "religious" duties (particularly duties associated with the religious festivals).⁸⁴

This incorporation of religion into the sphere of political authority through the customs and traditions of the clan is what is necessary to appreciate if we are to attempt an understanding of the foundations of legitimacy for the Athenian. Legitimacy--and therefore the most stable authority--always had to turn to some form of divine sanction. "Law" was never sufficient if it was seen to be arbitrary. Human laws always had to envoke a professed conformity to "divine Law".⁸⁵

It is for this reason that the founding legislators were believed to be inspired by the gods.⁸⁶ That "inspiration" is what lent authority to their laws.

The process begins with Dracon circa 621. His "laws" were merely the coding of existent tradition.⁸⁷ Solon himself was clearly of the same thinking and even went so far as to forbid any change in the law for (possibly) a century.⁸⁸ And even the apparently drastic reforms of Cleisthenes in 501 (the redrawing of Athens' political map by replacing the original four tribes with ten political units) can be seen to be bending to the force of tradition if we remember that each new tribe received its own hero and religious customs.⁸⁹ The seeking of religious sanction was carried through to the entire city of Athens (and this is of particular import during her days of empire) when she tries to make

Athens a major oracle center.⁹⁰

Here we have our clue to understanding the problems encountered by tyrannical governments. Unlike the legislators, the tyrants could not readily claim divine sanction. This forced them to improvise some link with traditional authority, and the best way for them to do this was to rely very heavily on existent legal structures and customs.⁹¹

The result was that tyrannies never became as radical a form of government as we may at first suspect them to be. Their problems were accentuated by the Delphic oracle, which supported aristocratic government.⁹² The issue of Delphic support for the aristocracy is particularly relevant as oracles were viewed as a major source of religious and political legitimacy.⁹³ In conjunction with this notion of religious-political authority, we may note that political attacks upon the tyrants took the predominant form of moral accusation.⁹⁴

Recognizing the strength of tradition in the Athenian conception of legitimacy and authority, we may perhaps conclude our examination of the Athenian social milieu with an examination of the core of that tradition--religion.

RELIGION

Any study of the Athenian religious consciousness must firstly contend with the problem of sheer "bulk". There were a large number of religious cults in Athens, with varying rites of practice and dedicated to many deities (both divine and semi-divine).⁹⁵ However, it is possible to group them in a definite and intelligible order.

Two Religious Mainstreams

The oldest religious tradition in Athens was the conception of

the divine "family" of gods headed by Zeus.⁹⁶ The newer tradition is exemplified in Orphism and the Eleusinian Mysteries. The difference (for our purposes) we shall discuss momentarily; the similarity of the two traditions is what concerns us at the moment.

Above all, both traditions were extremely ritualistic.⁹⁷ This ritualism necessitated that ultimate religious authority (in the context of one who is privy to sacred "knowledge" or "power") rested with someone or some group. The scope of persons exercising this authority is wide and varied from religious cult to religious cult. At Delphi only the Pythia could speak the words of Apollo,⁹⁸ and some of the civic cults of Athens entrusted the carrying out of religious rituals to citizen-boards or prominent families.⁹⁹

The result was that religions became bound in traditions from which the individual could not deviate. Poems supposedly written by Orpheus directed the practices of the Orphic cult,¹⁰⁰ the origin of the rites associated with Delphi are lost in antiquity,¹⁰¹ and certain rites are known only to privileged families.¹⁰²

But the Orphic and Eleusinian religious orientations did offer one innovation--they offered salvation. The Homeric Hades was a drab existence--really a form of lifelessness--for all who inhabited it; hero or peasant.¹⁰³ It is in the light of this knowledge that we may appreciate the aforementioned¹⁰⁴ "heroic" struggles of the ancient aristocrat-warriors. They were seeking to attain an ultimate earthly perfection because that is all that is possible for men (in the absence of a heaven).

However, the Orphics and Eleusinian promised salvation to everyone.¹⁰⁵ "Perfection" was now not the exclusive privilege of a chosen few (and attainable only in mortal life); it was available to all.¹⁰⁶ The

attainment of this goal, however, was not seriously disruptive to the existent social order.

Religion and Social Class

Let us now slightly amend our somewhat bland previous assertion that there is no "heaven" in Greek religion. There is, of course, the existence of the gods which is "heavenly" in a definite sense. There is also the existence of aristocrat-warrior-heroes (the nobility) which is a sort of "heaven" as it is the penultimate form of purely human life. And finally there is a whole group of semi-divine "heroes" who are midway between men and the gods.¹⁰⁷ Naturally the aristocracy is closest to these heroes (we may recall that heroes were the founders of clans), and it is not difficult to conjecture that they may at least have a faint hope of being blessed with some form of afterlife. No such even remote prospect existed for the non-aristocratic classes.

It was to these common people that Orphism and the Eleusinian Mysteries appealed.

The sixth century B.C. was a period of remarkable religious ferment when the ordinary individual, who enjoyed no gentile privilege, was becoming more and more concerned about the after-life. The Isles of the Blest were reserved for heroes and those favored by the gods, or what usually amounted to the same thing, by birth, for Homer had no care for the common man's soul. The initiation ceremony at Eleusis, impressive and satisfying by its very nature, seemed to proffer some real hope, and for those who returned death had apparently lost much of its terror.¹⁰⁸

We see, at this point, a competition between two "forms" of religion. The old tradition of the Olympian family is a rigidly hierarchical orientation reinforcing qualitative differentiations among gods and men.¹⁰⁹ The new religious tradition is a mysticism which brings comfort

to all men regardless of class. It is therefore no accident that Orphism probably originated in, and was supported by, the lower classes.¹¹⁰ With the growth of a mercantile middle class, we see yet another deity--Hermes--gaining importance. We may note that Hermes is a very ambitious god and seeks to expand his power and influence.¹¹¹

Yet these religious influences did very little to alter social reality. All contained an internal doctrine which was supportive of the status quo.

Firstly, the Orphics preached salvation; but within the framework of reincarnation. Thus their doctrine rationalized poverty and oppression in this life as a punishment for transgressions in another life.¹¹² Therefore the believer accepted his lot as a just one. Such a doctrine merely perpetuated the Athenian hierarchical world-view.

The Eleusinian Mysteries--also offering salvation--offered it in an equally socially conservative form. To be "saved" required that one merely belonged to the religion. No specific conduct was necessary, so a person simply continued life as he always had.¹¹³ Thus a short period of suffering--if salvation awaits one--is well worth enduring. Again the status quo is preserved.

Hermes, however, is a very active god. His rise in prestige is reflected in the growing strength of the middle class. However, this class was always on the fringes of the aristocracy and, as Solon recognized, could readily be incorporated into full citizenship. Also, Hermes was a member of the Olympian family of gods and it is easy to see how his status could be elevated without any serious violation of tradition. We therefore have, in Hermes, and the middle class, a change which reflects not a matter of quality; rather a matter of degree. And certainly it is

easy to see how Hermes would be at ease in a city which ruled an empire in the fifth century.

We may therefore profitably view mystic religion as the placebo of the truly oppressed classes. By the same token we can see how--in the case of Hermes--traditional religion was able to incorporate the aspirations of an already very privileged group of society. Indeed, the middle class could no more afford to support a truly egalitarian religion than could the nobility.

Both the mercantile and the aristocratic classes saw the need to adhere closely to both civic and "cosmic" law:

The dignity and authority of the rulers of a city were not curtailed but enhanced...by the fact that they were constitutional rulers, nor were their powers less full because defined by law. And the Gods were constitutional magistrates, not absolute or despotic rulers such as ruled the barbarians. They had their office determined by the nature of things, and powers commensurate with that office. They were the administrators of the moral and physical equilibrium of the Universe. They could keep things to their courses and places, and men to their places and duties.¹¹⁴

In this manner, it would be easy to claim that the civic order is in fact a reflection of a larger universal order.

We can sum up and restate this attitude of the Greeks towards their Gods by saying that the analogy dominant in their conception of the Universe was that of a society. To Greek religion the Universe looked and behaved as if it were an enlarged edition of the city-state. Men and things were alike citizens of it, and equal before its laws. The Gods were the aristocracy, men the commoners, of this commonwealth. The constitution of Nature was through and through a political constitution.¹¹⁵

The perpetuation of this viewpoint benefited both the state and the mercantile middle class as both used slaves as generators of revenue.¹¹⁶ Therefore the state and its ruling classes (now including the

mercantile class) certainly benefited from the concept of "citizen-priests" which saw no major differentiation between the duties of government and the duties of religion.¹¹⁷ And that is why it certainly benefits such an ideology to have Athena in the dual role of state goddess and goddess of everyday work.¹¹⁸ Any exoticisms such as the mystic cults, if they do not upset this ideology (and we have seen that they do not), are therefore tolerated.

The "Power" of Religion

Our examination of the "types" or religious sentiments and subsequent distribution of these sentiments through the social strata still leaves a singularly important question unresolved. We still do not know how "powerful" a social force religion was. To what degree did it affect the everyday thoughts and actions of men, and of what consequence was this to the actual operations of state?

Our documentation will reveal that the influence of religion was great indeed.

Lives were needlessly lost and Mediterranean history forged when Nicias delayed the retreat of his troops from Syracuse in 413. He acted on the advice of a soothsayer who interpreted an eclipse of the moon as an omen which dictated that nothing should be done, militarily, for twenty-seven days. The delay resulted in a decisive defeat for Athens.¹¹⁹ It is true that Nicias was unusually sympathetic to the utterances of soothsayers,¹²⁰ but it is also true that this was not perceived as a deterrent to his military capabilities.

The relationship between religion and military endeavours is a close one. One particularly significant Athenian consultation at Delphi centered on how Athens should react to the Persian threat.¹²¹ This

incident is isolated by us because of its historical significance. The phenomena of consulting oracles for political guidance is, however, a common one as oracles (particularly Delphi) were seen as legitimators for political actions.¹²² "Political actions" here are not limited only to state endeavours. Internal political struggles--such as the Alcmaeonidae's plots against Peisistratus--could also involve seeking oracular support.¹²³

It is in the hopes of obtaining legitimacy for their rule that the tyrants turned to religion. Peisistratus is an excellent case in point. He "purified" the oracle at Delos in 543¹²⁴ and he went to great lengths to convince the Athenian populace that Athena herself wanted him to rule.¹²⁵ Indeed it was he and his sons who actually greatly contributed to religious sentiment by encouraging the building of temples and the practice of religious rites.¹²⁶ (The temple building in Pericles' reign may be viewed in the same light. The Parthenon, as well as four other temples, were built in his time.¹²⁷) Indeed one of the legacies of the "tyrannical" sixth century is that religion became stronger because of the support that the tyrants gave it.¹²⁸

The issue is, of course, the establishing of legitimacy. And the process applies equally to domestic and inter-state affairs. Solon's task was greatly simplified by Delphic approval; and Sparta hoped to legitimize her expansion into Tegean territory.¹²⁹ Cleisthenes sought a Delphic blessing for his political revisions by asking the oracle to choose the names for the newly formed ten tribes.¹³⁰

What we are witnessing here, of course, are attempts to cloak change under the guise of traditional sanctions. Nowhere is this more strikingly documented than in the relationship between religion and the

establishment of colonies.

Oracles, particularly Delphi, were consulted before a colonizing party was sent out.¹³¹ As there may not be a "legitimate" leader among the colonists, and new legislators may be needed for the colony, oracles were consulted to provide such legitimacy for both the new leader and his legislation. The strength of this oracular sanction is evident from the fact that the new leader--once confirmed by the oracle--assumed the de facto powers of a king in the new colony and, upon his death, was revered as a religious personage.¹³²

To even further illustrate the social diversity of the religious orientation we may perhaps conclude our documentation with a few random observations. Note that Hellenic sports festivals (most prominently, the Olympic games) had religious overtones. The winner received a religious symbol, such as a wreath, and had the honor of making a sacrifice to the gods.¹³³ Whole states would be excited by the quest for a founding "hero's" remains. If they could be returned to his "home" state, and properly respected via sacrifices and other forms of homage, it was believed they would emit a force of some sort which would bring benefits to the state.¹³⁴ And finally (and particularly ironic) we may note that Protagoras defended sophism on the grounds that semi-religious personages such as Homer, Hesiod and the disciples of Orpheus and Musaeus practiced rhetoric.¹³⁵

In brief, it is evident that religious sentiment was a powerful force affecting all aspects of life:

...religion was so essential to the state, so bound up with its whole structure, in general and in detail, that the very conception of a separation between the powers was impossible.¹³⁶

That such a separation did not exist is, of course, beneficial to those who hold power (both religious and political)--the citizens. By appropriating both functions into their legitimate domain of control, they were able to effectively control the ideology of the whole city-state. Thus the dual functions of political office. For example, the Council of Areopagus could not only remove the curse from the killer of a fellow human (thereby avoiding the penalty of exile) but it was also the guardian of the constitution until the mid-fifth century.¹³⁷ This combination of functions--so odd to our social orientation--was perfectly logical to the Athenians.

Penalties for Religious Transgressions

Having understood both the pervasiveness and strength of religious sentiment, let us briefly consider the actual force of religious sanctions.

To appreciate the significance of religious sanctions, we must firstly take care to remember that the gods were part of the Greek's daily environment.¹³⁸ Only in this manner could "religion" be such a pervasive force in daily life. This proximity of gods and men was taken for granted. The example of Herodotus is not extreme: He was a stout believer in prophecy, oracles, and was initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries.¹³⁹ He was also a respected personality in Athens, and his career advanced accordingly. But what happened to those who did not see the "obvious" presence of gods in the city?

We know that Protagoras was charged with atheism and his books may have been publicly burned.¹⁴⁰ We also know that Anaxagoras was tried under a religious law for his teachings on the corporeal nature of celestial bodies. We may profitably examine the wording of the law which

he violated. The law is concerned with

...those who do not acknowledge divine things or who give instruction about celestial phenomena.¹⁴¹

We also know that the list of those who were brought to trial on charges of religious impiety is a long one.

But we must be careful to note that these laws, although they were often used as a form of social persecution, applied to all citizens. Even the powerful Alcibiades could not ignore the consequences of the notorious "mutilation of the Hermae" incident.¹⁴² And it is frightening to note that the state of Athens was prepared to execute anyone who committed the "crime" of revealing the secrets of the Eleusinian Mysteries.¹⁴³

These brief examples illustrate a central tenet of Athenian social consciousness. The powers of state and religion acted as a unit to enforce the perpetuation of tradition. The essence of that tradition we have discussed. As a result, we cannot concur with the naive view of Athens that is all too frequently put forth. She is not the highly "democratic" and ideologically tolerant utopia idealized in many undergraduate textbooks. Alongside her admittedly magnificent achievements we must note her serious limitations. These shortcomings are manifested in the force of the wrath that she could--and did--direct against those who espoused any "heretical" doctrines.

In their dealings with the divine the Athenians were as old-fashioned, as bigoted, and as superstitious, as they were enlightened and progressive in their love of surveying and embellishing the spectacle of human existence.

Athens, then, in spite of her artistic temperament, her culture, her love of thought and conversation, was no place for untrammelled scientific and philosophic investigation. ...This may be the reason why Athens, in spite of her brilliancy and her attractions as an imperial capital,

failed to attract or to hold so many brilliant minds. The charm of the Periclean court could not persuade the historian Herodotus to settle definitely there, and the philosopher Democritus, rich and free to live where he chose, preferred to travel or to live at Abdera. Even the poet Aeschylus, it has been suggested, for all his piety and Miltonic Puritanism found the atmosphere too stifling, and used to visit Sicily for air. Perhaps, too, Euripides found the concealed irony and skepticism with which he edified the religious majority, and entertained the cynical minority, of his audience, an insufficient vent for his revolt, and sought relief at last in the ... New World of Thrace.¹⁴⁴

THE IONIAN ANTITHESIS

We stated at the beginning of our discussion that we will not concern ourselves with an explication of the "origins" of the atomic perspective, rather we will treat atomism as a "given" which is introduced into an existent social milieu (fifth century Athens).¹⁴⁵ Yet the tendency to ask "why" is strong: Why did Ionian history nurture an orientation which was so different from the Athenian worldview?

The issue is obviously relevant to our topic, and certainly worthy of a separate treatise. However, a lack of reliable sources prevents such an enquiry from being anything substantially more than conjecture. Archeological and literary sources do not provide enough of an empirical base from which we may accurately reconstruct Ionian history up to the fifth century.

Nonetheless, perhaps a few general observations may at least give us a hint of the social-historical forces which eventually gave birth to the atomic perspective. We believe that such an investigation could fruitfully concentrate on the influence of economic, geographical, technological, and political-cultural factors on the course of Ionian his-

tory.¹⁴⁶

The Iron Age (beginning circa 1200) increased the availability of metal to the point where a large number of craftsmen now had access to it. Refinements in artisans' techniques brought about an efficiency which allowed a change in emphasis from production for domestic consumption to an emphasis on production for trade.

If we note that Greek settlements in Asia Minor were restricted to a narrow coastal plain along the Aegean--and that access to the interior of Asia Minor is hampered by hilly terrain--we can readily perceive how the sea was viewed as the logical medium of travel. The Aegean, along the Asia Minor coast, is a difficult area to navigate due to shifting wind conditions and the presence of a great number of small islands. This is one major factor which spurred the Ionian interest in practical technological innovation.

We have noted that many Ionians whom modern history considers to be philosophers were, in their time, noted as inventors.¹⁴⁷ Much of their energy went to the development of refined aids for safe sea travel (improvement of navigational equipment, development of cartography, concern with problems in engineering, etc.). The subject of this study is, of course, nature herself (stars, tides, wind, etc.).

The combination of the above factors may have given rise to dramatic political and cultural phenomena.

The combination of commodity production and maritime expedition results in the city-state coming into prominence. Now a new aristocracy --one whose interests are intimately tied in with commercial ventures-- begins to challenge the traditional authority of the landed and military aristocracy. Indeed, the importance of the city-state is itself a new

phenomena. The landed gentry is to be found, generally, in the countryside--they are not city-dwellers. As the source of wealth changes from a rural to an urban concentration, the dominance of the new "commercial" aristocracy becomes clear. This new aristocracy is "commercial" because it derives its source of wealth from mercantile adventures.

It follows that any technological improvement which aids either the process of manufacture or of shipping operations stands to directly benefit the new aristocracy. Therefore practical speculation would naturally find support in this class. We can see how such a practical exploration of nature would slowly "demystify" the world. (In other words, the sailor and the "commercial" aristocrat--both concerned with turning a profit on a ship loaded with goods for trade--may eventually come to recognize the superiority of a rudimentary meteorology over a fully developed mythology of "sea gods".) Over a very long period of time, the philosophical manifestation of this approach to the observation of nature could result in a wholly corporeal view of nature (i.e. atomism).

If we think of trade as a pragmatic art, we can see how a "live and let live" attitude toward the cultural, religious and political idiosyncrasies of one's trading partners is a necessity. This is simply to say that one exhibits at least token tolerance and/or respect for the customs of those one wishes to trade with. It does not pay to annoy one's potential source of profit!

A long period of practicing this form of conduct, we may speculate, may eventually result in not only a very sympathetic attitude toward divergent cultural practices, but may even erode one's faith in the absolute validity of one's own beliefs. (Perhaps here we have a clue to the phenomena of religious tolerance in Ionia, noted at the beginning

of our work.¹⁴⁸⁾ Can we not see here the germ of the emphasis on "custom" preached by the sophists?

To effectively carry on trade, one requires more "international" mediums of communication. It is therefore not surprising that Ionia was a pioneer in accepting such innovations as money, alphabetic writing (probably to facilitate the keeping of records) and a standard system of weights and measures. All of these, of course, increase the "efficiency" of trade and accelerate the aforementioned processes.

All of the preceding is, again, a plausible explanation and complements the scanty evidence we have on Ionian social history up to the fifth century. However--although we personally subscribe to what has been stated--we stress that the argument is far from conclusive.

The scenario does gain some further plausibility if we very briefly compare it with the current of events in early (before the fifth century) Athenian history.

Above all, the rural-urban dichotomy did not emerge as early in Attica as it did in Ionia. The struggle of the mercantile interests to gain supremacy over the agrarian was long and bitter, and did not really culminate until the days of "empire". Reflective of this is the delayed Athenian interest in utilizing the sea. It is not until the late sixth century that maritime interests take on a pronounced importance. Since mercantile interests were slow to develop, the emphasis on practical technology lagged also. (Innovations in agricultural technology were minimal--even in the fifth century.)

And we would do well to note that the Mainland Greeks were often victims of great social upheavals.

In Mainland Greece...the Archaic Age was a time of

extreme personal insecurity. The tiny overpopulated states were just beginning to struggle up out of the misery and impoverishment left behind by the Dorian invasions, when fresh trouble arose: whole classes were ruined by the great economic crisis of the seventh century, and this in turn was followed by the great political conflicts of the sixth, which translated the economic crisis into terms of murderous class warfare. It is very possible that the resulting upheaval of social strata, by bringing into prominence submerged elements of the mixed population, encouraged the reappearance of old culture-patterns which the common folk had never wholly forgotten. Moreover, insecure conditions of life might in themselves favour the development of a belief in daemons, based on the sense of man's helpless dependence upon capricious Power; and this in turn might encourage an increased resort to magical procedures, ...¹⁴⁹

This is not to say that the Ionians were free from this sort of social upheaval (we simply do not know), but surely it is reasonable to assume that a crudely "scientific" (for lack of a better term) orientation is more apt to flourish in an atmosphere of peace. This frees the speculative minds of the society to pursue far-ranging topics of study at their leisure, rather than forcing them to focus their attention upon solving perennial crises. Here we are simply saying that fear is a logical consequence if one (be it an individual or a society) is exposed to recurring violent social upheavals. And who can blame one for grasping for what are now generally considered irrational placebos (i.e., oracles, mysticism, religious persecutions, etc.) in times of crises? The culminative effect of such reactions is to undermine the credibility of more naturalistic explanations. (We must note however that domestic tranquility can also foster development of wholly metaphysical orientations. Ancient Egypt is a case in point. Therefore this perspective is most plausible if we couple it with the aforementioned economic, technological, political-cultural and geographic "determinants" that Ionians

were subjected to.)

In summary, we agree with the assertion of G.L. Huxley:

The greatest gift of Ionia to the intellectual tradition of mankind was the creation of a rational view of the world. ...The ferment of Ionian society provided the right climate for free ratiocination, a climate which did not last. The Athenians' persecution of the philosopher Anaxagoras would have been inconceivable in the Miletus of Thales and Anaximander.¹⁵⁰

We find it lamentable that the question "Why did atomism flourish in Ionia?" may never be answered to everyone's satisfaction. Hopefully some light on the issue has been shed by our discussion of the negative side of the question: "Why was atomism not acceptable to the dominant sectors of the Athenian social milieu?"

Footnotes - Chapter VI

¹This is particularly significant if we appreciate that which was stressed in the last chapter: Athenian citizens themselves were not a homogenous group of single mind and interest. Of specific importance is the clash of the interests of the old aristocratic group--the landed gentry; and the relatively "new" citizens--the group admitted to the sharing of full citizens' rights through, notably, the reforms of Solon.

²Lionel Pearson, The Local Historians of Attica, Vol XI of Philological Monographs, ed. by T. Robert S. Broughton (Philadelphia: American Philological Association, 1942), p. 1.

³All four observations are made by J.B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians (Harvard Lectures), (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1909), pp. 2-5.

⁴Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁵See Winspear, Genesis, pp. 29-30.

⁶See p. 13.

⁷See Bury, Historians, p. 244. and Michael Grant, The Ancient Historians, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 57.

⁸Bury, Historians, pp. 33-44.

⁹Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁰See chapter II.

¹¹See Bury, Historians, pp. 10-12. Victorino Tejara, also acknowledging Bury in his statement, puts it very succinctly. In attributing the beginnings of objectivity, rationalism, and accuracy of report to Ionia, he states:

"This is the awareness which was but an application to the world of men of the same Ionian rationalism which had already undertaken to discuss what could be believed about the world of nature."

Victorino Tejara, Modes of Greek Thought, a vol. in The Century Philosophy Series, ed. by Justus Buchler (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Educational Division, Meredith Corporation, 1971), p. 111.

¹²Grant, Ancient Historians, p. 53.

¹³Ibid., pp. 40-42.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁷See Bury, Historians, p. 243.

¹⁸Grant, Ancient Historians, p. 29.

¹⁹Bury, Historians, pp. 242-243.

²⁰Grant, Ancient Historians, pp. 38-39

²¹See Bury, Historians, pp. 61-66.

²²See Grant, Ancient Historians, pp. 114-121.

²³Bury, Historians, pp. 242-259.

²⁴Grant, Ancient Historians, p. 76.

²⁵We should perhaps note that Thucydides seems to be much more influenced by Ionian materialism than Herodotus. See Grant, Ancient Historians, p. 79. and Bury, Historians, pp. 75-76.

²⁶William Barclay, Educational Ideals in the Ancient World, (London: Collins, 1959), p. 84.

²⁷Robert Ulich, Education in Western Culture, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), p. 23.

²⁸H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, translated by George Lamb (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956), pp. 36-38.

²⁹H. I. Marrou, "Education in Homeric Times" in Nobility, Tragedy, and Naturalism: Education in Ancient Greece, Vol. I of The Burgess History of Western Education Series, ed. by J. J. Chambliss (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 26-27. Marrou, in an attempt to assist the reader in comprehending the consciousness of the "Homeric hero" compares him to a medieval knight. Although we are not convinced that the analogy is perfectly applicable, we do feel that it is very useful and is well worth making.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 27-28.

³¹Ibid., p. 31

³²Marrou, Education in Antiquity, p. 38.

³³Marrou, "Education in Homeric Times", p. 34.

- ³⁴Marrou, Education in Antiquity, p. 40.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 39
- ³⁶Marrou, "Education in Homeric Times", p. 34.
- ³⁷Ibid., p. 34.
- ³⁸Marrou, Education in Antiquity, p. 43.
- ³⁹Ulich, Education in Western Culture, pp. 24-25.
- ⁴⁰Barclay, Educational Ideals, p. 82.
- ⁴¹Ibid., p. 79.
- ⁴²Marrou, Education in Antiquity, p. 33.
- ⁴³Barclay, Educational Ideals, p. 105.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., p. 112.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., p. 121.
- ⁴⁶See M.G. Jones, The Charity School Movement, (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1938) for an overview of the perceived "uses" of literacy for lower class children in eighteenth century Britain.
- ⁴⁷Barclay, Educational Ideals, p. 117.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., p. 122.
- ⁴⁹Marrou, Education in Antiquity, p. 10.
- ⁵⁰Barclay, Educational Ideals, p. 110.
- ⁵¹Ibid., p. 117.
- ⁵²Marrou, Education in Antiquity, pp. 9-10.
- ⁵³Ibid., p. 10.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., p. 13.
- ⁵⁵Barclay, Educational Ideals, p. 119.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 119.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 124-130.
- ⁵⁸Ulich, Education in Western Culture, p. 25.
- ⁵⁹Kenneth J. Freeman, Schools of Hellas, No. 38 of Classics in

Education, general editor, Lawrence A. Cremin, (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1969), -. 211.

⁶⁰Marrou, Education in Antiquity, p. 47.

⁶¹Barclay, Educational Ideals, p. 91. For an overview of the Greek view of women see Verna Zinserling, Women in Greece and Rome, trans. by L.A. Jones, (New York: Abner Schram, 1972), pp. 14-31. and O'Faolain, Julia, and Martines, Lauro, ed. Not in God's Image (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 2-32.

⁶²Marrou, Education in Antiquity, p. 11.

⁶³G. Lowes Dickinson, The Greek View of Life, (Chautauqua, New York: The Chautauqua Press, 1909), p. 9.

⁶⁴Winspear, Genesis, pp. 29-30.

⁶⁵Grant, Ancient Historians, pp. 57-58.

⁶⁶Marrou, Education in Antiquity, pp. 10-11.

⁶⁷Bowra, Periclean Athens, p. 137.

⁶⁸This is a particularly intriguing irony of Athens' history. It is true that the ideals, as we have seen, of "excellence" were the legacy of an aristocratic era--and were appropriated by the non-aristocratic classes. However, the aristocracy, as a very small group, lived these ideals in isolation from the rest of their society and in isolation from other societies. They were not imperialistic; quite the opposite. The "democratization" of Athens reworked these aristocratic ideals to justify an expansionist political program, and as C.M. Bowra notes above, gave a "factual" basis for the feelings of superiority the free Athenians had. An aristocrat, by definition, does not have to leave the bounds of his particular society to "confirm" these same feelings.

Thus, ironically, if Athens had remained rigidly aristocratic, perhaps the turmoil of the Peloponnesian Wars would have been avoided and Athens would not have suffered her great decline. On the other hand, the creative energies unleashed by the limited democratization of Athens would perhaps not have emerged and Athens would not have had such a brilliant internal history.

For a brief history of the Athenian empire, see M.L.W. Laistner, Greek History, (New York: D.C. Heath and Company, 1932), pp. 236-278.

⁶⁹Bowra, Periclean Athens, p. 132.

⁷⁰Winspear, Genesis, p. 66.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 115-116.

⁷²Bowra, Periclean Athens, pp. 100-103.

⁷³C. Delisle Burns, Greek Ideals: A Study of Social Life, (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1917), pp. 84-85.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 104.

⁷⁵Dickinson, The Greek View, p. 67.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 76.

⁷⁷Burns, Greek Ideals, p. 77. and Dickinson, The Greek View, p. 123.

⁷⁸Winspear, Genesis, p. 89.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 89-90.

⁸⁰Dickinson, The Greek View, p. 76.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 154-155.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 156-157.

⁸³Winspear, Genesis, p. 32.

⁸⁴Burns, Greek Ideals, p. 64.

⁸⁵Freeman, God, p. 207.

⁸⁶Dickinson, The Greek View, p. 70.

⁸⁷Freeman, God, p. 206.

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 208-212.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 214.

⁹⁰Attilio Mario Levi, Political Power in the Ancient World, translation by Jane Costello, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965), pp. 83-84.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 64-68. This is particularly a characteristic of Peisistratos' rule. See Jarde, The Formation, p. 164.

⁹²Levi, Political Power, pp. 97-98.

⁹³Ibid., p. 83.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 103.

⁹⁵For an excellent overview of the numerous religious cults of Athens see John Pollard, Seers, Shrines, and Sirens: The Greek Religious Revolution in the Sixth Century B.C., (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965), pp. 40-64.

⁹⁶ See Winspear, Genesis, p. 53.

⁹⁷ For a short overview of Orphism see Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 56-69. For an overview of the Eleusinian Mysteries see Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 47-56. For a closer examination of both the Orphic and Eleusinian cults, as well as the other major cults in Greece, see Pollard, Seers in its entirety.

⁹⁸ See Pollard, Seers, pp. 17-39.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 40-64.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 25-27.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 40-64.

¹⁰³ Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 40-41.

¹⁰⁴ See previous discussion on "education" and "hero worship".

¹⁰⁵ Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, p. 47.

¹⁰⁶ An interesting parallel to this is the spreading of the concept of perfection through sports, alluded to in our discussion on "education".

¹⁰⁷ For an overview of semi-divine heroes in Greek religion see Pollard, Seers, pp. 117-136. It is to be stressed that gods and semi-divine "heroes" are not seen to be exclusive of each other. In the case of Athens, Athena was closely associated with the hero Erechtheus, who had his own annual festival. Heracles and Theseus are two other major Athenian heroes who were honored in festivals. See Pollard, Seers, p. 41 and p. 59.

¹⁰⁸ Pollard, Seers, p. 67.

¹⁰⁹ Winspear, Genesis, pp. 53-54.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 47.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 55-59.

¹¹² Pollard, Seers, p. 100.

¹¹³ Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, p. 51.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 35.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 30. Fuller also notes, on p. 37, that the difficult to understand (for the modern student) term "virtue" essentially means the recognition of this order and to work within the limits one finds himself in.

- 116 Winspear, Genesis, p. 67.
- 117 Pollard, Seers, p. 47.
- 118 Ibid., p. 47.
- 119 Laistner, Greek History, p. 268.
- 120 Decharme, Euripides, p. 67.
- 121 H.W. Parke, Greek Oracles, a vol. in Hutchinson University Library, edited by H.T. Wade-Gery, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1967), pp. 102-104.
- 122 Levi, Political Power, p. 52.
- 123 Parke, Greek Oracles, p. 98.
- 124 Pollard, Seers, p. 148.
- 125 Ibid., p. 40.
- 126 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
- 127 Bowra, Periclean Athens, p. 119. For an overview of the role of religion in the Athens of Pericles' time, see Bowra, pp. 106-138.
- 128 Pollard, Seers, p. 93.
- 129 Parke, Greek Oracles, p. 65.
- 130 Pollard, Seers, p. 33.
- 131 Parke, Greek Oracles, pp. 44-45.
- 132 Levi, Political Power, p. 57.
- 133 Ibid., p. 44.
- 134 Pollard, Seers, p. 119.
- 135 Ibid., p. 95.
- 136 Dickinson, The Greek View, p. 10
- 137 Pollard, Seers, pp. 48-49.
- 138 Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, p. 31.
- 139 Grant, Ancient Historians, pp. 54-55.
- 140 Winspear, Genesis, p. 139.
- 141 Bowra, Periclean Athens, p. 191.

¹⁴²Pollard, Seers, p. 42.

¹⁴³Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, p. 48.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 205-206.

¹⁴⁵See p. 5.

¹⁴⁶This discussion is based on Novack, The Origins, pp. 53-67.

¹⁴⁷See pp. 12-14.

¹⁴⁸See p. 14.

¹⁴⁹Dodds, The Irrational, pp. 44-45.

¹⁵⁰G.L. Huxley, The Early Ionians (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 93.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that the contents of the preceding chapters have illustrated how alien atomism was to the dominant aspects of the Athenian social milieu. However, perhaps a brief overview of what has preceded will strengthen our conviction that the fifth century Athenian social reality was almost wholly incompatible with the Democritean (atomic) social perspective.

TRADITION

The Athenian respect for tradition was, as we have seen, very deeply seated. Whether in the form of ancestral reverence, or in the form of seeking "legitimacy" through historical and/or religious sanctions, the process was the same. Men simply could not form new institutions or adopt new mores on their own initiative. Any change always had to claim adherence to a "legitimate" historical tradition. As we have noted, this orientation was supported by the educational institutions. The Athenian curriculum embodied what was "known" to be the historically "best" education.

This certainly conflicts with atomism. For example, education must be "innovative"; not traditional. Man is constantly learning new things which must be incorporated into his existent body of knowledge. It cannot be otherwise. There simply are no "truths" to discover as wholly objective knowledge is not possible. This is of particular re-

levance for education as education is what "creates" man's "nature" through human history. Therefore the concept of an infallible educational "authority" is clearly out of place.

In like manner, unquestionable authorities for other realms of human endeavour also do not have a place. Laws, as one example, are not rooted in any static, eternal, "truths". They are man-made --reflecting the state of knowledge of the legislators of that time--and therefore may readily be changed once new knowledge outmodes them. These sorts of changes are in no need of traditional sanctions.

RELIGION

This orientation, obviously, has devastating consequences for a deeply religious society (such as Athens) as religion tends to become a very strong form of sanction for--and against--a very wide range of social actions.

We have seen that both the "old" (Olympian) and the "new (mystic), religious traditions of Athens permeated all aspects of social life and both had the common traits of being very authoritarian and ritualistic. Such a religious structure would simply have no place in an "atomic" society. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that any form of religion would in fact exist. Certainly a religion supporting the concept of an essentially non-corporeal view of physical reality and the concept of some form of afterlife clearly is in conflict with atomism which explicitly states that all reality is wholly corporeal and the soul, as part of that reality, is mortal.

THE GODS

Such a viewpoint is particularly fatal for the "gods". We will

recall that the gods can and do interfere in human events--in the eyes of the Athenians. To a lesser degree, so do the semi-divine personages called "heroes".

This state of affairs is rejected by the atomist. True, entities we choose to mistakenly call "gods" may exist, but they are not divine. Rather they are merely other equally corporeal forms of life which possess certain traits we may not (such as, perhaps, superior strength). But they are not the divine instigators of events shaping human history! They are bound by the same physical realities all of nature is. This being the case, why should we pray to them as they cannot affect anything in our social reality?

THE COMMON MAN

However, whereas the gods fall from grace in an atomic society, the common man is socially elevated.

We may recall that the Athenian had no respect for the activities of the craftsman or laborer. This reflected the belief that such men are born into a position of qualitative inferiority--as compared to the qualitatively superior position of the noble. (This, we shall recall, is why only certain men are capable of being educated.)

Atomism, however, reverses this situation. The craftsman is not a despised figure in the atomic perspective. This is because the impetus for change and improvement comes from society itself, and we must therefore appropriate suggestions from all of society's members. We therefore have an essentially sociological orientation.

SOCIOLOGY

Atomism--in its social implications--demands, among other things,

recognition of the fact that men learn from their environment. If we are careful to keep in mind that "environment" means both physical and social surroundings, then we can readily see that men can best mutually benefit each other if there is full cooperation among men. We therefore must ensure that all members of society have equal access to the social machinery which takes account of suggestions to improve the human condition, and we must ensure that all men have an equal voice (and therefore equal respect) if we are not going to prejudice the "validity" of opinions along the lines of the social class of the expressors of those opinions. Thus society is a dynamic entity which recognizes the sociological forces which ensure the "evolution" of the societal organism.

This is obviously a radically different viewpoint from the Athenian. In Athens, "cooperation" was a very static concept. The laboring classes "cooperated" within total society by merely physically supporting the leisured classes. The purpose of this was to allow these leisured classes to live in isolation from the common herd. Thus the "citizens" appropriated all functions (save subsistence production) for their own sphere of activity and completely rejected the broader sociological meaning of group cooperation that the atomists held. (And we must, again, note that the view of women and slaves Democritus held is closer to the Athenian view than a consistent atomic viewpoint. However, this is still an "improvement" over the Athenian viewpoint which rejected all classes--even the freemen--who worked with their hands.

"FATE", "CHANCE", AND INDIVIDUALISM

The lack of such a sociological orientation is what makes nonsense of the Athenian historical perspective. In the eyes of the Athenians, individuals can and do make history by their own sheer will. These men

are the "heroes". But, in contradiction to free will, the hero must accept that "fate" has put him in a position where he is able to exercise his individual (and "superior") talents, and he is always in danger of being frustrated by "chance". This orientation is, of course, logically untenable and assumes ridiculous dimensions if we remember that the individual hero (or state, in the case of the whole of Athens) can exercise his free will, is ever goaded on by his "fate", is constantly wary of "chance", and yet can consult an oracle which can infallibly predict the future.

An atomist is almost at a loss to comprehend this scenario. In a word, there is no predestination--either in the context of "fate" or oracular divination. Nor is there "chance" operating in human affairs. What we call chance is only our ignorance of environmental contingencies.

MODERATION

A pivotal--and universal--environmental contingency is recognizing the dangers of excess. The atomist recognizes that man must act in accordance with the physical laws of nature and cannot hope to transcend them. A major physical law dictates that "well-being" has a physical--not transcendental--ontological status, and achievement of that status demands moderation. Thus physical excess must be avoided as must excessive indulgence in social activities.

In contrast, Athenian men indulged in the pursuit of excellence through both physical (i.e. sports) and ideological (i.e. the search for "glory" and "valour") excesses. In fifth century Athens, this took a nationalistic reification through the maintenance of an empire.

ATOMISM REJECTED

To seek a compromise between two such opposing orientations--the atomic and the Athenian weltanschauungen--seems a futile task. It is therefore little wonder that the atomic doctrine fell on deaf ears in Athens. To adopt the atomic perspective would have resulted in cultural ramifications which would have necessitated a wholesale restructuring of the Athenian social milieu. That Athens required a more compatible philosophy--and accompanying social perspective--is understandable. That the Athenian world-view played such a major role in the development of western intellectual thought is history. That a combination of these two factors resulted in atomism remaining a perennial philosophical underdog was perhaps inevitable.

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